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
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4 1828.

AN

ESSAY

ON

THE MEANS OF DISCOVERING

THE

SENSES OF WORDS.



BY THE

REV. JOHN PHILIPS POTTER, M.A.

NEW ORLEANS, 1828.

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TO
NASSAU WILLIAM SENIOR, A.M.

OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, OXFORD,

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

IN requesting your permission to dedicate to you "An Essay on the Means of Discovering the Senses of Words," I am well aware that I solicit the attention of a most acute judge of verbal analysis, of one indeed who has applied with brilliant success the principles of the Aristotelic logic to the investigation of the most difficult of the moral sciences.

Though the object of verbal analysis in the hands of the philosopher is of far higher importance than that which the philologist contemplates, still, so far as they both investigate the force which custom has given to words, they have the same end in view, and must use the same means for its attainment. But here the philologist stops, whilst the philosopher proceeds farther to investigate the realities of mind and matter, and to compare the meaning of words with their prototypes in nature, which, however they may be

distorted by the erroneous opinions of men, they were still intended to represent. And it is the object of a philosophical definition to reconcile these expressions of human opinion with moral or physical truth, and so to become the interpreter of nature as nearly as is possible in the language of common life. It is to the successful application of this double analysis of words and things that we owe the most important results, in purifying the terms of political science from the errors they have served to perpetuate, and in restoring them to society as organs for the diffusion of right principles and beneficial conduct. I know no object more worthy to employ the most powerful intellect and the most expanded benevolence.

The philologist, on the other hand, has no higher aim than to ascertain the meaning which custom has given to words, without pretending to alter this in conformity to a more philosophical view of that which they were intended to express. Yet philology, if it ascends not immediately to moral and physical truth, is a most faithful record of the opinions of men, ascertaining these at the remotest periods, when history is silent, and tracing their gradations through all the changes of language. But it is as a school of acute and

patient investigation, well suited to strengthen that intellectual sight, which discerns objects impalpable to the senses, though far more powerful towards happiness or misery than all sensible objects; it is as a school of metaphysics and morals, teaching us to estimate the shades of thought and feeling, that philology has her highest boast. It is only through the delicate organizations of a highly cultivated language that these can be expressed, or even felt. For language, to the generality at least, is in this respect an inventor, and as the imagination cannot conceive sounds which the ear has not heard, so the many can not conceive ideas which language has not expressed. But I forbear from still farther exceeding the limits of a dedication.

With an earnest hope that nothing may prevent you from prosecuting a far more valuable analysis, and continuing to educe truths of the greatest practical importance to the happiness of mankind,

I am,
My dear SENIOR,
Ever yours faithfully,
J. P. POTTER.

PREFACE.

THE title of the following Essay on the means of *discovering* the senses of words is intended to intimate to the reader, that there are more verbal terræ incognitæ than the charts of the Dictionary makers would lead him to conclude. Words and phrases, like the islands and continents of the ancient hydrographers, have often been laid down by very careless observers, and their position and boundaries will in these cases not unfrequently be found erroneous. Indeed the very landmarks of the Latin language, the explanatory particles, which have been set up as objects to guide the philologist in his course, have often had their position so incorrectly represented, that they may rather be compared to buoys intentionally misplaced for the purpose of misguiding an enemy, or, at least, to sand-

banks, which the careless surveyor of a coast has set down as quicksands, and by so doing has created to the navigator uncertainty of being right, if not danger of being wrong in his course.

Indeed, considerable danger occurs at that period of scholarship, when a facility in observing rules, which relate to inflection and government, has been united to an extensive acquaintance with the meanings of words, so far as these are explained by Dictionaries or ordinary notes. The student, easily making out the general drift of an author, rests satisfied with having acquired a power of construing with fluency, often even with much force and elegance, and never suspects that it is possible he can be construing inaccurately. To any hint he may receive to this effect, he is able to answer, that the meaning found fault with is *the most appropriate he can select* from Ainsworth, Nizolius, or Facciolati; perhaps, is the explanation given by them of the very passage in question.—Or, if he have ascended one step higher, if his acuteness has detected

the errors of lexicographers, and his diligence has endeavoured to supply their defects, he will be forced to acknowledge, that in this attempt he has been guided rather by a general sagacity, than by any system of rules; and consequently, that he feels little confidence in the accuracy of the meanings he has substituted for the more manifestly erroneous explanations of the Dictionaries. “ Whenever I am at a loss to understand the meaning of a Latin word, I read over all the explanations in the Dictionary, and make out something by putting them together.” This plan of philological investigation I have heard mentioned as the dernier resort, and perhaps, if we are determined to trust to the reports of the lexicographers, and will not examine the original documents for ourselves, this mode of *taking the average* may be the safest. It resembles the conduct of a person, who is satisfied with the general accuracy of his tradesman’s bills, on the ground that when the mistakes made against the customers’ interest are subtracted from the mistakes

made against the interest of the tradesman himself, the sum total may be tolerably accurate.

But I will suppose the student to be dissatisfied even with this plan of taking the average, and in a word to have ascended a higher stage of scholarship, and in defiance of his prejudice against modern Latin and his ignorance of German, to have made himself master of *the second chapter in the first part of Scheller's valuable Præcepta*, together with the useful remarks on the same subject in the introduction to Dr. Crombie's Gymnasium. Yet still he will be obliged to acknowledge, that though his mind has been "harped aright," though he has caught the key-note of a very different scholarship from what he had before rested satisfied with, he does not yet feel himself possessed of a perfect clue, by which he can pass with sufficient certainty through the labyrinth of a Dictionary article to the meaning he wishes to discover; still less, that he can evoke the Fairy Order herself, to touch with her magic wand these ra-

velled heaps, and transform their intricate confusion into a simple and easy arrangement ^a.

The German scholar will perhaps answer, that this has already been accomplished by the author of the *Præcepta*, and that when we are in possession of a translation of his *Latin Dictionary*, we shall find all the errors corrected, and all the deficiencies supplied, by which the student is at present impeded. Not having any

^a I allude, learned reader, to a pleasing fable, *haud alienum a Scævolæ studiis*. The heroine is represented as a careless and impatient person, to whom a good lady gives a ravelled skein of different coloured silks to be arranged. The reader, if he have ever attempted an exploit so little within the influence of Mars or Hercules, will acknowledge, that the author bringing down the Fairy Order in a machine is fully vindicated by the "*dignus vindice nodus*." Nor would he find such assistance at all superfluous, were he to attempt a series of definitions of the particles of the Latin language with no other aid than may be derived from Scheller, Tursellinus, Facciolati, and Nizolius. To trace the series *juncturaque*, expressed by a single definition, is often the work of many days of hard thinking. It is however when obtained a "word of power," an open sesame to many a closed passage.

knowledge of the German language, I cannot form an *ex facto* opinion on the probability of such hopes being realized. On the one hand, Scheller has proved to the Latin reader, by his *Præcepta*, that he had the power *ex fumo dare lucem*; but, if we may be allowed an inference from the defects of all former lexicographers, even of the laborious Stephens himself, and that in a language much more easy to explain with accuracy, we shall not expect that the *power* of tracing the meanings of words for ourselves will be dispensed with by the endeavours of any single lexicographer. Indeed the decision of this question does not rest on probabilities. Either the author of the following Essay has been misled by a futile desire of more definite meanings, or Scheller is defective, if not erroneous, in many of his definitions of what he calls the *modi connectendi*, and of other of the Latin particles.

Even were the student furnished with the most copious and accurate Dictionary, it would surely be more scholarlike,

and, which is of infinitely greater importance, more conducive to habits of *diligence*, *acuteness*, and *accuracy* in study, that he should be able to discover the meanings of words for himself, than that he should be taught to rely on the ipse dixit of a lexicographer, synonymist, or commentator.

The following Essay, being at once an analysis of the second chapter of Scheller's *Præcepta Styli Bene Latini*, and an attempt to supply some deficiencies in that excellent compendium, aims at cultivating this power in the reader. Should it induce any one to refer to the original, (to which references are made for whatever has been borrowed from it,) and betray him into a careful perusal of that work, a service of no inconsiderable value will have been rendered him, at the expence of only a small portion of his time. And let me hope, if the less advanced student is convinced of the existence of the impediments I have noticed in the path of scholarship, he will give a few hours of diligent attention to the method

of surmounting them here offered him. He will afterwards decide whether he will encounter the labour of applying this method to some portion of his daily studies.

Whatever be his decision, let him not lay the flattering unction to his love of ease, that such studies are undeserving his attention. Studies which cultivate acuteness, strength, precision, and arrangement in the mind ; studies which open the stores of ancient literature, and render the poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of antiquity familiar to our memories ; studies which give us the full use of language as an organ of expression and thought, offer the very fittest initiatory discipline for the mind.

It may indeed suit the views of certain captious objectors, to estimate the value of classical education by the knowledge, or rather the ignorance, of those who have not passed the portal of learning, who are struggling with grammatical and verbal difficulties, when they ought to be taking a wide range of the literature of Greece and Rome, and illustrating it from the

works of modern writers. To use the language of logicians, it may suit them to represent that evil a proprium, which in truth is merely an accident of classical education, nay, an accident, which, unless I am much mistaken, is not only separable, but easily separable, from the system which it disgraces. I have attempted, at the commencement of the following Essay, to point out the origin of the evil, together with its remedy, I trust, in such a manner as may avoid giving offence to the able and conscientious conductors of early education.

The importance, especially at this time, when the lower orders are making so rapid an intellectual progress, of giving every possible impulse to the education of the higher orders, and of removing every impediment in the way of their acquiring *that* knowledge which is power, can hardly be overestimated. It is essential, not to the well-being only, but to the very existence of society, that those who are superior in situation should be superior also in moral power. Knowledge and virtue are its elements, or, to come nearer to

the definition of the great philosopher, an union of well-directed intellectual and moral energies constitutes the only power which can safely be relied on. These therefore are the objects of education. That grammar and language afford an excellent initiatory discipline for the exercise of the former, I feel as fully persuaded, as that they are merely initiatory, the porch, if I may so express myself, through which our Patrician youth should proceed to a knowledge of history, logic, rhetoric, morals, and politics, and that any impediment which delays them so long at this portal as to cause their failing to attain these ulterior objects, is at all times, but more especially at this time, to be deprecated.

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PREFACE.

SECTION I.

IF we desire to speak, to write, or even to read a language with ease and precision, our first object should be the acquisition of a *copia verborum*, accurately understood, and readily remembered ; that we may, on the one hand, be able to express with facility and clearness the objects around us, and the feelings and thoughts within, and, on the other, have a ready and clear understanding of the expressions of others.

And that it may be in our power to devote sufficient time and attention to this object, we must be careful, that in our grammatical studies the precept of Quintilian be carefully observed. *Quam* (we take the liberty to refer the relative to Grammar) *ut per omnes numeros penitus cognoscere ad summam scientiæ necessarium est, ita incipientibus brevius ac simplicius tradi magis convenit.* Aut enim difficultate institutionis tam numerosæ atque perplexæ *deterri solent* : aut eo tempore, quo præcipue alenda ingenia atque indulgentia quadam enutrienda sunt, *asperiorum tractatu rerum atteruntur* : aut, si hæc sola didicerint, *satis se instructos arbitrantur.*

Whatever be the cause, it is a fact to be much regretted, that the early acquisition of a copia of words, accurately understood, and readily remembered, is much neglected, whilst we spend too much of our early study upon the *res obscuras atque difficiles easdemque non necessarias*.

Should any of my readers feel inclined to doubt or deny this fact, he may at once bring the matter to the *argumentum ad hominem*, by attempting to render a few English words *rapidly* and *accurately* into Latin, mentioning their various synonyms, and so defining each, as to express the shades of difference between them. Few comparatively could take this test, and yet nothing short of this is requisite to the writing a language with ease and perspicuity.

This deficiency of readiness and accuracy in remembering a copia verborum is the more to be regretted, because, if we attended to *writing*, if not to speaking, the Latin language with fluency and correctness, we should be enabled to read it with increased pleasure. Every one must be aware, that it is possible to *make out* the meaning of a passage, so as to attain its general sense, without feeling the delicacies either of its expressions, its syntactical government, or the arrangement of its words; yet nothing short of a perception of all these is requisite to reading a language with a scholarlike precision. Now it

would be impossible to write, I do not mean to copy, this same sentence, without understanding the rationale of every part of it. Writing a language is therefore the best test of understanding it.

Quære, might not this more accurate scholarship be acquired by a different system of instruction; I mean, by returning to the system which produced the great scholars of past times, i. e. by requiring our pupils to fix daily in their memory a number of Latin words, proportioned to their power of retaining what they have learned, and by exercising them in forming these words into sentences, according to the rules they have been taught respecting the inflection of endings, the government of words, and their arrangement in a sentence?

If we returned to this practice of early teaching a *copia verborum*, it appears probable, that the acquisition of the Latin language would not only be more rapid, and more accurate, but, which is of some consequence, if intellectual habits are of even more importance than the knowledge acquired, with more pleasure also. I might say, with some pleasure, instead of much pain. It is well known, that the acquiring new words, and practising the use of them, is pleasurable to children. Now if we estimate the primitives of the Latin language to be in number about four thousand, and suppose a boy to learn ten words every

day, repeating *iterum iterumque* those he has already learned, till his scholarship is built up, like that celebrated house of which we have all heard of in our childhood, I feel little doubt, that a boy would thus familiarize himself with the roots of the Latin language in two years, allowing for various interruptions, and might commence this discipline at a much earlier age than he could venture on the mysteries of the *as in præsentī* or *propria quæ maribus*. Now supposing him to have the primitives of the language familiar to his memory as household words, he would, with comparatively little difficulty, acquire, in the order of their dependence, all the more important derivatives. And if at this time synonymous terms were offered in *juxta* position to his memory, he would be led to observe their shades and gradations of meaning. I think a boy might thus become as familiar with the *use* of Latin words in the space of four or five years, as he may become with the art of speaking or writing a modern language, if well taught, in half that time. And there cannot be a doubt, that, whilst it would enable him to read Latin authors with more pleasure, and consequently with more attention to the matter, it would give him that power of composing in Latin, which *cannot* be obtained from reading only. For though it be true, that a person who can translate from English

into Latin, can with equal ease translate from Latin into English, it does not follow, that a person who can translate from Latin into English, can therefore translate from English into Latin. This fact indicates the advantage of a plan which would at least save much time, and which I therefore earnestly recommend to the attention of my readers, whether they have to educate others, or have yet to educate themselves. Those who do not yet possess a copia of Latin words, if they be required to write Latin, have in this respect to educate themselves. For they can write neither with facility nor clearness, till this copia be obtained.

Nor let them listen for a moment to the decryers of what is captiously denominated a knowledge of words. The objects of education, exclusive of religious and moral discipline, seem capable of a threefold division. Of these, there can be no doubt that one portion of time ought, as it generally is, to be devoted to the sciences of number and magnitude. Another portion is well bestowed on the study of the Greek and Latin languages and literature. It is yet a desideratum, that a certain portion of time in each day should be given to the acquisition of that information which consists in a knowledge of facts. If the elements of natural history and philosophy, of history, and its attendants, geography and chronology, were taught by a judicious use of such works as

adopt a mode of instruction suited to the age of the pupil and the subject to be learned^a, there can be no doubt that *habits* of acquiring information, by observation especially, and by reading, and a *taste* for intellectual pleasures would gradually be formed ; both which would be conducive to the innocence, usefulness, and happiness of after life.

Fully allowing that these objects have not yet obtained the attention they deserve, it cannot be conceded to their injudicious advocates, that they ought to supersede what it pleases them to denominate a knowledge of words, but which might more justly be defined an acquaintance with grammar, logic, and rhetoric, as obtained by the study of the languages of Greece and Rome, and implying considerable acquaintance with the literature of those nations.

Though the utility of words, as instruments of expression, is too evident to need the least illustration, their use, as organs of thought, is not so obvious. Yet it is certain that very few persons possess a power of mind adequate to the conception of an idea independent of the aid of words, or strength of memory sufficient for keeping permanent possession of a thought, which they have not the means of registering by an

^a See more especially the mode of teaching natural philosophy recommended by Mr. Mitchell ; Mrs. Markham's Dialogues on English History ; Dr. Hill's Essays on Greece, &c.

appropriate sign. Indeed the difficulty with which an original thinker excogitates a complex idea responding to some physical or moral combination really existing in nature, if, before his time, it had no sign to represent it; the probability, that this idea, obtained so painfully, will fade from his memory; and the impossibility of his communicating it to others, until he has either invented or borrowed a word to express it; contrasted with the ease with which, when it has once obtained a local habitation and a name in language, the idea will be received, hoarded, and issued as current intellectual coin, by men even of inferior powers of mind, is a phenomenon most likely to be overlooked by the very persons whom it most benefits. They forget the long process of *analyzing* subjects which before appeared indivisible, and *synthesizing* others which had remained penitus toto orbe divisa, both which processes must precede the invention of those terms which enable us with such facility to express abstractions and associations of thought—indeed by means of which, the conclusions of a long train of reasoning, and the results of a wide induction of facts, become merely the *πρὸς ὅτι* of the subsequent enquirer. Nor is it only in words representing complex ideas that the value of these instruments of thought and expression is evident. A very little consideration will

prove to us the utility of words as representatives even of the simplest ideas. Werner, the celebrated mineralogist, constructed a table of seventy-nine shades of colour, and attached a name to each. By using these names of colours singly or in combination, as the colours themselves are seen simple or blended in the objects of nature and art, he proposed to supply the naturalist and artist with a means of expressing with accuracy, and consequently of remembering, every variety of colour; the importance of which power to the mineralogist, botanist, painter, &c. &c. it is unnecessary to enlarge upon. Now words are but the colours with which the poet, orator, or philosopher, may be said to copy the realities of mind and matter. The illustration might easily be carried farther.

“ The wisest people of antiquity were indeed
 “ fully aware of the importance of philology, and
 “ indicated by their use of the word *Λογος*, to signify the faculty of reason, a process of reasoning, and a sound expressing each step in that
 “ process, that they esteemed words not so unimportant as many of our realists would lead us
 “ to consider them; indeed, that they conceived
 “ themselves to ascend from the first lisping of
 “ childhood through a process of reasoning founded
 “ on language to the full development of the
 “ power of thought. They were weak enough to
 “ believe that to acquire well-defined signs of

“ ideas was to obtain definite ideas, and to obtain
 “ definite ideas was to obtain the fittest instru-
 “ ments of reasoning. They were not ignorant
 “ that these must be employed on the realities
 “ of things, or that their products will be visionary
 “ and unreal. For, let us remember, it was not
 “ the age of a genuine philology, which was whirled
 “ in ideal vortices, laboured for imaginary wealth,
 “ and had its peace of mind disturbed by airy
 “ daggers.

“ *Somnia, quæ vitæ rationes vertere possunt*

“ *Fortunasque tuas omneis turbare timore.*

“ Even these abuses of words make the use of
 “ philology, in the true sense of that most abused
 “ term, more evident. For the cure must often
 “ be derived, not immediately from the realities of
 “ life, but from a keen and laborious examination
 “ of these winged nothings. The self-deceived
 “ enchanter cannot be led forth at once into the
 “ light of day, but some time and trouble must
 “ be expended in shewing him that his magic
 “ circle is but a chalked line, his fumigation but
 “ smoke, and his spectres only its varying shadow
 “ passing over the nearest wall.

“ If the question of the importance of a genuine
 “ philology, and it is not of that possessed by the
 “ *auceps syllabarum* that we are speaking, be de-
 “ cided by the evidence of facts, it would be easy

“to shew, not only that the most imaginative
 “poets, but also that the most acute and com-
 “prehensive-minded philosophers, must have la-
 “boured sooner or later with diligence and
 “acuteness in this study. The process of nature
 “points out that it should be done early, and it
 “was left to modern philosophy to discover that
 “the end must precede the means. There is,
 “indeed, a spurious kind of philology which
 “employs itself about trifling questions, and pro-
 “duces bombast and frigidity of style, and loose
 “and confused reasoning. Even as a means of
 “guarding against this abuse true philology would
 “deserve to be cultivated^b.”

But these decryers of the knowledge of words
 have a more especial objection to the vocabularies
 of Greece and Rome, and would rather permit an
 acquaintance with modern languages, than with
 the poets, orators, historians, and philosophers, of
 the two great nations of antiquity.

“I will not enlarge upon a topic of very inferior
 “importance to that of the *expediency* of what is
 “called a classical education, but surely there must
 “be little liberal curiosity in that mind, which,
 “having the means of making itself familiarly ac-
 “quainted with the opinions, feelings, and circum-

^b See a Letter to John Hughes, Esq. M. A. on the Systems
 of Education proposed by the Popular Parties, p. 29.

“ stances, in a word, with the literature, of two
 “ great people long descended into the grave of
 “ nations, undervalues this wondrous privilege.
 “ Nor can we form a higher opinion of his judg-
 “ ment or taste, who denies the essential import-
 “ ance of the lessons they have left us to the
 “ feelings and interests of human life in all ages,
 “ or asserts that these are not conveyed in a style
 “ of such delicacy and force, as to afford a model
 “ in almost every kind of composition.

“ The danger to be dreaded, is not that we de-
 “ vote ourselves too ardently to classical studies,
 “ but that we stop short in the portal of learning,
 “ and rest satisfied with a school-boy scholar-
 “ ship. Though it is no easy task (the difficulty,
 “ however, is favourable to the cultivation of
 “ acuteness and diligence) to disinter their
 “ thoughts and feelings from the solid flood of
 “ ignorance, which the destruction of so many
 “ valuable sources of information has poured upon
 “ their works, farther increased by the heavy
 “ matter accumulated through ages of dictionary
 “ makers and commentators, yet the labour of the
 “ diligent student will at length effect its object.
 “ He will again walk in their deserted streets, and
 “ almost imagine that he hears the busy hum of
 “ life around him ; he will be a spectator at their
 “ gymnasia and their theatres, at their forum and
 “ their temples ; will listen to their orators, sena-

“tors, and philosophers; will even be present at
 “their familiar and domestic meetings, and pierce
 “into the penetralia of their solitary hours.

“Per terram antiqua Ditis caligine mersam
 “Tendere et umbrarum sedes penetrare sepultas
 “Fert animus. Quisnam mihi dux Cyleneus altum
 “Pandat iter?

“If we would find such a guide, we must seek
 “the Hermes of the ancients in a genuine phi-
 “lology, and propitiate him with the sacrifice of
 “a hecatomb of idle prejudices against the study
 “of words.”

* See a Letter to John Hughes, Esq. M.A. on the Systems of Education proposed by the Popular Parties. (Published by Hatchard, and reprinted in the Pamphleteer.) In which I have endeavoured, first, to expose the *weakness* and *insolence* of the arguments by which that party, whose motto is ever *novum per totum*, attempts to establish the necessity, not of improving parts, but of changing the whole, of education; and secondly, to rouse the apathy, as it then appeared, of the public to a sense of their *danger* in allowing another party to have it in their power to oppose education to the institutions of the country.

SECTION II.

OUR copia verborum must be derived from the works of writers who are known to have been careful in their choice of words. In the Latin language, Cicero and Cæsar are, by universal consent, facile principes as writers of prose ; and, as it will be long ere we have possessed ourselves of the store of words, phrases, and constructions, which their works alone will supply, it is a question rather curious than useful, what relative authority, in sanctioning forms of expression, must be ascribed to other writers of Latin prose. When the time for discussing this arrives, we must not be guided so much by a reference to ages of gold; silver, brass, or iron, as by internal and external evidence of a writer having possessed good taste in the selection and use of words ; of which the best proof will be found, not in the dates of his several works, but in the traces his style exhibits, that a diligent study of the two great masters of Latin prose has preserved him from a careless admission of vulgarisms on the one hand*, and from a studied affectation of rhetorical ornaments on the other. Such writers,

* See Scheller Præcepta, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 16.

whatever be the age in which they may have lived, will have endeavoured to retain the improvements, whilst they were rejecting the innovations of time. To give rules for estimating their relative merits would far exceed my power, and would indeed be useless to those who will not reject this Introduction, as too elementary for their scholarship.

On this head, Scheller cautions his readers, lest in their respect for the authority of great writers, they impute to them the errors of their *copyists* and *editors*, or regard, as sanctioned by their authority, words and modes of construction, which they have *quoted* from inferior writers, or have used *in imitation* of a vulgar or affected style^d.

Nor must we forget, that many words and phrases, which have the greatest propriety in one style of composition, are inadmissible in another^e. Thus a *vulgarism*, which would be in character in a work of broad humour, can not be admitted into any composition, which ought to be written in the pure and correct style of good society. *Colloquial idioms*, which are graceful and spirited in the higher comedy, will appear familiar and

^d See Scheller Præcepta, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 1. 16.

^e See Scheller Precepta, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 1. and Dr. Crombie, vol. i. Introduction, where the reader will find some excellent remarks.

flippant in philosophical discussions, and in the more elevated kinds of poetry. Much of the *language of poetry* is more imaginative and unpractical, than is consistent with the main objects of oratory, history, and philosophy ; in which it is of primary importance, that the speaker or writer appear, on the one hand, not to be hurried away by his own imagination, and, on the other, not to be appealing to the imagination of his hearers or readers. Cicero as an orator, a philosopher, and a writer of letters ; Virgil, Horace, Lucretius, and Terence ; Cæsar and Livy, have indeed much of language in common, but each has also much that belongs to his peculiar style of composition. It may be necessary to add, that in classing words as vulgar, colloquial, prosaic, or poetic, we must be on our guard against arguing from the custom of our own language to that of Greece and Rome, or we shall fall into great errors. Nothing indeed can be more mistaken than to draw an inference from the custom

Quem penes arbitrii est et jus et norma loquendi

of one language to that of another.

Perhaps our *first* endeavour should be to cultivate a *simple narrative* and a *clear argumentative* style. Of the former we have an admirable example in the commentaries of Cæsar,

whose turn of mind led him to unite simplicity, purity, and force, in his language. When Cicero speaks of Cæsar's common style of conversation as more effective than the oratory of other men, he pays it the very highest compliment. Its simplicity was as much the effect of conscious strength as it was of purity of taste. There is indeed in the Latin language no specimen of a philosophical style at all equal in degree of excellence to the style of Cæsar, as a narrative of events. The Offices of Cicero avowedly aim at this simplicity, but Cicero was too rhetorical a writer to succeed eminently in a pure philosophical style. Perhaps indeed the Latin language is even more inferior to the Greek in words expressing the simpler than in those expressing more complicated ideas, and therefore forces a writer, who would not be tame and meagre, to write rhetorically. Perhaps too the taste of the Romans like that of the French, and unlike that of the Greeks and English, affected a rhetorical display, where the subject demanded simplicity. As a philosophical style, that of Cicero is far inferior to the writings of Plato, and not to be mentioned with those of Aristotle, yet it is acknowledged to be the best philosophical style in the Latin language, and as such must be our model.

It will be easy, when we are accustomed to the styles of Cæsar and Cicero, to discern what-

ever is peculiar to poetic, colloquial, or humorous composition, but very difficult, if our taste and acquaintance with the language have been formed upon the latter styles, to acquire the simplicity which narrative and argumentative compositions require. If, for example, a foreigner were to form an English style on the writings of Hume and Adam Smith, he would be more secure from falling into bombast, flippancy, and vulgarity, than if he were to commence his acquaintance with our language by studying and imitating Milton, Sheridan, or Foote. Indeed he would obtain from the former a far better idea than from the latter, of the staple of the English language, as it is spoken and written in good society. The necessity of learning a few every day phrases of courtesy, &c. will not amount to an exception from this rule, i. e. that the *narratio brevis et lucida*, and the *æquabile et temperatum disputandi genus*, are the models on which we ought to form our first attempts at acquiring a good style. From the opposite practice of commencing the study of a language by reading its poets, more especially if the student have not previously acquired considerable acuteness and diligence in examining the force of words, it will follow—first, that he will fail of attaining a correct and delicate feeling of the “exquisitely

sought" words of poetry^c; and secondly, that

* And without a keen perception of these, what is poetry? Strip each word of the innumerable associations which crowd into the mind of the scholar, as he remembers instantaneously its derivation, its first sense, its different metaphorical applications, its connection with sciences, arts, and manners—feels also the peculiar fitness of its application in the instance before him compared with other words of nearly similar meaning—and what is left but a *mortuum caput* of dactyls and spondees, at most of expressions, which have neither the elevation of poetry, nor the reality of prose. Contrast the pleasure of reading Homer after familiarizing ourselves with the language of Xenophon, Herodotus, and Thucydides, with the painful process of making out his allusions when used as an early class book! If it be objected that Rome was not built in a day, it may be sufficient to answer that neither was it built by commencing with the capitals of its pillars and working downwards. The first step in a language ought to be the obtaining a familiar acquaintance with such writers as Cæsar and Cicero, and acquiring from them a copia of the most frequently used words of the language rendered familiar to us "as household names" by our being required to use them *so frequently* both *viva voce* and in writing, that use may produce readiness of memory, and *so precisely*, that we may distinguish them from all their synonyms. We must indeed labour to get rid, if we have acquired it, of that indefinite understanding of words which confounds them with their synonyms, or it will be impossible that our *writing* or *construing* can be correct.—There is indeed another disadvantage in beginning with poetry, namely, the infrequent recurrence of the same word, and the consequent probability of its passing from the memory. We are in danger of losing in a few

having debased these gems of the language, he will not scruple to use them as current coin for the most ordinary demands of prose; and lastly, having no test by which to distinguish the words and forms of expression which are in common to poetry and prose, he will be liable to be deceived by derivations indicative of a metaphorical application, by idioms which appear poetical to an English mind, &c. &c. to rank words of the most common occurrence among the choicest flowers of Parnassus. The consequence of these errors will be a most wretched style of composition; *si cantas*, *male cantas*, *si legis cantas*; his poetry will be prosaic, and his prose poetical. Tame poetry and bombastic prose! Indeed, when we hear or read a composition to which Logic has neither given a backbone nor ribs, and Rhetoric has supplied neither muscles nor flesh, but which over a rickety frame-work of argument has stretched a loose and gaudy covering of words, whilst we are reminded of the unhappy student who manufactured a

days, what we acquire with difficulty; and this must ever be the case unless the *iterum iterumque* of repetition fixes what we would remember. What is wanted at first is words in *their primary meanings, recurring frequently, and relating to common subjects*. To familiarize our minds with the language of poetry before they are used to the language of prose is

Like giving them ruffles, when wanting a shirt.

human monster to no other end than to plague and disgrace himself, we have no hesitation in referring the phenomenon to that want of good sense as well as of good taste, that exaggerated mode of thinking and feeling, which is generated by an attempt to form our first style of thought and expression on a poetic model. Again I repeat, that our *copia verborum* must be drawn from the writings of Cæsar and Cicero, if we would form a correct narrative and argumentative style, if we would avoid vulgarity, flippancy, and bombast, in Latin prose, and not transfer these faults to our English compositions. For let us be assured, that a false taste in our own language will be consequent on a false taste in that of Rome.

SECTION III.

IT is evident that a *copia verborum*, though selected from the best writers, will not enable us to express ourselves with perspicuity, elegance, or force, unless we obtain *a clear understanding of each word*, and *apply it correctly*. We must therefore ascertain with precision the senses in which words have been used by these writers^f: and in doing this must endeavour not only to find out the precise *idea*, which a word conveyed to their minds, but also to discover what *objects* (whether of the senses, the feelings, or the thoughts) would have excited in their minds that idea. For example in the Latin language, we must guard not only against an *unroman* conception of the meaning of Latin words, but also against an *unroman* application of the words themselves, even when we are correct in their meanings. But the rationale of this Rule may require to be a little more developed.

It is evident that we may attach to a word a *less forcible* meaning than it conveyed to the minds of the best writers, and consequently employ it where its true meaning will be too strong for the occasion, or decline using it as too

^f See Scheller Præcepta, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 7.

strong in a situation where it is precisely the word we ought to employ. On the other hand, we may ascribe to a word a *more forcible* meaning than it bears in the works of good writers, and so use it in situations for which its true signification is not sufficiently strong, or reject it in others as too forcible for which it is exactly fitted. Lastly, we may unite these errors by conceiving a word to have *less force* in one respect than it really has, and *more force* than it really has in another, and then our use or rejection of it will involve two mistakes instead of one.

But supposing we have attained to the exact *meaning* of a word, still we may err in its *application*, by overlooking the fact, that objects of perception, thought, and feeling, which excite this very idea in ourselves, may not have excited the same idea in a people differing greatly from us in many circumstances, opinions, and habits of life, and still more in the arbitrary rules of language by which the operations of the mind are so much influenced. Very considerable acuteness and diligence will indeed be needed to guard us against these two great errors, first, of ascribing to words a sense more or less extensive than they bear in good writers; secondly, of applying words to objects to which good writers would not have applied them.

Now we are, for example, in great danger of

neglecting these rules, when we translate from Latin into English, or from English into Latin, words, one of which has been *derived* from the other without the derivative bearing exactly the same meaning as the primitive. Indeed the more nearly two words approach to being synonymous, so long as they are not so precisely, the more likely shall we be to fall into these errors. English verbs derived from Latin compounds, as *offendo*, *prævenio*, *contendo*, &c.; English nouns derived from nouns of the third declension ending in *tas* and *tio*, as *familiaritas*, *severitas*, *gravitas*, *contentio*, *gratificatio*, &c., are dangerous to translate from either language into the other. How much diligence and acuteness must be used to avoid these errors, may be seen even in a single sentence of Cicero; for example, we are in great danger of forming wrong notions of the meanings of the words *abundare*, *præceptis*, *institutis*, *auctoritatem*, *scientia*, and *facultate*, which occur in the first sentence of the *Offices*; by supposing, on the one hand, that they mean neither more nor less than our English words of the same derivation, and, on other hand, that they apply to every thing to which we might apply the English terms, and that they do not apply to any thing to which we might not apply the English words. By referring to the definitions and examples which will be given of the words in the first sentence of

Cicero's Offices, the student will form some idea how much acuteness and diligence will be required to protect him from adopting imperfect and erroneous meanings. And if he will transfer his suspicions to the meanings of other words, and will put himself under the discipline of the first chapter of Aldrich's Logic, and of the rules and illustrations which have been appended to it, he may save himself from many misconceptions and mistakes in limine. The very fact of finding words in two languages alike in sound, should put us on our guard against supposing them to have the same meaning; and even when they have the same meaning, against supposing that they admit of the same applications and constructions⁵.

⁵ Surely Doctor Crombie's assertion, that "the greater part have been transferred in their primitive acceptations," is very unfounded and dangerous! In addition to the errors to which the student is liable in the first sentence of Cicero's Offices, add the following from the remainder of the section: *Rudes, proficias, judicium, arroganter, distincte, studio, consumpsi, assumo, vindicare, æquarunt, æquabile, temperatum, laboraret, quietum, disputandi, disputator, subtilis, vehemens, copiosissime, pronuntiare, splendide, delectatus, contempsit*. If only the above words, and their degrees of difference from the English, were before us, they would be sufficient to suggest the advantage of commencing our study of languages rather with the Greek than the Latin. These words in the latter are like hidden rocks, which the young navigator mis-

More especially should we be on our guard against mistaking the meanings and applications of words, each of which signifies a *combination of two or more ideas*; for the uniting of two ideas in one word is often a consequence of an association of thoughts depending on something peculiar to the religion, morality, policy, customs, circumstances, &c. &c. of one nation. Another nation, not having the same religion, &c. &c. will not have the same associations of thought, nor consequently words which express the same combinations of ideas. Now the more nearly these combinations of thought in two languages resemble one another, so long as that resemblance falls short of identity, the greater will be our danger of misunderstanding and misusing the words of each language.

But even names of things, which from the laws of physical and moral nature never vary, are often very imperfectly translatable by the most nearly synonymous terms of two languages. For words express not the things themselves, but our ideas of those things: and as very different views may be taken of the same thing, (according to the *property* to which we most attend,) very different associations of ideas, and there-

takes for deep water, and therefore sails securely where he is most in danger.

fore names, implying very different combinations of thought may be found in two languages, referring to the same thing. These words therefore, in the logician's phrase, will not be simply convertible, though the things they denominate are *universally* the same. Now if it be a work deserving the attention of the philosopher, to trace to its origin identity, similarity, discrepancy, and opposition of thoughts in different nations, whether as a matter of very curious speculation, respecting the thoughts and feelings of others, or for the eliciting of truth as to our own; for to free ourselves from the bonds of language is often a vast step from error; if this be also a very wholesome exercise of the faculties, tending to increase their acuteness and strength; lastly, if something more precise than a vague understanding and a loose applying of words be worth cultivating as an organ of thought and expression, (for if our instruments are imperfect, so will our work be also,) we shall not be losing our time in enquiring into the meanings of words, as used by good writers.

SECTION IV.

THE surest means of attaining a full and precise knowledge of the force of a word, is, to examine it in *numerous examples* from the best writers, with a close attention to the context^a. The *number* of quotations it may be necessary to bring together will vary considerably, according to the difficulty of discovering the primary sense, and of settling the force and connection of the secondary meanings. Sometimes it may be even necessary to examine with accuracy each of the examples contained in Facciolati and Nizolius, before we can feel certain of having elicited the exact meaning. But more frequently the significations of the word will be fixed with much less trouble, especially when we have acquired the *ορμα εξ εμπειρίας*. It is not however on the multitude of the quotations examined that we must rely, so much as on our *diligence* and *acuteness* in finding out the exact force of each. These qualities, in the very highest degree in which they can be possessed, are so indispensable to successful philology, and the evidence submitted to their investigation is so strictly the evidence of probabilities, and that in every

^a See Scheller Precepta, vol. i. cap. 2. sect. 8.

gradation, from the weakest suspicion to the strongest moral certainty ; and there is such fair employment for faculties of every kind, from the soberest judgment to the most vivid imagination, and of every range, from the darkest dulness to the most brilliant talent ; and the conclusions arrived at often bear so immediately on the business of life, always furnishing the mind with precise well-refined thoughts, which, like the rules of the logician, are of universal application wherever reason and language can be employed, that we consider grammar, in its widest sense, the very gymnasium of the mind, fitted to exercise every power that has a name in the catalogue of the metaphysician.

Our *first step*, and we must not shrink from it, should be *to collect instances of all the different meanings of the word we propose to examine*. In doing this it will save us much time and labour, to take the most striking examples of each of the different significations assigned by lexicographers to the word, (keeping them under distinct heads,) and examine each of these examples carefully as to the contexts which are united with the word whose meanings we wish to discover. Sometimes it may be necessary to refer to the originals for more of the context, than is contained in the examples adduced by Facciolati and Nizolius. For it is only by a diligent attention to contexts,

by comparing and recombining differences of construction, and variety of ideas connected¹ with

¹ To acquire that delicacy of intellectual tact which perceives almost imperceptible differences and shades of thought, we must cultivate acuteness and taste by studying the sciences of logic and rhetoric under an able teacher.—To prevent slight differences of construction from escaping us, we must familiarize ourselves with the works of the best grammarians. Perhaps it may not be amiss to construct such tables as the following from the works of Scheller and Matthiæ.

NOMINATIVE

Is the **FIRST THING** to be ascertained in a sentence.

NAMES the *agent* of the active verb, the *subject* of the neuter verb, the *object* of the passive verb. Ego statuo—ego sto—ego statuor.

Is **OMITTED** when easily understood from the context. Thus personal pronouns, (except for emphasis,) as being implied in the termination of each verb. Thus also substantives, when obvious from the context; especially homo and negotium.

Is **WANTING** to those impersonal verbs, (of which the passive has no object in the nominative, and whose actives have generally no object in the accusative, and whose perfect participle is generally neuter: as *parcitur—parciturum*.) Also wanting to future participles passive in the neuter when used with verb subst. as *eundum est*. Also wanting to impersonal verbs with an active termination; whose nominative is a word understood in the genitive which follows: thus *pœnitēt me laboris*. So *venit mihi in mentem illius diei*.

the word whose meanings we wish to discover, that we can elicit all its significations. To attempt an enumeration of these differences will not only be endless, but useless to the reader, who would be puzzled by a clue more perplexed than the labyrinth through which it is proposed to guide him. But differences which a priori cannot be defined, may yet be clearly felt, when a sort of tact has been derived from frequent attempts. All that can be done previous to such experience is “to harp the mind of the philologist aright” by exhorting him *to neglect no shade of difference in the context*, and by supplying him with *a few examples*, in which he will see this diligently attempted. It has been said, that we must keep the different meanings of a word under the distinct heads which lexicographers have assigned them. A careful examination will how-

NOMINATIVE

REQUIRES the verb to be in the same number and person as itself. A singular noun of multitude (as implying plurality) often takes a plural verb, as does also a singular noun joined to another noun by *cum*, as *dux cum principibus*. The prædicate, when immediately preceding the verb, often determines its number instead of the subject: *amantium iræ amoris integratio est*. So in apposition the attributive nominative sometimes fixes the number of the verb instead of the principal one. *Tungri, civitas Galliæ fontem habet, &c. &c. &c.* The verb itself is sometimes omitted when easily understood, as *cœpit, est, &c.*

ever generally enable us very considerably to diminish the number of different significations assigned by lexicographers to each word; more especially if we endeavour to *define each signification of a word with precision*, instead of resting satisfied with the common mode of expressing it by the most nearly synonymous words in our own language. Indeed this mistaken attempt to translate word for word and phrase for phrase from one language into another, which rests on different analogies, has caused that endless division and that inextricable confusion of significations, with which lexicographers too often perplex the understandings and burden the memories of those who rely on them for explanations; forcing upon those who consult them the necessity either of adopting the most *vague* meanings in order to free themselves from senses almost contradictory, or else of acquiescing in meanings in which *precision* is obtained at the expence of truth. In a word, every scholar who has consulted Latin dictionaries will bear witness to the assertion, that either he has rested unsatisfied with their vague generalities, or has embraced positive errors, or, lastly, has gone through some such process as I am now recommending. But of this more hereafter. By the aid of clear definitions of meanings, we shall reduce the different significations of a word to a more manageable number, and be able to proceed to our

Second step, namely, to compare all these different significations with one another, for the purpose of *discovering the one leading idea*¹ *which is common to them all*, and if possible of selecting examples in which this original idea appears pure and unmixed with any secondary meaning. In the course of this second step we shall observe how frequently lexicographers have failed to elicit this primary signification of a word, and have consequently left all its secondary senses in uncertainty and confusion; how frequently they place first, in their list of meanings, a sense from which the other significations could not possibly be derived, and which therefore becomes a centre of doubt and confusion, radiating darkness, if I may so express myself, on all the secondary meanings; which darkness is by them reflected on the supposed primary sense, and on one another. The discovery of the true primary signification of the word, by a careful consideration of what idea is common to the definitions of all the significations, is on the contrary the bursting of light from darkness, and the emanating of a principle of order from chaotic confusion.

Our *third step* will be, to *trace the connection of the secondary meaning with the primary, and with one another*, and to arrange the sequence of the different significations accordingly. Of this

¹ See Scheller Præcepta, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 9, 10.

also more hereafter. When our work is done, we shall have the pleasure of discerning a strong and clear analogy between the meanings of many a word, which the (miscalled) explanations and arrangement of the lexicographer have left in an inextricable labyrinth of doubt; and the result of our threefold labour will be, a *clearness and precision in understanding and applying the senses of words*, and *a facility in remembering them*, of which those who trust to the farrago of lexicons can have no idea. I speak thus of *all* the Latin dictionaries which are accessible to the English reader. Of the dictionary of Scheller, not having any knowledge of the German language, I can only indulge high hopes, founded on the well-known acuteness and diligence of the author of the *Præcepta*. But it is surprising how little has been done by the compilers of former Latin dictionaries, when we remember that a copious dictionary contains better materials for eliciting the precise meaning of each word, than can be comprised in the more limited note of a commentator. The lexicographer has before him *all* the data, and yet how frequently does he fail of drawing the conclusion which they warrant; whilst the annotator, by restricting his illustration to parallel passages, leaves the questions of the general meaning of the word unattempted, nay even obscured by the very precision with which he has fixed its

meaning in reference to a single application. It is almost superfluous to add, that this observation relates only to the common herd of commentators¹; men,

Who with no deep researches vex the brain;
 Who from the dark and doubtful love to run,
 And hold their glimmering tapers to the sun.

¹ In endeavouring to rouse the mind of my reader to attempt a more accurate scholarship than he can obtain from lexicographers and commentators, I fear lest I may appear guilty of exaggeration. I must rest my answer on a comparison of the explanations I shall presently offer of the words in the first sentence of Cicero's Offices, with the articles of Nizolius and Facciolati, and with the philological notes of the commentators on the Offices.—I take up a book which chances to be on the table where I am writing. It is the Variorum edition of Cicero's De Oratore, in usum studiosæ juventutis. I open the book at hazard. The first reference which catches my eye relates to the words "animo æquo;" and the comment supplied at the foot of the page is "libenter." I have no reason to consider this an unfair specimen of school-book annotation, and am sure, that if the studiosa juvenitùs trusts to such explanations, its general knowledge of the precise meaning of words will be on a *level* with its understanding of the real and metaphorical meaning of æquus, æquitas, æquor, &c.

SECTION V.

THOUGH the primary sense of a word is frequently to be traced only, and is always to be traced most satisfactorily by the process we have been describing, it is often discoverable at once from *derivation*^m. And even when the derivation of a word is not so evident as to warrant a decisive opinion as to its primary meaning, previously to an examination of the one idea common to all its significations, yet there may be so much evidence from similarity of sound, that when similarity of sense has also been established by comparing its various significations, all doubt of the correctness of the derivation must be removed, and additional light be thrown on the primary sense. In most cases this is the safest use of derivations.

But before we can avail ourselves with precision of the aid to be obtained from a derivation, we must make ourselves well acquainted with the *meaning of the original* from which the derivative word is drawn; another reason for studying the Greek before the Latin language. And it will

^m See Scheller *Præcepta*, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 10.

greatly facilitate our tracing of derivations, if we are careful to ascertain what *changes**, *additions*, and *omissions* of letters and syllables are customary in deriving words from the primitive to the derivative language. To this we should add the knowledge of the *meanings* of *terminations*°.

It will also assist us in fixing the primary meanings of words, to bear in mind that the *real* significations of words, that is, their significations as applied to designate objects of sense, (whatever we can see, feel, &c.) are more likely to be primary meanings^p than their *metaphysical* significations, that is, their significations as applied to express different modes of thought, feeling, &c. For actions of the mind, and objects cognizable by the mind alone, are generally spoken of in terms *borrowed* from actions of the body, and objects perceptible to the senses. A little consideration will shew the rationale of this fact,

* Ibid. p. 99. I am not aware whether there is any Treatise on the Latin Language answering to the delightful Treatise of Valckenaer on the Analogies of the Greek Language, a work which, with the Essay of Adam Smith, (published with his *Moral Sentiments*,) should be read and commented on iterum iterumque by the young philologist.

° See Scheller *Præcepta*, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 10. and more fully in his *Grammar*, vol. i. p. 259. where the reader will find an excellent summary of the meanings of terminations, with which he must make himself familiar.

^p See Scheller *Præcepta*, vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 10.

namely, that inconvenience from the want of names for the actions of the body and for the objects of sense would be felt by the framers of a language, long before they felt any need of expressions to designate the operations and objects purely of the intellect. Now as this latter need would not occur till a considerable advance was made in framing the language, it was likely to be then supplied by a metaphorical application of the verbal riches already existing in names for all corporeal substances, actions, and relations. This metaphorical application of words, which primarily designated corporeal things, to signify pure intellectual beings, operations, and analogies, would not only be recommended by that love of tracing and exhibiting resemblances, which is a first principle in the *μιμητικὸν ζῶον* man, but would be enforced by the facility of explaining the mysteries of the intellect by similitudes to the obvious actions and objects of sense, and would be rendered necessary by the difficulty, we may almost say impossibility, of inventing words purely intellectual, which, even if ever so clearly defined, would long remain utterly unintelligible to the vulgar, whose minds dwell among gross realities. These considerations and others a posteriore derived from the facility we experience in explaining the intellectual from the corporeal senses of words, and the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of the

reverse, establishes this most important rule beyond the possibility of doubt.

To the metaphysician the tracing of the intellectual parts of a language, if the expression be allowable, to its material parts, is an enquiry of the deepest interest, and leads to very important truths relating to the progress of metaphysical and moral knowledge. For opinions on these most important subjects have as often been the effects as the causes of the forms of language. How often have the opinions of a whole nation been influenced by what we have called intellectual metaphors, and men's belief and conduct affected by the strong associations of language! The spiritus and animus of the Latin, and the *logos* of the Greek, the virtus of the former, and the *agora* of the latter, when pursued to their derivations, will shew how language influences belief and practice. It may be compared to a mould, of which the commonest realities afford the mere material, and the wildest imagination often gives the form, but into which the thoughts not only of the poet and orator, but of the historian and philosopher, are forced to run. And if he be not careful to correct the mould itself, they will not unfrequently come forth in forms of imperfection and error, of which the effect on his belief, practice, and happiness, will attest the importance of language.

This leads me to another important assistance

in discovering the original senses of words. A knowledge of the literature of a people, as exhibiting its religion¹, morals, polity, circumstances, customs, and opinions, will throw great light on its language; and the higher into the history of antiquity we can carry our knowledge, the more likely shall we be to ascend to the sources of language, because we shall be more likely to trace the origin of the primary meanings of words. For on the one hand, as philology throws the light of strong conjecture on matters beyond the record of history; so on the other, the facts of history afford demonstrative evidence respecting the origin of language. Not only will the *primary* sense of many of the most important words of a language derive explanation from the history of facts, and supply additional evidence respecting these facts; but the *secondary* meanings of words, which supply all the favourite metaphors of the language, will lose half their force and beauty to those who have not learned from history the best comment on their primary meanings. To the historian, these *historical* words, if I may so express myself, will have a similar interest to that which the *intellectual* words have to the metaphysician, and will lead to conclusions very interesting to one who would ascend to the

¹ See Scheller Præcepta, vol. i. cap. 2. sect. 10. p. 95.



barbarous periods of social life, and trace in the first elements of language the origin of mighty institutions.. Thus, by combining philology and history, the philosopher contemplates the mighty *Senate* of Rome as originating in an assembly of the elders of a barbarous tribe ; her rule of *right* emanating from her early kings, her *religion* most revered as supplying that bond of an oath, by which, if treaties were struck and sanctioned, the vow of the soldier to conquer or die was also bound on his conscience, and chains were forged for a vanquished world'.

' Let the student combine the history of an ancient feast, as given in Homer and in the history of Joseph receiving his brethren, and he will see the origin of *pasco*, which without such a comment is not very easily referable to *pasco* tribuo.

SECTION VI.

AS we discover the primary meaning of a word, by eliciting the *ens unum in multis* (to borrow an expression from the logician) contained in all the secondary significations, so we *derive* much light on each of the secondary meanings *from* the primary. For this stands related to the secondary meanings as a genus to its several species; and as each species of the logician, though it has something peculiar to it, which constitutes its difference from each other species, yet have they all the *pars communis essentiæ*, according to which they are referable to the same genus, so though each secondary meaning of a word has something peculiar to itself, (which we may discover by the context,) yet are they all pervaded by one common idea, which they derive from the primary meaning.

The beauty of these *specific* applications of the generic and primary meaning, if we may be allowed the expression, is, not frequently, but generally, lost sight of in the Latin dictionaries. The lexicographer not only fails in eliciting the

primary or generic sense of a word, (and this when he has succeeded in tracing its derivation,) but even when successful in discovering the primary meaning, still, by a strange perversion in defining the secondary meanings, he seems to make it his object to select words, which shall mark in the strongest manner possible the *difference* between these secondary and the primary sense, and between each of them and every other. Instead of choosing expressions, which may preserve the *resemblance* between all these cions of a common stock, he perversely labours to destroy all evidence of origin from the same parent, and of fraternity, often even of consanguinity, among the offspring. The lexicographer's motto ought to be, "*similitudines comparat;*" how often is it, "*dissimilitudines facit?*" The consequence of this is very injurious to a language. First, the *rationale* of the secondary meanings of a word is sacrificed, and these meanings are made to appear unconnected with the primary idea, and therefore arbitrarily given to the word, to the great discredit of the philosophy of the language, which is falsely accused of having ideas unconnected with one another, or very slightly connected, signified by the same word. Secondly, the *associations* which each signification of a word conveyed to the mind of a Roman are lost, and the language is falsely charged with a deficiency of that richness in na-

tural and beautiful associations of ideas, which is essential to its being a fit instrument for oratory and poetry. Indeed the mind of the reader, under the guidance of the dictionary maker, acquires a most *unroman* conception of the meanings of Latin words. It views as altogether different, it might almost be said as opposed to one another, senses which the Roman expressed by the same word, because he considered them as varieties of the same idea. On the enunciation of the word, the *generic* idea presented itself to his mind, so far modified indeed by the context, as not to leave him in doubt about its specific application. But to the dictionary scholar's mind, it is the *specific* meaning of a word that first occurs, and the generic idea is at best a faint and subsequent recollection.

In the præceptum of the Latin he at once sees the precept of the English, and perhaps confines the meaning and application of the Latin word to the meaning and application of the English word, but he does not primarily, perhaps not even secondarily, understand or apply the word in the true sense of something received into the mind previous to the time and circumstance when we may be called upon to act.

Still greater error and confusion in the understanding and applying of words will arise, if from

the secondary meanings of words, others are derived, which may be called *tertiary meanings*. These cannot, without considerable awkwardness, be traced immediately to the primary, because they are derived, not from the primary alone, but from the compound idea, made up of the primary idea, and of that which is peculiar to the secondary. Indeed, when the tertiary is derived altogether from that part of the secondary in which it *differs* from the primary meaning, it will be impossible to trace it immediately to the primary, without resorting to the most forced explanation. When the secondary meaning chances to have grown obsolete, we are either forced to the use of some such awkward expedient, or to admit the primary and tertiary meanings to have had no connection; or, lastly, are tempted to supply a supposititious secondary meaning, as a series juncturaque to explain their connection.

The Latin word *signum* means, primarily, a statue: secondarily, a signet ring, on which some image was engraved, and which was used as a sign manual; and also a standard, on which an image was painted, and which was used as a military signal: thirdly, it signifies a sign or signification of something. Now this tertiary meaning, being derived from the specific difference of the secondary meaning from the primary,

could not be traced immediately to the primary ; indeed, but for the secondary sense, the connection between them would be utterly unintelligible.

SECTION VII.

TO attempt an explanation of the rules to be observed in the use of metaphors, would be to make our *τα παρεργα πλείονα τῶν ἐργῶν**. Thus much will be collected in the process of our philological enquiries. First, that *all the secondary* senses of a word must originally have been metaphorical applications of it, more or less forced from its primary meaning, dictated in the poverty of language by want of proper terms ; subsequently by that love of tracing analogies which more especially belongs to the poets of each language, (who are often the earliest writers, and therefore the first authorities ;) and, lastly, by a prurient love of ornament. We shall also observe, that secondary meanings of a word, which when *first* used were at once recognized as metaphorical, in process of time and from common use lost this

* What Scheller expresses by the *pulchrè cogitare*, must be sought from a diligent study of history, morals, poetry, oratory, &c. and a thorough acquaintance with the sciences of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. Of some part of the latter he has given a very insufficient summary in vol. i. part i. cap. 2. sect. 11—16.

character, and came to be considered almost as proper, and quite as ordinary uses of the word, as the primary. Now if it chanced that the taste of the age affected novelty in rhetorical ornament, fresh metaphors would have to be invented, which in their turn would become flat, stale, and unprofitable for the purpose of ornament. Hence we may anticipate the rapid depravation of any language, in which the gross bad taste prevails of introducing a poetical and rhetorical style into the business and amusements of common life. The fame of Cicero's oratory, the itching ears of a tasteless populace, the crowd of teachers of what they called rhetoric, and the absence of a sound philosophy, united to the luxury of the higher orders, hastened this progress of a false refinement in the Roman language. To trace this misuse of metaphorical language would afford one of the very best lessons on the principles of a sound taste in composition.

It may not be amiss to notice here, that the enquiries and discoveries of the philologist expose him to an error, against which it will be well to caution him. Observing that many senses of words are secondary and metaphorical, to which use has given the commonness of primary senses, he is in danger of affecting a *curiosa felicitas* on the one hand, and an over nice fastidiousness on the other, which will be quite thrown away on

the generality of his readers, and this both in the meaning and in the construction of the words he uses. In endeavouring to snatch a grace beyond the rules of common practice, he will greatly increase his own difficulties, and only make his style cramped and affected. So far indeed as his enquiries elicit meanings used, and rules observed by good writers, they are valuable; but when they lead him to meanings and rules which, however philosophical, are not sanctioned by the use of the best writers, he has passed the limits which divide the well-ordered possessions of good taste, where each soil has its appropriate culture and no more, and every object bespeaks nature to be aided, not restrained, by art, into the pet farms of philosophical theory, where every natural process is forced or impeded by artificial rules. In a word, the rule is not what we think Cicero and Cæsar *ought* to have authorized, but what they actually *did* authorize. And whatever secondary meanings there is evidence of their having used so commonly, as to prove that these meanings had already passed into the *ordinary language* of society, we are to regard as having all the currency of primary meanings, though the derivation make it evident that they are used in a borrowed sense. In fact, every sentence in our own language will exhibit many secondary meanings, which, without losing a constant reference to their primary mean-

ings, are become good every day prose. They have in them just so much of imagery as enlivens prose without turning it into poetry. Now as to what metaphors are to be allowed in Latin prose, not our, but the judgment of Cicero, Cæsar, &c. must decide. Indeed, nothing is more important towards the formation of a good style, than to discover from the practice of great writers, what meanings have lost the effect of ornament, and are become the staple language of prose. Even a mind of the least acuteness in distinguishing shades of difference, will separate words into prosaic and poetical, and will compare the former to the solid wood, and the latter to the flowers of a language. With the former we build our houses, and make our implements of agriculture, trade, and war; but with the latter we deck our processions and our feasts. The excellence of the golden age of any language will consist principally in putting words to their proper use, neither on the one hand profaning sacred vessels to the purposes of common life; nor, on the other hand, from a desire of simplicity equally mistaken, though perhaps less pernicious in its effects, building altars with stones hewn for the most vulgar uses. Sound taste will avoid affectation and exaggeration on the one hand, and vulgarity and negligence on the other.

SECTION VIII.

THE more precisely we endeavour to ascertain the meanings of words, the more shall we be on our guard against what Scheller calls *fictæ elegantiae*, or the use of certain favourite words, phrases, constructions, &c. as if they were ornaments to be introduced ad libitum as a decoration of our style; sparingly when we wish our composition to be plain, but more profusely when we desire it to be rich and splendid. As our conception of the force of words becomes more clear and definite, we shall be convinced, that although a word convey to the mind the most pleasing idea or combination of ideas, and though it be a precise, graceful, or dignified term, when properly used, if it harmonize not with the context, but exhibits some incongruity of meaning, or awkwardness of language, when taken in connection with the *ideas* and *words* with which it is joined, it will be rejected with disgust by good taste. We must therefore be very accurate in ascertaining the *circumstances of sense and syntax*, which require one mode of expression rather than another, or we shall only be affected and awkward, when we intend to be elegant. All

indefinite rules respecting one word, phrase, mode of construction, or arrangement of words, being "elegantly put"¹ for another, on the ground either of its being more rare or more common, &c. must be allowed no weight, till the circumstances under which they are, not indeed more elegant, but more correct than those to which they are preferred, are clearly defined. Indeed the use of these pretended condiments is as little left to our taste, and ought as precisely to be reduced to definite rules, as that of the most familiar or ordinary words in the language". If the authors of works on style, who give such vague rules, would attempt even the definiteness of numbers, and would tell us that such a form of expression is used ten times, for example, where another is used only once, we should at least be able to calculate the chances of our "putting the word elegantly."

¹ Scheller gives many examples, (see part i. cap. 2. sect. 3, 4.) These with his acute remarks deserve the diligent attention of the student, not only as supplying information, but as affording a model for our imitation.

² The reader would do well to analyse, if not to translate, the fourth section in the second chapter and first part of Scheller's *Præcepta*, entitled, *Cavendæ sunt fictæ quædam elegantie*.

SECTION IX.

THE *works of writers on synonyms* will yield us much assistance in ascertaining the meanings of words, if we be careful not to rely too implicitly on their definitions. This caution is not unnecessary, as the definite errors of Dumesnil are often more dangerous than the confusion and imperfection of Facciolati, not only from their imposing assumption of acuteness and precision, but because they are accompanied with too few examples to enable the reader to detect their inaccuracy. Yet if the scholar will be on his guard, and not yield his assent to the ipse dixit of the synonymists, but try their definitions by the test of various examples, he cannot fail to derive great benefit from their writings. The mere attempt to define the meaning of a Latin word, instead of acquiescing in the common mode of translating it by a single English word, (which probably signifies more or less, perhaps more *and* less, than the word for which we use it ; and besides this, is not applied to all the objects, &c., to which the Latin word applies ; and is applied to many to which the Latin word would be inapplicable ; and in farther addition to all these incongruities, has different associations, from derivation, custom, &c. &c.)

the mere attempting definition, instead of translating word for word, must *lead* to a more clear understanding, and a more correct use of the word attempted to be defined. The starting of the enquiry is to "harp the mind aright." When it is pursued with the patience and acuteness of which there are many examples in the works of Dr. Crombie and Dr. Hill, and still more in Scheller's excellent Treatise on Latin Style, a far more philosophical acquaintance with the Latin language will be the result, than can be obtained by endeavouring to translate word for word into English. Not that the latter practice must be neglected, lest we lose the benefit to our English style of cultivating a facility of expressing our ideas with perspicuity, grace, and force, as in our native language; a power indeed over its verbal and grammatical riches, which is indispensable to the orator and good writer, and which this exercise is well fitted to produce. Still, we repeat the assertion, that the scholar who, for example, supposes each word of Horace represents an idea capable of being adequately expressed by a single English word, or by an idiomatic English phrase, must have a much less correct notion of the original, than he would have of the *garum* mentioned by the satirist, if he were to suppose its flavour the same as that of Burgess's anchovy sauce. There is the greater need of *repeating*

our cautions on this subject, because there exist so many inducements to neglect them. The *pleasure* of what is called construing elegantly, the *little help* to be derived from dictionaries or even ordinary notes towards construing accurately, and the *difficulty* of supplying the deficiencies of these sources of information by our own exertions, *all* lead us to rest satisfied with much less precision in rendering the force of Latin words, than we strive to attain in the Greek language. Indeed in that far nobler language we are less tempted by similarity of sound to an idle admission of identity of meaning ; and besides this, have many more words that do answer exactly to English words ; and even when we meet with expressions for which we have no adequate term, we are tempted by greater beauty of derivation and analogy (being also aided by better lexicons, scholias, and notes) to investigate their precise force. The facts also of our entering on the study of the Latin language at an earlier period of life, and of commencing it with the imaginative words of poetry, is, as we have already observed, hostile to our obtaining as precise a knowledge of the force of Latin as we do of Greek words.

SECTION X.

THERE are *two modes* of applying the above rules for the investigation of the primary and secondary senses of words. The *first* and most satisfactory is, to take some Latin composition of acknowledged excellence in the style we wish to cultivate, and not only *examine each word in all its meanings*, (selecting examples of them for future reference,) but also *collect all the synonymous terms* in the language, after submitting them also to a similar examination. Indeed synonyms will often reflect such light on each other, as will furnish additional evidence of their respective meanings.—Having thus collected words conveying different shades of the same idea, and having connected them in the memory with each other, and brought them, if the expression may be allowed, to bear readily on the passage to be illustrated*, we shall be able to express that idea with precision and propriety, under all the various accidents with which it could be associated in the mind of a Roman. We do not say in the mind of

* The cultivator of a Latin style cannot have a better test of his progress in this most difficult and important branch of his work, than his ability to *illustrate* the words of his author with their synonymous terms, and *define* each as he proceeds.

an Englishman, because each language has words expressing combinations of thoughts peculiar to itself, for which no adequate expression will be found in another language.

If to this method of examining the words of an author, we add the practice of *translating* into idiomatic English, not Latin-English, (the English of Addison, not of Johnson,) and of *retranslating* again into idiomatic Latin, not English-Latin, (not the Latin obscurorum virorum,) *marking our errors* from the original, and repeating this exercise until the original is firmly impressed on the memory, we shall have adopted the *best* method of cultivating a good Latin style. It is also a useful habit to *retranslate viva voce* into Latin what a friend translates *viva voce* into English.

And that we may not forget the Latin words and phrases we acquire, it would be well to set down very *minute questions* as we proceed, respecting the matter and style of what we read. By occasionally asking ourselves these questions, and endeavouring to answer them in the Latin, we may at once keep fast hold of the subject matter, and of the language in which it is conveyed.

But if this method of collecting the synonyms of each word that occurs appear too laborious, and the process too slow, the *next best mode*, but

next longo intervallo, will be, to confine ourselves to ascertaining with precision *the force of each word* in the text of our author, without troubling ourselves about its synonyms. Our progress in reading will be more rapid; and if we be careful to *connect in our memories* the words which are synonymous, as they chance to occur, our copia of synonyms will from time to time increase, though very slowly and imperfectly when compared with its progress according to the former method. In using this mode of study, we must be careful to note down each new verbal acquisition accurately, and refer to it iterum iterumque, not only by asking ourselves what is the English to the Latin term, but also what is the Latin to the English term. For thus only shall we acquire that readiness of recollection, which will enable us to construe or compose with ease. Indeed no one can have failed remarking, that it by no means follows that a person to whose memory the English term is suggested immediately by the Latin, has also the Latin term as immediately suggested by the English. In other words, a ready construer may be a slow composer.

Perhaps it will be the wisest method to unite these plans of study, neither overburthening ourselves with synonyms nor neglecting them. In doing this, we may *class the words* which occur in reading an author under the following heads.

First, Words which occur so frequently, and the sense of which is at once so obvious and precise, that we cannot fail of attaining a full and clear understanding of their meaning, in the course of reading Latin authors with an ordinary degree of attention. Secondly, Words, the precise meaning of which is not so obvious as of those just mentioned, but which, when once defined, stand so clear and distinct from their synonyms, that there is no danger of our ever afterwards confounding them. These will require to be ascertained and defined in all their meanings, but need not be compared with their synonyms. Thirdly, Words, of which not only the precise meaning is not obvious, but which are distinguished from their synonyms by such slight shades of difference, that it will be necessary to compare them with all these before we can attain a clear understanding of their force. This will more especially be the case with some of the prepositions and all the conjunctions in the Latin language.

CONCLUSION.

SHOULD my reader feel inclined to rest satisfied with a less accurate scholarship than that which I have been recommending, in short, with the idle habit of translating word for word and phrase for phrase into English, I must repeat the assertion, that he will have and convey to others an understanding of the meaning of his original not more correct, a feeling of the beauty of his original not more delicate, than he would of the proportions of the Antinous, if he had seen that statue clothed in an English dress. Should he answer, that at least he translates his author into correct, elegant, or forcible English, we will allow him the additional praise of dressing his Antinous in one of Stultz best fits. Let it be engraved in his memory, that in expressing in English the exact force of each Latin or Greek word, accurate, scholarlike construing principally consists ; and, on the other hand, scholarlike composition is most evident in rendering, where this can be done, each shade of thought by its appropriate expression. To have a general, vague, indefinite notion of the meaning of a word, and to use a word in a general, vague, indefinite sense, is a sure test of want of diligence, acuteness, and, in a word, of accurate scholarship.

PART II.

EXAMPLES.

WE will now examine the words in the first sentence of Cicero's Offices, with their synonyms, according to the rules laid down ; selecting such examples of the use of each as exhibit the senses of the word most strikingly, and at the same time supply instances of the leading differences as to construction, with which it is found united. The student may be assured, that to make himself perfectly acquainted with the force of each example, will in the end be the shortest, as it is the surest, road to a good Latin style. Again and again it may be repeated, that he has two things to do ; first, to get an accurate knowledge of the force of each word ; secondly, an accurate knowledge of its application ; we may add also, *post memoria sepire*. We propose to examine the words in the following sentence.

Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum jam audientem Cratippum, idque Athenis, abundare oportet

præceptis institutisque philosophiæ, propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem, et urbis; quorum alter te scientia augere potest, altera exemplis: tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Græcis Latina conjunxi, neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci: idem tibi censeo faciendum; ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate.

1. *Quamquam**. *Etsi*. *Licet*. *Etiam*si. *Tametsi*. *Cum*. *Quamvis*.—*Etsi*, *tametsi*, *quamquam*, *quamvis*, *licet* sunt synonyma: non raro et pro iis *cum* usurpari potest, in primis sequente *tamen*. Scheller Præcepta, part i. cap. 8. sect. 8. n. 9. see also part i. cap. 2. sect. 17. n. 17. A. B. C.

Quamquam and *Etsi* indicate *an admission of something which is opposed to a preceding or subsequent assertion expressed or understood*. Their *place* is immediately before that which is admitted, in order to mark it from the beginning to be

*Unfortunately our first example is the most difficult and discouraging in the sentence, ranking under that third division of words, which are distinguished from one another by such slight shades of difference, and whose meaning in itself is so very abstract, that they require much comparison and thought to ascertain their exact sense. It is a bad omen, that we are in danger of stumbling in limine, if the writer be not the clearer, and the reader the more attentive.

an admission. If this admission be made before the assertion to which it is opposed, *quamquam* and *etsi* will be in the beginning of the sentence; if after the assertion, they will be in the middle of it. They are used indifferently with the indicative or potential mood, as the case may require: assertion of *fact* or assertion only of *capability*. (See Scheller as quoted above, and Crombie's *Gymnasium*, vol. ii. page 318.)

The *derivation* of *etsi* (et. *and*, si *if*) would lead us to expect a *previous context* as indicated by *et*. But this often is not the case, as the Epistles and Orations of Cicero frequently begin with this word. Perhaps the context is to be supposed to be *in the mind* of the writer or speaker, and thus by the use of *etsi* he gets "in medias res." *Et* must certainly be considered as indicating a continuance of thought, and *si* an admission, (which is the concluding part of that thought,) and *tamen* an objection. *Quamquam* (from *quam* *how*) approaches in meaning our word *however*; for as *quam* indicates the manner, how, the repetition of it may be considered to have the effect of, however (or in whatever manner) the manner of the thing in question be, &c.

Quamquam and *etsi* are used *in circumstances* so similar in sense, and with a *construction* so precisely the same, that it is difficult to detect the

difference of *meaning* between them. Yet a difference is indicated by the fact, that Cicero commences more than thirty of his letters and five of his orations with *etsi*, and only four of his letters and one oration with *quamquam*. Is *etsi* a less set and formal expression than *quamquam*? Its indicating a continuity of thought in the mind of the writer or speaker, and his thus getting at once in *medias res* without introduction or explanation, seems to imply this; and, on the other hand, the occasions in which Cicero uses *quamquam* in preference to *etsi* in the commencement of a letter and of an oration, appear to support the opinion of *quamquam* having in it something less familiar than *etsi*. In the first instance of beginning with *quamquam*, (Epist. ad Fam. lib. ii. epist. 1.) Cicero is writing to a young man, who had formerly been one of his followers, to admonish him of the high hopes entertained of his future conduct, and to remind him of his past advantages, in having had such an adviser. He also reproaches him for having neglected his early friend, and for having attempted to excuse this neglect, by complaining of being himself neglected. Throughout the whole letter it is an elder speaking to a younger person. The next instance (Id. lib. v. epist. 13.) is in a letter written in an elevated style of philosophy and deep feeling, in answer to exhortations and consolations under the distressing

events of the state, and which has all the gravity of a philosophical argument. The third letter commencing with *quamquam* (lib. x. epist. 19.) is addressed to a Roman general, to notify his letters having been received by the senate, and to exhort him to prosecute the war with Antonius. The last is (lib. xiii. epist. 9.) a formal letter of recommendation of a body of men and of one individual in particular to the good offices of a Quæstor of Bithynia. The oration (*Pro Lege Maniliâ*) which commences with *quamquam* is his first speech after being made Prætor. It opens with set terms of respect for his audience, and with an expression of modest confidence in his own qualifications for the situation in which he is placed. All these, like the opening of the Offices, are in a sustained style of writing. We may also notice, that in the first book of the Offices, which throughout preserves the calm yet dignified tone of a philosophical treatise, *quamquam* is used twelve times, and *etsi* only once. And in this single instance Cicero is introducing his own opinion and practice, as an illustration of the general argument; and in doing so, naturally adopts a more familiar manner towards his son. *Mæd quidem sententia, &c.* In quo si *mihi* obtemperatum esset; *etsi* non optimam, at aliquam rempublicam, quæ nunc nulla est, haberemus. See sect. xi.

The following examples will suffice to illustrate the position and government of *quamquam* and *etsi*. The difference of their meaning can only be proved by a more copious induction than we can find room for^b.

Quamquam abest a culpa, suspicione tamen non caret. *quamquam* est scelestus, non committet hodie, ut &c. rogo te ut, *quamquam* sis adolescens, tamen mortis cogitationem non negligas, omnia jucunda, (accusative) *quamquam* sensu corporis judicentur, ad animum referri tamen.

Etsi aliqua culpa tenemur erroris humani, a scelere certe, &c. *Etsi* in ipso itinere dissidebant tabellarii, tamen surripiendum aliquid spatii putavi, ne &c. *Etsi* non dubitabam quin &c, tamen &c. *etsi* vereor judices ne &c, tamen &c. *etsi* iniquo loco, proelio tamen justo dimicandum erat. *Etsi* id ipsum nonnullis videatur secus. pol, *etsi* taceas, palam id quidem est.

As *quamquam* and *etsi* admit a *fact*, *licet* *supposes or grants a case, arguementi causâ*. It often chances that the case supposed is also matter of fact, but even then it is put hypothetically, and it is the case supposed, and not the fact, that is considered. Hence *licet* takes a *subjunctive mood*, (*depending on ut understood*;)

^b A full stop indicates the end of a quotation, except when the whole quotation is included in brackets, [.].

as expressing possibility, and not asserting fact. (See Scheller Præcepta, part i. cap. 2. sect. 17. n. 17. b. 6.) Licet has been considered by the dictionary makers as an adverb, but is really a verb impersonal, says Scheller, as much as when in a sentence it is followed by an infinitive.

Licet hercule undique omnes in me terrores periculaque impendeant omnia, succurram atque subibo. licet ergo patrem appellet, tamen illud apparebit. licet tibi significarim, ut ad me venires, tamen &c. licet corpus abesset meum, dignitas jam in patriam reverterat. et præter eos quatenus enumeres multos licet, cum denique creantur, nonnullos in omni memoria reperies perniciosos tribunos? quantumvis licet excellas.

Etiam si "non est i. q. *quamquam* sed est pro *si etiam*." Scheller Præcept. Indeed *etiam si* more nearly approaches the meaning of *licet*, as it supposes a case. It differs in sense from *licet*, in supposing a case more strongly opposed to the previous assertion or denial to which it relates than is implied by *licet*: moreover it implies an addition to something gone before, (et jam si,) which *licet* does not; (herein also it exceeds the force of *etsi*, as much as *etiam* does that of *et*; but of this hereafter;) lastly, *etiam si* differs in construction from *licet*, inasmuch as it is (like *si*) used indifferently with an indicative and potential mood, as the case may require, that is, according

as it is used to suppose *the fact* or to suppose *the possibility*.

Ego bonos viros sequar, etiamsi ruent. tuis enim dictis, etiamsi timidi essemus, tamen omnem timorem abjiceremus. facere omnia aut voluptatis causa, etiam si eam non consequare; aut non dolendi, etiam si id assequi nequeas, omnia brevia, tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sint. ista veritas etiamsi jucunda non est.

Tamenetsi. Tametsi. (τε, αμα) Here tamen (indicating the *assertion* of something) is *joined* to etsi, (indicating the *admission* to which that assertion is opposed). *This form enables the assertion to be stated first, and the admission last.* Memini, tametsi nullus moneas, (i. e. etsi nullus moneas, tamen memini.) obtundis, tametsi intelligo. non mehercule quæ loquor crederem, tametsi vulgo audieram, nisi &c. *Tametsi, secondly, indicates the continuance of a train of thought,* the tamen indicating an assertion opposed to something *gone before*, (what has gone before is briefly recapitulated after the etsi,) and then the tamen being again repeated draws greater attention to the opposite assertion.

Tametsi a duce deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant. Tametsi mihi nihil fuit optatius, quam ut primum abs te ipso, deinde a cæteris omnibus, quam gratissimus erga te esse cognoscerer; tamen afficior summo dolore

&c. In this example, tametsi, though indicating a *continuance* of argument, *begins* a letter, and must be explained as etsi required to be in the like situation ; i. e. by considering what has gone before *in the mind* of the writer^c.

Cum. (*ovv.*) *Cum*, in such sentences as, cum scirem, te mihi inimicum esse, tamen ad te venire ausus sum—*cum* omnes a meis inimicis faces meæ invidiæ subjiciantur, tamen omni in hominum coetu celebramur, is not to be confounded with quamquam and etsi; *it marks the union as to time of the power of doing one thing, (expressed by the potential mood,) and the act of doing another thing (expressed by the indicative);* for example, at the very time that I may, might, &c. do one thing, I am, was, &c. doing another. In the same way *cum*, secondly, is used to *signify the union of two actions, when the former is not in posse, but both in esse*: cum ea nondum consecutus eram, quæ sunt hominum opinionibus amplissima, tamen ista vestra nomina nunquam sum admiratus. *Cum*, the preposition, will hereafter be explained. It is clear that the force of *cum* as a

^c These delicacies of meaning and application are lost, by our construing etsi and tametsi like quamquam, by the word *although*. That etsi does indicate *continuance* of thought, and does not, like quamquam, start a *fresh subject*, may be inferred from that use of it in tametsi, i. e. to *recapitulate* what has been *mentioned before*.

conjunction is borrowed from its force as a preposition.

Quamvis. Quamvis, contracted from quantumvis, (as quam from quantum, and tam from tantum,) ought never to be confounded with quamquam, etsi, &c. *It indicates an admission, on the part of the person using the word, that the quantity or degree of something may be extended at the will of the persons to whom it is used.* We must always be careful to discover *the thing* to which it refers; whether it be *some quality*, signified by an adjective or adverb, as the case may require; (quamvis callide. quamvis audacter. quamvis impudenter, &c. quamvis ridiculus est. quamvis sordida res est. quantumvis facundos. quæ quamvis sint fructuosæ, nihilo magis sunt &c.) or whether it be *some state or action* signified by a verb, or a verb and substantive. Quamvis in turbidis rebus sint, tamen &c. Etsi quamvis non fueris suasor et impulsor profectionis meæ, approbator certe fuisti. erat inter eos dignitate regia, quamvis carebat nomine. We must be very careful to ascertain whether the quamvis relates to the *substantive* only, or the *verb* only, or the *substantive and verb* taken together, as forming only a verb in meaning. On the fixing precisely what quamvis refers to, the accurate understanding and use of it depends. And sometimes this is not easy.

I would advise the reader to state briefly the force of *Quamquam*, *Etsi*, &c. for ease of reference, and to adopt English terms which will convey the true meanings of these words.

2. *Te*. The student will not fail to notice the derivation from the Doric Greek. *Filius* must have been derived from *φίλος*.

3. *Annum*. This is one of those words, of which the meanings are at once so obvious and precise, that we easily understand them in the course of reading. The derivation deserves attention. *Annus*, in its first sense, means a circle, as we are informed by Varro: hence it derives its meaning of the space of time during which the sun performs its annual circle. *Annulus*, a ring, is a diminutive of *annus* in its first sense. The first using of *annus* to signify a year must therefore have been metaphorical. But its being metaphorical was afterwards entirely lost sight of; and to have laboured in construction, to have borne its origin in mind, and to have used no epithets with *annus* which would not have harmonized with its original meaning, would have been a folly when it had once acquired the meaning of *year*, though in the transition state of the word, if I may use the expression, such attention to its origin might be in good taste. *Quere*, is

not annus from annuo, (in its first sense,) which also from *nunc*^d.

4. *Jam. Nunc. Hodie. Tunc.* *Jam* indicates a negation of any addition of time being made to a certain period; which period may be present, past, or future, as the case requires. (Already is an action doing; already was an action doing or done; already shall an action be doing or done.)

Scio jam quid vis dicere. jam tu autem nobis præturam geris. impune abire quia jam non potest. jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos. jamque ab eo non longius bidui aberant, cum &c. etsi jam primis temporibus illis, multis rebus offendebatur animus. se mirari, quare jam tertium diem se teneretur. vidi ego jam juvenem &c. jam per fines Sequanorum copias transduxerant. id tu Brute jam intelliges, cum in Galliam veneris. Omitte: jam adero. Here the present time is indeed indicated by jam. This Irishism indicates haste: *Now*, (at this instant,) I *shall* be present.

Surely the endings of jam and tam, taken in conjunction with their meanings, indicate an analogy in thought as well as language; tam so much in quantity, jam so much of time, both implying the negation of more: so cum, quum, quam.

^d We cannot attach much importance to the derivations *annuotatus* and *nos*, which must make it necessary to derive annus a circle, from annus a year.

Jam with an *ablative* (*jam* a prima adolescentia, *jam* inde a principio hujus imperii. *jam* ab illo fonte et capite Socrate. *jam* usque ab heroicis temporibus. omnia, quæ per hoc biennium agitata sunt, *jam* ab eo tempore, quo L. Catilina consilium inivit &c, in hoc tempus erumpunt) *excludes* any addition of time to the moment implied by *jam*, in order the more strongly to mark, that the time, from the commencement indicated by *a* or *ab*, to the very moment indicated by *jam*, is *included*: for instance, in the last example, the *point* of time is indicated by *jam* and *erumpunt*; the *space* of time included is indicated by *ab eo*, and *jam*.

Nunc (*vvv*), first, indicates a *time actually present to the speaker or writer*; secondly, *the speaker or writer's attention and imagination being carried back to a past time, or forward to a future time, he uses nunc, and speaks of that time as if present*.

1. *Erat tunc excusatio oppressis, nunc nulla est. Alium esse censeo nunc me, atque olim, cum &c. Idem Menandri Phasma nunc nuper dedit* (lately in reference to the present time) *quem nunc amabis. nunc deinceps ratiocinationis naturam consideremus.*

2. *Nunc reus erat apud Crassum Divitem* (*at the time I am speaking of*; *nunc* is surely not here put for *nuper*, as Dr. Crombie sup-

poses : his explanation would be a greater stretch of *language* than mine is of *imagination*.) *Fatidicamque* Themis, quæ nunc oracula tenebat. nunc huc, nunc illuc et utroque sine ordine curro. Tribuni plebis nunc fraudem, nunc negligentiam consulum accusabant. The nunc homines and ut nunc res est are too common phrases to need explanation.

Hodie, (hoc die,) signifying, first, *actually on this day*; secondly, *at this very time*.

Tunc indicates some time not present to the speaker, but present to the person spoken of; as does the imperfect tense of the verb substantive: Macedones milites ea tunc erant fama, qua nunc Romani feruntur. Cum senex sis tunc in otium te colloces. quas ordine suo tunc demum persequar cum præfatus fuero. Here the speaker is the person spoken of.

5. *Audientem. Audio. Accipio. Ausculto. Exaudio. Inaudio.*

First, *Audio*, to hear. *Audi* ista de majoribus natu. majores natu *audi* dicere. *audistis* dici. ex eo *audi* cum diceret. de re aliqua *audire*. *audire* de capite alicujus. plus milies *audi*. bene et male de se *audire*. To hear well or ill of one, as in the Greek language.

Secondly, *Audio*, to listen to. *Audi*, si vis, nunc jam. *attente audire* aliquem. *Philippe ades*

audi paucis. Cleanthes qui audivit Zenonem. ponere aliquid, ad quod audiatur. nec Homerum audio. (attend to.) audivere dii mea vota. Syracusani nobis dicto^o audientes sunt. (attentive to.)

Auscullo, to listen heedfully, omnia ego auscultavi ab ostio. [auditis, non auscultatis, tanquam pharmacopolem. nam ejus verba audiuntur: verum ei se nemo committit, si æger est.] nisi me auscultas, atque hoc, ut dico, facis. ausculata paucis.

Exaudire (ex audio) appears to indicate the hearing at or from a distance, and implies that the sound is loud: inaudire (in audio) indicates the hearing when close, and implies the sound to be low. maximâ voce, ut omnes exaudire possint, dico. fit strepitus, adeo ut exaudiri possit foris. vox quoque per lucos vulgo exaudita silentes. metuo, ne de hac re quippiam inaudiverit. Aquini consilia sunt inita de me, quæ te video inaudisse.

Accipere (ad capio) indicates that a person has acquired some information, &c. the ablative famâ, auditione &c. states the means. ex aliquo states from whom, and de aliquo about whom. Audire aliquem states merely the action, audientem esse alicui the quality. We actually hear many persons (audimus) without having the quality of be-

* This is what the grammarians call the dative of the *person* and the dative of the *thing*. Both are objects to which we listen.

ing very attentive to what they tell us (audientes esse).

6. *Id. Hic. Ille. Iste. Ipse.*—*Hic, this, implies some person or thing more immediately present actually or in imagination to the speaker or writer than ille, that. Hic is this present person, or the thing which we have now in hand, and are now considering: ille is that other person, or the thing farther removed in time or place or by imagination.*

The first section of the Offices will alone supply seven striking examples, and it is a good exercise to define the force of *hic* and *ille* in each.

Hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti sæpius audis:

Vendidit hic auro patriam: hic thalamum invasit natæ, &c.

Hoc posito quod sequitur videndum est. hoc est patrem esse aut hoc est filium esse? prorsus a me opinionem hanc tuam esse amotam volo. his ipsis (these very) verbis quibus erant scriptæ. hos eosdem (these same) motus, perturbationes dixerimus. hunc talem (this person of such a character) tam jucundum, &c. has hujusmodi merces, &c. hoc evenit in labore atque in dolore ut mors obrepat, &c. si sensum hunc haberet ut, &c. quid hoc morbi est? quid hoc hominis? est in lege hoc, utque, &c. nos hi sumus. quoniam vos his ingeniis homines (men of this ability)

tantum operæ mihi ad audiendum datis. tu si hic sis (this person) aliter sentias. si quid nobis adversi evenierit tibi erunt parata verba, huic homini (for this man, meaning himself) verbera. ad præturam gerendam, hoc est ad evertendam rempublicam. Cum judicatum non faceret, addictus Hermippo et ab hoc ductus est. hoc erat quod, &c. (this was the reason that,) hæc et alia multa.

When two or more things are spoken of, each considered by itself, and intended to be present, and equally present, to the speaker, hic is repeated with each, (as we have already seen.)

Hi molium objectus, hi proximas scaphas scandere: alii vadere in mare: quidam manus protendere. cum sciret et hæc et hæc.

When things before spoken of are referred to by hic and ille, hic denotes the latter, that is, the one proximate to the commencement of the reference (this), and ille the former, the one farthest from the commencement of the reference (that).

Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceputationem, alterum per vim: cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc belluarum, confugiendum ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. Often hic and ille are used *singly* in this sense of reference. Ex quatuor autem locis, ille qui &c. Inter hominem et belluam hoc maxime interest,

quod hæc &c. homo autem &c. Hic is *this nearest* to the reference; ille, *that farthest* from the reference^b. Scheller, vol. ii. p. 619. censures the occasional breach of this rule (of hic denoting the latter, &c.) which occurs in Latin writers. Perhaps the hic and ille in the cases he specifies are not intended to be used in the sense of "*the former and the latter*," as referring to what had been *mentioned* before or after; but rather in their *proper* sense, namely, hic *a thing at hand*, ille *a thing remote*. Thus in Hannibal's oration; (Livy, lib. xxx. cap. 30.) in which he sets forth the mutability of success in war, and uses it as an argument to persuade Scipio to make peace with the Carthaginians, he continues, melior tutiorque est certa pax quam sperata victoria. hæc in tua, (this *present* and immediate advantage is in your own power,) illa in deorum manu est (that *distant* and far removed good is in the power of the gods, who may deny it.) It seems very improbable, that a breach of a rule so conducive to perspicuity could have been admitted into so finished a speech, unless some *oratorical* advantage were secured by it. Now

^b Should any one think this explanation unnecessary to those who use the grammarians' phrase, "the former and the latter," we beg him to shew how ille and hic can have any meanings of priority or posteriority, independent of their primary sense, *nearness* and *remoteness*, to the person speaking, except in the ipse dixit of the grammarian.

by referring the *hæc* and *illa* to their *proper* significations, a fault so evident is avoided, and an additional force of expression is obtained. Again, in Livy, lib. xxiv. cap. 29. the historian is speaking of sending out a factious populace on military service; he continues, *et mittentibus et missis ea læta expeditio fuit, nam et illis, quod jam diu cupiebant, novandi res occasio data est, et hi sentinam quamdam urbis rati exhaustam, lætabantur.* Here also perhaps *illis* and *hi* do not mean the latter and the former, but rather *illis* *those* who were gone on the expedition, *hi* *these* who remained at home. This passage, though quoted by Gronovius, Sanctius, and Scheller, as an instance of a classical author neglecting the common rule of *hic* signifying the latter and *ille* the former, is capable of being satisfactorily explained, without resorting to the *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus* of the critic. Livy's imagination is more present to those who remained in the city than to those who left it; and he therefore speaks of them as *hi*, whereas the *missi* are *illi*. Vulgo, *these here* and *those there*. For the same reason, and not from neglect of the rule of reference, when speaking of *socios* and *hostes*, he immediately afterwards uses the pronoun *hos* to designate the *socios*, and *illos* to designate the *hostes*.

The following passage of Cicero, *Pro Roscio*

Comœdo, quoted by Gronovius, Sanctius, and Scheller, as an example of the rule respecting reference being neglected, is equally explicable. *Quid est, quod negligenter scribamus adversaria? quid est, quod diligenter conficiamus tabulæ? quâ de causâ? quia hæc (adversaria) sunt menstrua, illæ tabulæ sunt æternæ; hæc delentur statim, illæ servantur sancte; hæc parvi temporis memoriam, illæ perpetuæ existimationis fidem et religionem amplectuntur.* We cannot suppose so careful a writer as Cicero allowing such an error, as Scheller considers this, to have the sanction of his authority. The author of the *Præcepta* does not hesitate to say of this great rhetorician, "*debebat pro hæc dicere illa et hæc pro illæ.*" In truth Cicero is using *hæc* and *illæ*, not as mere references to the former or latter, but as words of considerable oratorical force. *Hæc* are those *adversaria present* for a moment (*δυναμιστα ἐς τὸ παροχθὴμα ἀκούειν*); *illæ* are those *tabulæ* which will last, as they have lasted, to *distant* ages (*κτῆματα ἐς αἶν*). Ernesti, agreeing with the three critics I have quoted, in attributing a neglect of the common rule of reference to Cicero, adduces the following passage from the *De Finibus*, iv. 4. *Cumque duæ sint artes, quibus perfectæ ratio et oratio compleatur, una inveniendi, altera disserendi; hanc posteriorem Stoici et Peripatetici, priorem autem illi egregie*

tradiderunt: *hi* omnino ne attigerunt quidem. Now the *illi* and *hi* are not, as the critic would persuade us, an example of the pronouns of *reference* being misused. The *illi* refers to those, of whom the writer had before said, Quid enim ab *antiquis* ex eo genere quod ad disserendam valet, prætermissum est? Again, Quanta ab *illis* varietas argumentorum, &c. Again, Quid ea quæ dialectici *nunc* tradunt nonne ab *illis* instituta sunt et inventa? Again, A Zenone minus multo (elaboratum est) quam ab *antiquis*. In a word, the *illi* are the *antiqui*, i. e. the Peripatetics; the *hi* are the Philosophers *now* in repute, and whose founder was later in time than Aristotle, i. e. the Stoics. The *hi* and *illi* are therefore not *misused words of reference*, but are *correctly* used in their *primary* sense.

Another passage from the Epistolæ ad Diversos, lib. vii. Epist. 2. is quoted by Sanctius. In primisque me delectavit, tantum studium bonorum in me extitisse contra incredibilem contentionem clarissimi et potentissimi viri. (Pompeii) Postremo; (vix verisimile fortasse videatur;) oderam multo pejus hunc, (Bursam) quam illum ipsum Clodium. Illum (Clodium) enim oppugnaram: hunc (Bursam) defenderam. Sanctius notices this passage as containing an error against the rule of reference, because the latter *illum* refers not to the person first, but last spoken of; and

hunc refers to the former. But the *illum* immediately follows the *illum* ipsum Clodium, and is naturally referred to the same person to whom the first *illum* refers. The *hunc* also very properly refers to Bursa, as being the person under consideration at present. The circumstances respecting Clodius are only introduced as connected with this present decision against Bursa.

Another passage quoted by Sanctius is from Tacitus, Hist. ii. 77. *Acriore hodie disciplina victi, quam victores agunt. Hos ira, &c. accendit; illi per fastidium habescunt.* But the *hos* and *illi* are not, as Sanctius and Ernesti, a misuse of the pronouns of reference. *Hos* means these our soldiers; *illi* means the soldiers of our enemy Vitellius. I think the reader will allow, that the classical writers have been censured without reason, and their meaning hitherto mistaken.

Ille, that, in distinction from *hic*, this, implies *that some person or thing is spoken of as more or less distant in reference to the speaker or writer*, either really or in imagination.

Antipater ille Sidonius, quem tu probe Catule meministi, solitus est. (Here a person distant in time and place is spoken of.)

Ut ex eodem Ponto Medea illa quondam profugisse dicitur.

Magno illi Alexandro.

Ille ego qui quondam &c.

Ex illo fluere et retro sublapsa referri spes Da-
naum.

Philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem
sed non satis acuti.

Ubi nunc senatus est ille quem secuti sumus ?

Ubi sunt equites Romani illi illi tui ?

Idem ille populus. (The same that it was for-
merly ; at a distant time.)

Illum ab Alexandria decessisse nemo nuntiat.

Nunc illud est, (it is that thing ; or, our affairs
are in that state) quòd si omnes sua consilia con-
ferant, atque huic malo (this evil, present) sa-
lutem quærant, auxilio nihil afferant.

Quem neque fides neque jusjurandum, neque
illum (though quem has been just mentioned he
is speaking of a person not present, and an action
passed) misericordia repressit, &c.

Tametsi nolo illam rem commemorando reno-
vare, cujus omnino rei memoriam omnem tolli
funditus ac deleri arbitror oportere. Unum illud
dico (I assert that one thing for it is about what
has passed) si propter, &c.

*When two or more things are spoken of, each
considered by itself, and each distant, and that
equally, from the speaker in time, place, &c.
(actually or by supposition,) ille is repeated with
each.*

In illis fructus est, in illis opera luditur. De cute quid faciat ille aut ille sub.

We have already seen how *ille* refers to the former of two things specified.

1. When the thing spoken of is neither so distinguished as immediately *present*, nor as ~~utterly removed~~ from the writer or speaker, neither "this thing" nor "that thing" is (he, she, it) ~~a mere~~ instead of *hic* or *ille*: and may be determined by reference to something already mentioned, without any demonstration of nearness or remoteness, the person or thing already described.

~~A~~ *iam* ~~audientem~~ *audientem* *idque* *Athenis*. Here in translation the *id* might be left out, as it is merely wanted to recal the *audientem*.

So might the *id* with *feci* be left out, or be translated, nor have I done *it*, in &c. *neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam.*

Quoniam in eo studio ætatem consumpsi. With the word study there is no need of particularizing this or that, as the words immediately preceding, with the reference of *eo* to recal them, are sufficient for that purpose.

Videor id meo jure quodam modo vindicare. I seem to claim it. *What* the thing claimed is has been explained by the context.

Equidem et Platonem si genus id forense dicendi tractare voluisset. The forensic kind of oratory. *What* kind has been explained before.

Venit mihi obviam tuus pater : is mihi literas abs te reddit. Fuit quidem senex mercator : navem is fregit apud Andrum insulam : is obiit mortem. Here the is (he) is merely a reference to the person already mentioned.

Quisnam hinc a Thaide exit ? Is est, an non est ? Is it he ? (*Who* has been explained before.)

In all these instances it is clear, that *is* is used only for simple reference to something before explained. *Often the explanation comes immediately after the Is.*

Ab eo exordiri volui maxime, quod ætati tuæ esset aptissimum. In this case, if we use the word *that*, we must remember that the original has only a force of *reference*, and not of *demonstration*. But to avoid this, we may leave out the id in the translation to "begin with *what* might be most," &c.

The same observation will apply to latissime patere videntur ea quæ de officiis tradita ab illis sunt ; and we may avoid the use of "*those things*," by translating it "*the things which*."

Hæc ea est quam miles a me ereptum venit. This is the woman, &c.

Is mihi profecto est servus spectatus satis, cui dominus curæ est. He is, &c.

Cum jam in eo res esset, ut in murum evaderet miles. "Was in the state that," &c.

Neque tu is es, qui, quid sis, nescias. Are you the person; who.

Itaque ego is in illum sum, quem tu me esse velis. Am the person you wish me, &c.

Atque hæc omnia is feci, qui sodalis Dolabellæ eram. I who was, &c. Antonius cum una legione eaque vacillante. And it wavering.

Iste. When the person or thing spoken of is to be described as connected in some way with the person addressed, whether the mention of this connection be intended for honour, for ridicule, or merely to state a fact, *iste* (this friend, &c. of yours) *istud* (this opinion, &c. of yours) is used.

Atque, ut sciatis, non hominibus istum (Clodium), sed virtutibus hostem semper fuisse. (*This your Clodius*) in this oration (pro domo sua) there are many like uses of *iste*, used contemptuously.

Ex his propinquis ejus, hominibus honestissimis, audio, non tu in isto artificio accusatorio (in *this your* craft of accusing) callidior es, quam hic in suo.

Ut, jam ne istius quidem rei (of this matter *you are anxious about*) culpam sustineam, quod minus fuerim in provincia, quam fortasse fuerit utile.

Sunt ista, Læli, (what *you say* is true,) nec enim melior vir fuerit Africano quisquam.

Nam qui septem appellantur, eos qui ista sub-

tilius quærunt (seek after these subjects *you are fond of*) in numero sapientum non habent.

Est istuc quidem, (*what you say* is something,) Læli aliquid, sed nequaquam in isto sunt omnia.

Sic ista senilis stultitia (which *you urge*) quæ deliratio appellari solet, senum levium est, non omnium.

Recte tu quidem Scævola et vere, nec enim ab isto officio quod semper usurpavi cum valerem (this duty *you speak of*) abduci incommodo meo debui.

Eoque scripsi libentius, quod mihi ista Παράδοξα quæ appellant (these *paradoxes of yours*, to use a vulgarism, as they call them) maxime videntur Socratica.

Nunquam mehercule ego neque pecunias istorum (these *friends of yours*—he is supposed to be addressing his arguments to Clodius) neque tecta magnifica &c. in bonis rebus aut expetendis duxi.

Veniant igitur isti irrisores (*these your laughers*) hujus orationis.

Tu vero dic, et istam rationem (*this your plan*) quam cepisti, tene.

Sequar igitur, ut institui divinum illum virum, quem quadam admiratione commotus sæpius fortasse laudo, quam necesse est. *Attic*, “Platonem scilicet dicis.” *Marc*, Istum ipsum (the very

man, that *favourite of yours*.) *Attic*, Tu vero eum, nec nimio valde unquam, nec nimis sæpe, laudaveris.

Nam, nec istos excellentes viros, nec multos alios præstantes cives respublica perdidisset, (those *you have mentioned*.)

Jam vero ista conditione. (On this *condition you have granted*.)

Iste occurs, I think, only once in the first book of the Offices.

Ipse, self, joined with either of the personal pronouns in any number or gender, (expressed or understood,) *has the effect of emphasis or repetition*. Tu ipse, ego ipse, illi ipsi, &c.

It has the same force when joined with hic, ille, is, idem, iste. Quin etiam illa ipsa rerum humanarum domina fortuna.

Ipse ille Gorgias in illo ipso Platonis libro.

Estne hic ipse de quo agebam?

Cum hoc ipso tempore stent cum gladiis.

Istius ipsius in dicendo facultate.

Id ipsum est deos non putare, quæ ab iis significantur contemnere.

Ejus ipsius liberos, qui, &c.

Ego ille ipse factus sum.

It has the same force with a substantive. In tempore ipso advenis.

In the following example from Cicero, (16 Epist. ad Brut.) all these pronouns are used.

Cum vero judicas, tantum *illi*^c non modo licere, sed etiam a te *ipso* tribuendum esse, ut rogandus sit, ne nolit esse nos salvos; nimiam magnam mercedem statuis. *Id*^d enim ipsum illi largiris, quod per illum habere videbatur respublica. Neque *hoc*^e tibi in mentem venit, si Octavius ullis dignus sit honoribus, quia cum Antonio bellum gerat: *iis*^f, qui *illud*^g malum exciderint, cujus *istæ*^h reliquæ sunt, nihil quo expleri possit *eorum*ⁱ meritum, tributurum unquam populum Romanum, si omnia simul congesserit. . . . Octavius *is* est, qui quid de nobis judicaturus sit, exspectet populus Romanus? Nos *hi*^k sumus, de quorum salute unus homo rogandus videatur? Ego vero, ut *istuc*^l revertar, *is* sum, qui non modo non supplicem, sed etiam coerceam postulantes, ut sibi supplicetur.

I have perhaps given too numerous examples, but the words we have just examined are important.

^c He had spoken of him *before*.

^d *What* is explained by quod.

^e *This* thing I *am* now urging.

^f *Who* is explained by qui.

^g That evil now *removed*, past, and ended.

^h These difficulties of *yours*.

ⁱ *Who* has been explained just before.

^k The persons I *am* describing.

^l To that point in your conduct.

7. *Abundare. Redundare.* Abundare, (ab, unda,) *to overflow from fulness.* Ternis fere millibus passuum in omnem partem fons abundat. metaphorice, abundare honoribus, divitiis; consilio, præceptis, exemplis, doctrina, ingeniis &c. villa abundat porco, hædo &c. in eo genere rerum &c.

Redundare, (re, unda;) first, *to reflux or flow back*: fluctus qui a communi peste depulsi in nos metipsos redundarunt. verendum mihi non erat, ne quid, hoc parricidæ civium interfecto, invidiæ mihi in posteritatem redundaret. quid fiet, si hæc elapsa de manibus nostris in eum annum, qui consequitur, redundarint? si ex hoc tanto beneficio nullum in me periculum redundarit. quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. ad quos aliquantum etiam ex quotidianis sumptibus et luxuria redundat.

Secondly, *to be so full, that some reflexes or flows back, and so overflows, from incapacity to contain more.* Cum redundat bilis in corpore. urbs redundat militibus. nationes quæ numero hominum et multitudine poterant in provincias nostras redundare. Capua splendidissimorum hominum multitudine redundat. ex rerum cognitione efflorescat et redundet oportet oratio. redundare ornamentis, copia, &c. redundans orator, oratio, &c.

It is clear that *redundo* and *abundo* con-

veys praise or blame, as the case may chance to be.

Effluere, (e, fluo,) to flow or run out. *Amnis effluens in oceanum. quod semel esset infusum nunquam effluere posset. antequam plane ex animo tuo effluo. cum una cum sanguine vitam effluere sentiret. præterita ætas, quamvis longa, cum effluxerit, non potest consolari stultum senem.*

8. *Oportet. Decet. Opus est. Necessa est. Licet. Fas est. Jus est. Convenit. Conducit.—Decet.* A thing is said *decere* which is *becoming the character, situation, and circumstances of the individual.* *contempla, satin' hæc me vestis deceat. experiri, quam se aliena deceant. adolescens præfatur arrogantius et elatius, quam ætati ejus decebat. thus, decens motus, amictus, color; thus ætas decentius lasciva. lacrimare decenter. sed tum servare illud poetas dicimus quod deceat, cum id quod quaque persona, dignum est et fit et dicitur. Roscium sæpe audio dicere caput esse artis decere.*

Oportet implies a *higher obligation than mere becomingness*, arising from a sense of what is *right* and *ought* to be done in all such cases, rather than from a feeling of what is *becoming*.

Oportere perfectionem declarat officii, quo semper utendum est. *oportere* est consentaneum esse officio, licere legibus et juri, decere temporibus

et personis. nihil in bello contemni oportet. ex rerum cognitione efflorescat oportet oratio. oportet præceptis et institutis philosophiæ.

Opus est is said of whatever is useful or expedient to any one, what the wants of the individual, rather than the duties or decorums of the case, require. Opus est mihi, tibi, ipsi, &c. legem curiatiam consuli opus est, sibi necesse non est.

Hoc fieri et oportet et opus est. Si loquor de republica quod oportet, insanus : si quod opus est, servus existimor. nihil istuc opus est arte ad hanc rem quam paro. dux nobis et auctor opus est. hujus nobis exempla multa opus sunt. nihil sibi divitias opus esse. opus est ut habeat, &c.

Necesse est is said of whatever is needful in such a degree as that it cannot be done without, (ne-cesso,) or so unavoidable, that it cannot be escaped.

Necesse autem id est, sine quo salvi liberive esse non possumus. curas, non quod opus est, sed quod est necesse. necesse est mori. uri posse flammâ ligneam materiam necesse est.

Licet is said of whatever is allowed or permitted by laws and customs, &c.

Licere id dicimus quod legibus, quod more majorum, institutisque conceditur.

Fas est is said of whatever is sanctioned by the law of nature, by that rule of right implanted in man's nature previous to human ordinances :

hence *fastum*, as from *jus justum*. *ut id quoad posset, quoad fas esset, quoad liceret, populi ad partes daret.* *Clodium nihil delectat quod aut per naturam fas sit aut per leges liceret.* *audi Jupiter, audite fines, audiat fas, contra fas, contra auspicia. contra omnes divinas et humanas religiones. contra jus et fas.*

Jus est (a *jubeo*, *populus enim leges jussit*) is said of *whatever is agreeable to the institutions of justice established by men.*

Oratores contra jus fasque interfectos, vim volumus extinguere, jus valeat necesse est, id est judicia quibus jus continetur.

There are the following metaphorical uses of the word—*jus suum* (own right), *tenere, obtinere, facere sui juris* (to make a lawful right of), *esse sui juris* (to be of right over one's self), *jus dicere, reddere* (pronounce or render), *esse eodem jure, jus summum* (extreme of law), *jus causæ* (the legal right of a case), *æquo jure* (where what is law is also equitable.)

Convenit (*cum, venit*) is said of whatever is *consistent or suitable with, and, as it were, goes along with something else.*

Ad maximam partem civium convenit. ad pedem convenit. optime convenire cum aliquo. non eadem terra arboribus convenit et frugibus; ætatem aliam aliud factum convenit. factum con-

venit, sed jure an injuria factum sit, quæritur. convenit inter omnes.

Tacito cum opus est, clamas: ubi loqui convenit, obmutescis. non convenit, cum ego ad promerendum officium tam fuerim expeditus, vos ad referendam gratiam esse, &c.

Conducit (cum, duco) *tends with other things to a common object, supposes.*

Fidei conducit. conducat id necne ad vitæ commoditatem, ad opes. hoc maxime reipublicæ conducit. quod maxime in rempublicam conducere videretur.

Debet implies *something which, like a debt, is owed.*

Si volent grati esse, debebunt Pompeium hortari, ut mihi sit amicus. Civis talis, qualis et prudentissimus et fortunâ optima esse debet.

9. *Præceptis. Institutis.* Præcepta, (præ, capio,) *rules of acting, &c. received into the mind previous to our being called upon to act, &c.*

Præcepta de re militari cuiquam dare. præcepta dicendi, disserendi, officii, artis, sapientiæ, vivendi. præcepta tradere, tenere, noscere, edocere, curare. præceptum de dolore, &c.

Institutum (in, statuo): *a thing is called institutum which can properly or metaphorically be*

said *institui* "to be set up." This verb is applied *properly* to the actual setting up, as of *turres*, *arbores*, *vineæ*, *officina*, *naves*, *pontes*, *pili*, &c. even of *segetes*. *Metaphorically* it is applied to the setting up or establishing of *epulæ*, *dapes*, *feriæ*, *ludi*, *delectus*, *civitates*, *collegia*, *heredes*: a person is said *instituere* to set up or establish *vitam*, (a way of life,) *amicitiam*, *diligentiam*, *viam*, *astutiam*, also *instituere aliquem ad dicendum*, *ad aratrum*, *ad officium*, also *instituere aliquem Latine loqui*, *instituere columbas devolare*, also *instituere poenam*, *actionem*, *aciem*, &c. in *aliquem*.

Institutum then is *that which is set up or established in a moral sense*, for the substantive, at least, has lost what must have been its original meaning.

Leges et instituta. patrum instituta. mos et institutum. veteri consuetudine et instituto majorum. quod non sit naturâ sed quodam instituto. duarum vitarum nobis instituta capienda. meo instituto usus sum. instituti mei tenendi causâ. institutum vitæ capere. ad hujus libri institutum.

Monitum, an *admonition or suggestion, not only by words, but by any action, &c. which turns the mind to the conduct desired to be recommended*, implying something of which the *monitus* needs rather to be put in mind, than to be convinced of its expediency, &c. *meæ*

aures dies et noctes omnium præceptis et monitis patuerunt. ad quem metum si deorum monitis non duceremur. *Monere* does not imply the using of any *winning arts or regular arguments addressed to the judgment or feelings, in order to draw the person to the conduct required, as if being that to which he has a previous objection. This is implied by suaderē and suasio.* cum legem voconiam magna voce et bonis lateribus suasissem. Hæc eo spectant ut te horter et suadeam, reliqua sunt quæ pertinent ad rogandum. nunquam destitit, instare, suadere, orare. Nor yet does it imply *the urgency of one rousing us to some exertion for which we want spirit, as implied by hortor and hortatio.* hortari milites ad laudem. in exercitando et acuendo plurimum valet, si laudes eum quem adhortere. proponam tibi claros viros: quod facere solent qui hortantur. non hortatione, neque præceptis, sed precibus tecum fraternis agam. Nor yet does a monere imply *the ordering of a superior, who requires to be obeyed, which is signified rather by jubere and jussum.* deorum immortalium jussis atque oraculis id fecisse dicantur. jura et jussa populorum. jussis alicujus obediētem esse. facere, efficere, exequi, abnuere spernere, &c. jussa alicujus—quod nec senatus censuit, nec populus jussit (as having the supreme power.) Nor does it mean the com-

mitting to a person's care something to be executed; from whom diligent attention to the matter entrusted to him is expected by his employer. This is signified by *mando* and *mandatum* tu mandata effice quæ recepisti. tua mandata persequar diligenter. afferre mandata ad aliquem. facies scilicet, ut mea mandata digeras, persequaris, conficias. sed tibi nihil mando nominatum, me totum tuo amori, fideique commendo. mandare aliquid alicui per literas. mandare monumentis (that they may remind others thereof,) mandare literis res omnes singulorum annorum. memorizæ mandare.

Philosophizæ. Nec quicquam aliud est *Philosophia* si interpretari velis, quam *studium sapientizæ*. Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitur, rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque, quibus hæ res continentur, scientia. *Triplex est Philosophia Physica, Ethica, Logica*, quo nomine etiam *Metaphysica* a veteribus comprehenditur. Prima rerum naturam scrutatur, secunda animum componit, tertia bene disserendi rationem docet.

Propter (prope) in its primary sense, both when governing a substantive, and standing alone, signifies *close by*. propter aquæ rivum. fluvius Eurotas qui propter Lacedæmonem fluit. propter est spelunca quædam. si propter ii sint.

In its secondary sense, propter (governing an

accusative) indicates the reason for some action, &c. being done; and the rationale of this meaning of *propter* is, that this action, quality, &c. is closely connected with what is meant by the accusative governed by *propter*.

Propter hoc (closely connected with this) Siculum mel fert palmam, quod ibi thymum bonum et frequens est. non est æquum me propter vos decipi. propter frigora frumenta in agris matura non erant. susceptum onus aut propter perfidiam abjicere aut propter imbecilitatem animi deponere. si propter partium studium potens fuit Alphenus, potentissimus Nævius. qui propter acumen occultissima perspicis. propterea, *wherefore*, i. e. closely connected with these things.

Ob, in its *primary* sense, joined to an accusative, indicates it as the place towards which some motion is made; thus Ennius, ob Romam noctu legiones ducere coepit. ob Trojam duxit exercitum.

Ob therefore, in its *secondary* sense, does not mean merely in front of or before, but *fronting*, *turned towards*, cujus ob os Graii ora obvertebant sua. mors ob oculos sæpe versata est. mihi exilium ob oculos versabatur; the importance to ourselves of an evil turned *towards* us is much greater than in an evil which is merely *before* us.

Thirdly, ob, with its accusative, indicates the object proposed by an action &c. (the rationale

being, *towards which* the action, &c. as it were, moves, or which is the object of the action. Si est flagitiosum ob rem judicandam pecuniam accipere, quanto illud flagitiosius, eum, a quo pecuniam ob absolvendum acceperis, condemnare. In both cases the receiving money (the action, &c.) is for the rem *judicandam*, the hominem *absolvendum* as its *object*. Talentum magnum ob unam fabulam datum est. ob asinos ferre argentum. ob aliquod emolumentum suum cupidius aliquid agere. ob eam rem tibi scripsi, ut scires, &c. In all these cases the accusative dependant on ob indicates *the object* for the attainment of which *an action* &c. is done, and therefore implies, that the *action* must actually precede *the object* to be effected by it. Yet this object may be contemplated by the mind of the agent *prior* to the action being done by him, and as a reason for doing that action. Thus the substantive governed by ob indicates the *physical effect* and the *moral cause* of the action.

And thus ob gets its *fourth* sense, (derived, I say, not immediately from the primary, but from the tertiary meaning,) of indicating *the cause of an action*. In all instances of this use of ob, we should bear in mind, that the substantive governed by ob, whilst it indicates the *moral cause* of the action, indicates also the *object* or *end* for which this action is done; and we should endea-

vour to make this felt by others in our construing of the passage in question. If we do not express this *double* meaning, we shall be losing the true force of ob, and leave it undistinguished from its synonyms. “*For* the fancy of one all are to be risked” would give this meaning of ob. Unius ob iram prodimur; here, though the anger of Juno is the *cause* of the loss of ships, &c., yet it is *to gratify the anger*, it is for *this object* or end, that the ships are lost, &c. quasi ob industriam, as if for the purpose of real work; ob avaritiam, for the purposes of avarice; ob ambitionem. ob eam causam, for the sake of *effecting* this, which also was the *cause* of its being done; ob rem, conducive to the object in view, tending *towards* it.

Pro in one of its senses comes near to the meaning of propter and ob, and therefore must be considered.

The *primary* meaning of pro is *in front of or before*, illa præsidia quæ pro templis omnibus cernitis. pro æde Castoris sedens. pro æde Jovis Statoris hasta posita. pro castris suas copias produxit.

Now as to stand before or in front of any one (especially in war, and it is from actions in war that each people derives very many of its words) is to protect him, (pro, tego,) *pro* in its *second* meaning signifies *in defence of*, or *in behalf of*.

So the English *for* in "to fight for king and country." Non pro me sed contra me est potius. quæ pro nobis sunt amplificanda, quæ pro adversariis sunt infirmanda. pro salute mea populum Romanum obsecravit. pro se quisque eorum certabat. contra legem, proque lege.

Again, because to stand before another is to occupy his place, *pro* comes, *thirdly*, to signify *in the place of, in the room of*, as if one were the other. So the English word *for* "a substitute serves for me in the militia." Pro verbo proprio subjicitur aliud. Liber pro vino. sodes pro si audes. malle pro magis velle. incerta pro certis habere, falsa pro veris. Sicilia non solum pro penaria cella, sed etiam pro ærario Romanis fuit. id sumunt pro certo. nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, justum est non licere. cum jam pro damnato mortuoque esset. jam pro seditione res erat. esse alicui pro hoste.

A *fourth* meaning of *pro* is in *proportion to*; which sense doubtless follows from the third, (i. e. in the place or room of,) because there must be a certain ratio between two things, in order that one may be put in the place or room of the other. So the English *for* in "for such an action no reward could be found." Hunc pro dignitate ne laudare quidem quisquam satis commode potest. si omnes hospites huic pro patris ejus hospitibus et gratia adesse

venient, is satis copiose defenderetur. pro rerum obscuritate. pro re nata. nemo fuit qui non me pro suis opibus in illa tempestate defenderit. quis est qui pro rerum atrocitate deplorare tantas calamitates queat. sic quæ ab hoc pro facultate hujus, pro loco facta sunt grata: esse vobis debent. supplicia pro maleficiis suis metuere. quod et pro vetustate necessitudinis et pro beneficiis vestris et pro dignitate ipsius facere debeo. pro jure amicitiae nostræ a te peto. tibi pro tuis summis beneficiis gratias ago. prælium atrocius quam pro numero pugnantium fuit.

Under the sense of, in proportion to, will come pro, as often rendered in requital for, because the requital ought to be in proportion to the good or evil to be requited; pro vapulando abs te mercedem petam. misimus, qui pro vectura solveret.

To the sense "in the room or place of" I would refer these forms of expression.

Pro eo ac si concessum sit. pro eo est atque si attributus non esset. pro eo erit quasi ne legatum quidem sit.

But to the sense "in proportion to" must be referred, pro eo quantum in quoque sit ponderis. pro eo quanti te facio, quidquid feceris approbabo. sed satis jam dictum est, quin pro eo quod pluribus verbis vos quam volui fatigavi, veniam a vobis petam. id prout cujusque ingenium erat, interpretantur. prout animus pugnantium est, prout

numerus, varia pugnae fortuna est. etiam argenti bene facti, prout Thermitani hominis facultates ferebant, satis ¹.

Summus; defined by Cicero, "quo nihil est superius;" which has nothing higher; summum jugum montis ascendere. in summa sacra via. metaphorically, (and let us not lose the metaphor in compliment to *our* idiom;) ad summam senectutem. summum bonum. summa prudentia facere aliquid. summa ratione. voluntate &c. summum jus. summus et singularis vir. amicus summus. summa respublica mihi donata fuit. hodie aut ad sumum cras. quatuor, ad summum quinque.

Supremus (from supra, which from *ὑπέρ*.) For the difference of meaning or rather of application between summus and supremus we must look for examples of their use; from which it will appear, that supremus is never employed to describe the *character* of any one, (for the Jupiter supremus of

¹ I must earnestly entreat the reader to give to the delicate shades of difference, which we have been attempting to mark in the prepositions, his utmost acuteness and diligence. Even in construing the knowledge of them is important, but in *writing* Latin it is indispensable. Quæ autem parva videntur esse delicta, neque a multis intelligi possunt, ab iis est diligentius declinandum. Even in merely *making out* the meaning of an author, we may add, magna sæpe intelligemus a parvis.

the poets indicates physical superiority, as of the air,) nor to measure moral qualities. And we may add, that although *supremus* is used to signify *the highest place*, (as *suprema rupes. arce suprema*;) it is more commonly applied to designate what our English idiom would express by *extreme, last, or that beyond which there are no others*. We must however be on our guard in using this rule respecting the *application* of the word, against supposing that it explains its *meaning*; which is, as already expressed, *highest*, and was so understood by the Romans in instances where our language will not admit the metaphor of height to be used. *Supremo vitæ die. supremâ horâ. appropinquare supremis.* (last moments) *miles in supremis ordinandis.* (last will and testament) *fine supremo. digressu supremo. carmine suprema alicujus deflere. desperatione suprema. macie suprema. suprema tempestas diei,* (respecting which see the Archæologists;) *corpus supremo officio mandare sepulturæ. incestum supremo supplicio sanciunto.* *Supremus* belongs to the language of poetry, but is borrowed by prose, especially when speaking of that subject which always rouses the most sluggish imagination—death.

Altus implies a *perpendicular* (not horizontal) *measure*, but reckons either upwards or downwards: on the one hand, *alti montes. in altiore*

locum pervenire. altissimus gradus dignitatis. alta et exaggerata oratio. magnus et altus vir. altioribus se studiis et artibus dedere. alta mente præditus. alta voce; on the other hand, altæ stirpes stultitiæ. altissimis defixa radicibus. altum vulnus (poetice.) altissima flumina. emergere ex alto. alta quies (poetic.) somnus altus: but altum applied to the sea seems rather to refer to the phenomenon of height rather than depth, namely, of a ship going to sea appearing to ascend, and afterwards to be descending the hill of water interposed between it and the spectator on shore: (hence the nautical use of the *ανα* and *κατα* in Greek :) procul a terra abripi, atque in altum a conspectu pene omnium abripi. naves in altum provectæ.

Celsus. Whatever be the original sense of celsus, its general use conveys the idea, not of *physically* high, or high in the *metaphorical* sense, which is analogous to physically high, but *lofty in bearing* and *producing the feeling of loftiness in the spectator*, whatever be the real height of the object: regi apium pennæ breviores, crura recta, ingressus celsior. graditur gallus, ardua cervice, cristis celsus. status erectus et celsus. vir celsus et erectus, et ea quæ homini accidere possunt, omnia parva ducens. celsi et spe haud dubia feroces. celsus mente: even the celsus ap-peninus, and the celso e vertice montis, refers to

the *effect* on the mind of the beholder, not to the physical height.

Sublimis; whether derived, as Festus supposes, from the *limen superum ostii*, or not, is proved by the contexts with which it is united to signify *elevated on high from a lower situation*.

Sublimis fertur, veetus est, rapitur. sublimi flagello tange Chloën. hæc locutus sublimis abiit. consequitur pennis sublimem in nube columbam. Tyrio jacet sublimis in ostro. genus sublime dicendi. visus es mihi in scriptis meis adnotasse quædam, ut tumida, quæ ego sublimis: ut nimia, quæ ego plena arbitrabar. Even in the *montis sublime cacumen*, and the *quercus sublimi vertice nutant*, the notion of *elevated*, borne up into the air by the lower parts of the mountain or tree, must be preserved. "Swells from the vale, and midway leaves the storm."

Arduus in its *first* sense means *steep*, and thence in its *second*, *difficult*. *Collis aditu arduus. oppidum erat difficili ascensu et arduo. res ardua inventu. rerum arduarum et difficilium perpassio. magnum opus et arduum.* In some instances *arduus* seems to be used by the poets nearly in the sense of *celsus*. *ardua cervix equi. ardua supercilia.*

Procerus, long in proportion to breadth. Procerum et tenue collum. procerissimæ populi. longa procerior alno. proceritas rubi.

Editus. *Locus editus* is properly *a high point*

sent up, shot up, (e-datus) from the lower country. Edita montium. locis editionibus occupatis. ex edito quidam speculantur. Metaphorically, editus in lucem. atavis edite regibus. viribus editior. We must not here lose sight of the elevation above the common level of humanity.

Erectus (e-rectus), raised straight up, perpendicular. Deus homines humo excitatos, celos et erectos constituit. erectus horret crimis. metaphorically alacri animo et erecto. ardentes et erecti ad libertatem recuperandam. erectus in spem. magno animo et erecto.

Elatus (e-latus), borne up from among others. Ne elati voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. elati barbara arrogantia despiciebant suos. quibus illi rebus elati et inflati. animo magno et elato. It also means, *carried out of a council for instance, and therefore divulged*, de æde elatum. res, multis consociis elata. It is also applied to corpses *borne out for burial*; si Cæsar funere elatus esset.

Doctoris. qui docet aliquid. e. g. (δοκῶν τινος) dicendi artifices et doctores. doctor sapientiæ. summus ille doctor istius disciplinæ.

Magister, he who has the chief ordering of any thing: magister populi (the dictator). magister equitum. magister morum (the censor). curiæ. vicorum. Saliorum. chori canentium. scripturæ,

(of levying taxes). *auktionis* (of a sale). *navis*. *convivii*. *ludi* (schoolmaster).

Auctoritatem. A more striking instance of the confusion of meanings, arising from not ascertaining the *primary* sense of a word, can hardly be found than in the dictionary explanations of *auctoritas*. Even Ernesti collects examples of thirty-three meanings, without explaining the rationale of what he calls the *hujus vocabuli multiplex et varius usus*. In the following passage of Livy, and in the comments which any book on Roman antiquities will supply, the original meaning of the word may be seen. *Decreverunt, ut cum populus regem jussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres auctores fierent*. Taking this passage in connection with what we know was the form of passing a law in later times; that the person who proposed the law, was called the inventor, *legis*, or legislator, and the person who supported the proposed law by his influence over the senate and people was the suaser, or *auctor legis*, we make out that the *auctores* were those who (*auxerunt*) increased the weight of the proposed law, with the addition of the weight of their influence. The names of these persons were often put at the head of the law when promulgated, and being so prefixed were called the *auctoritates præsriptæ*. This explana-

tion of the proper force of auctor is borne out by the use of the verb augeo, which always indicates the increase of something already in existence: augere numerum, rem, suspicionem, animum, dignitatem. augere aliquem divitiis, consilio, ratione, exemplis. even augere damno, mœrore. augere rem laudibus (to amplify). The above explanation of auctor renders the rationale of its several applications obvious. Auctor (the supporter) rumoris, quidvis faciendi, legis, consilii publici, judiciorum, comitiorum, criminis, venditionis (who guarantees the title either as being the lawful possessor of the property, or a creditor having a power of sale). The guardians of women or minors were the auctores in all business which related to them, whether of dowry, marriage, &c.

Hence auctoritas is *the quality existing in any one mutatis mutandis of warranting and giving credit.*

The auctoritas senatus was the power residing in the senate, to invalidate or confirm certain acts of the people and consuls; and the form was preserved when the force had ceased. The auctoritas judicum was their power to authorize this or that construction of the law in an individual case. The auctoritas augurum was the power they possessed to permit or forbid a measure according to the omens, &c. The auctoritas

censoria was the power in the censor to warrant degradations. The *auctoritas imperatoris* was the power in the general to warrant his orders. The *auctoritas venditoris* was the legal power in his hands of warranting the sale.

In all the above cases the *auctoritas* was a legally vested right of giving warrant, more or less precisely defined.

But *men's opinions tacitly confer a similar right*, to the wise of accrediting opinions; to the veracious of accrediting testimony; to the prudent of accrediting plans of actions; to the virtuous of accrediting principles of conduct; to friends of accrediting advice, remonstrance; and in general to the man of high character of accrediting that for which his character can be a pledge. We must keep clearly in view, that the *auctoritas* of a person in each case does not depend on the evidence he can give of his opinion, &c. being correct. To require such evidence from him would rather be to attribute to him *nullam auctoritatem*.

Lastly, *we may attribute the idea indicated by auctoritas to things*; to laws of legalizing certain acts; to documents of warranting, *mutatis mutandis*, their contents; to places of warranting whatever could only be transacted, &c. in them; *et sic de cæteris*.

If it be asked how the above explanation is reconcileable with the application of *auctor* and

auctoritas to the inventor legis, it may be answered, that even he, though he rests his invention mainly upon the arguments and proofs he can give of its expediency, utility, &c. cannot avoid throwing in the weight of his character, and so in some degree recommending it *auctoritate sua*, and so becoming also *auctor ejus quod primus ille invenit aut fecit*.

Urbis. *Urbs* is a collective name for a number of houses built together: *civitas* for a number of persons united in one polity: *oppidum* is a walled town inferior to *urbs*, though it is sometimes applied to Rome and Athens. It is not necessary to give examples.

Quorum. The grammarians rather ungallantly speak of adjectives, &c. agreeing with masculine substantives rather than with feminine, because the masculine is of the most *worthy* gender. The reason is better assigned by Shakespeare, when he says, "Go to; *homo* is a name common to all." The masculine is used as the generic title: thus the Latin *equi*, and the English horses, includes horses and mares. There is a similar error, where the grammarians tell us that the first person plural is more *worthy* than the second, and the second than the third. The reason is rather that the first person plural includes both the second and third: we English, ye French, and they Spaniards. (*We*) are now at peace: as the second person plural

includes the second and third; ye French and they Spaniards, (Ye) were our enemies at Trafalgar.

Alter. WHEN ALTER OCCURS ONCE ONLY, OR, IF TWICE, IN DIFFERENT CASES, it implies,

First, one of two things, but which of them is left indefinite, one or the other, not both: necesse est enim alterum sit de duobus. Semper alter ab altero adjutus. Id est genus ex tribus collocationis partibus alterum.

Secondly, one in particular of two things referred to, and that the second; the first being already defined. Agricola serit arbores quæ alteri sæculo prosint. Alteris jam literis nihil ad me de Attico. Ptolemæus qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandriam conditam. Ad Brutum nostrum hos libros alteros (second set of) quinque mittamus. Altero quoque die vinum bibere (on each second day.)

Thirdly, alter means a second like the first, a repetition of the first. Me ipsum accuso, deinde te, quasi me alterum. Ad te, tanquam ad alterum me proficiens. So alter idem. Proximo, altero, tertio, die. Alter ab undecimo tum me jam cœperat annus. Unus et alter dies intercesserat.

BUT WHEN ALTER OCCURS TWICE IN THE SAME CASE,

Fourthly, the alter, which occurs first, means the one, and the second alter means the other, but each refers to a definite object. Accedit ut accusatorum alterius crudelitate, alterius indignitate perturbor. Quorum alterum mihi facere necesse est, alterum, &c.

Fifthly, where four terms are implied, alter indicates a sort of proportion between four definite terms. O magnam inquit artem Brutus, si quidem istis, cum summi essent oratores, duæ res maximæ, altera alteri, &c. So also milvo est quoddam bellum quasi naturale cum corvo, ergo alter alterius ova frangit.

Alius (ἄλλος) is opposed to the third meaning of alter, and signifies, *first, a different one from the one in question.* We use the English term "another" both in this sense, and in the third sense of alter, and this homonymy is liable to lead us into as absurd a mistake respecting the Latin language, as it often does respecting the French language. For example, a French servant brings only one glass after dinner; an Englishman, fond of his own customs, and not doubting that the idiom of his language is equally catholic, orders "une autre verre." On which the servant takes away the one he has brought, and fetches him another, (different, probably larger.) When each party at length understands the other, the Englishman is informed that encore

une verre is the French idiom for bring another glass, and that autre means a different one. Alius means then different from that in question. Nihil aliud est discere quam recordari. Alius factus est. (he became a different person to what he was before.) Alio transferebant. Quibus bestiis erat is cibus, ut alius generis bestiis vescerentur. Tantum dico, aliud esse illud, atque hoc. Alia causa est ejus qui calamitate premitur et ejus qui res meliores quærit. Aliunde stare.

WHEN ALIUS OCCURS TWICE, it means *that the second alius is not merely intended to express a repetition of what is meant by the former, but differing from it.* Aliud equo, aliud bovi, aliud homini. Aliud tuâ gratiâ aliud nostrâ. Accepi epistolas tuas aliam aliâ jucundiozem. Itaque illi alias aliud iisdem de rebus judicant. Aliud est maledicere, aliud accusare. Ex alio alia nectantur. Causæ aliæ ex aliis aptæ et necessitate nexæ. Aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Alii melius quam alii dicunt. Alius aliud dicit. (Here is a sort of proportion, such as we have noticed in alter.)

Cetera. (traga.) One or more being expressed or understood, cetera signifies all the other.

Et illum et ceteros Sophistas lusus videmus a Socrate. Ita ut cum cetero corpore caput quoque immergatur. Ut illud Scipionis: agas asellum, et cetera. Excepto quod non simul esses,

cetera lætus. Hac in re scilicet una multum dissimiles: ad cetera pœne genelli. argentum illi ceterum purum apposuerat. ceteri et cetera ejusmodi sunt.

Reliquus. (quod relinquitur.) *An account having been given of some, the reliqua are the remainder;* often the least important. Arcem sacerdotibus tradunt, reliquum oppidum relinquunt. sunt multi qui &c.; plures qui &c.; reliqui qui &c. Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis. erant mihi oppida complura etiam reliqua, quæ adire vellem. si qua reliqua spes est, quæ sociorum animos consolari possit. cum reliqui nihil sit omnino, quod, pertineat ad nos. in reliquum tempus ait se vectigalibus prospexisse. (It is used thus without tempus.) De reliquo jam nostra culpa fuerit si &c. ut pecuniam reliquam ad Buthrotii ad diem solverent. reliqua mea Camillas scribit se accepisse.

Scientia. Nouns which indicate qualities of the mind will generally be either traceable to a metaphorical use of a word, expressing in its first meaning something cognizable to the *senses*, or like the present substantive, must be referred to a verb, which would be used to express some simple and obvious *action* of the mind, long before a substantive indicative of a correspondent intellectual *quality* was thought of. Thus *Λογος*, in its primary sense, signified an articulate *sound*

obvious to the senses των μεροπων ανθρωπων, and distinguished at once by the ear from the βοα of the βους, and the hinnitus of the equus. Secondly, this power of articulate speech having been applied by man to its intended end, each λογος in its primary sense was made use of as a sign of some object spoken of, and thus the word λογος came to signify not only an articulate sound, but that which the sound represents, namely, *that which is spoken of*. Thirdly, men argued that there was some power within them, as properly adapted to the understanding of the things signified by articulate sounds, as the ear is adapted to perceive the sounds themselves; and they gave to this supposed *power* the same name, λογος. Thus λογος signifies, first, an articulate sound; secondly, ought signified by an articulate sound; thirdly, the power which takes cognizance of the significations of articulate sounds.

Scientia will be better understood by considering the meaning of the verb from which it was derived.

Scire in its *first sense* signifies *to know or be well acquainted with some fact or circumstance*. Primum illud te scire volo. De quo ipso si quid scio. Nec me ulla res delectabit, quam mihi uni sciturus sim. Certe enim scio. Pro certo scio.

Secondly, *scire* is more especially applied to *knowing or being acquainted with some art or*

branch of learning. Is omnes linguas scit. de legibus instituendis Lyncurgum scisse melius quam Demosthenem. omnes qui Latine sciunt. scire fidibus. ars earum rerum est quæ sciuntur.

It is from this *second* use of the verb scio that the meaning of scientia is drawn where it is applied as follows: Scientia in legibus interpretandis. scientia æris. Gallicæ linguæ. medicinæ. juris civilis. dialecticorum. loquendi. serendi, colendi et condendi fructus; for in all these subjects an accurate knowledge of their principles should precede the practising them as arts. Prudentia est rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum scientia (φρονησις). modestia est scientia opportunitatis idoneorum ad agendum temporum. omnes artes in aliqua scientia versantur: artem sine scientia esse non posse.

Scientia therefore is *an accurate knowledge of a subject, and implies a subject matter capable of being so known.* Res ab opinionis arbitrio sejunctæ scientiæque comprehensæ. oratoris omnis actio opinionibus non scientia continetur.

Opinio therefore is *a slighter notion, often founded on nothing better than popular belief,* always differing from scientia in the *foundation* on which it rests, even when it chances to be about the subject *matter* of scientia: opinionem autem, quam in omnes definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse imbecillam assensionem.

opinio de, esse in, habere, venire in, adducere in, &c.

Cognitio is spoken of in conjunction with scientia in the following sentence. Aut cognitio rei scientiaque perquiritur ; and its meaning must be sought from the union of cum and noscere. Now *noscere* signifies *to be acquainted with a person or thing* ; to know the former personally and the latter as a fact, (the *to be*.) This force of noscere is explained by Dr. Crombie in his Gymnasium, and is well contrasted by him with the force of scire in the sentence he has quoted, novi omnes, scio fures esse hic complures. *Cognitio* then signifies, first, *the act* (as the verbal ending indicates) *of making ourselves acquainted with various things, or obtaining a general acquaintance with them.* (This collectiveness of sense is indicated by the preposition cum. A similar collectiveness is indicated in cogitatio, co-agitatio.) Homines deorum cognitionem (a general knowledge of their existence, power, and wisdom) cœlum intuentes capere possunt. Cognitionem juris (the acquiring a general acquaintance with law) magnam ac difficilem esse. Nam quæ corporis sunt, cognitionem habent faciliorem.

Secondly, *cognitio* indicates more especially *the taking judicial cognizance*, or making one's self judicially acquainted with the various circumstances of a case. *Cognitio et iudicium fuit. re-*

cipere cognitionem falsi testamenti. cognitione damnare aliquem.

Agnitio (ad-nosco) signifies *the recognizing a person or thing in reference to some circumstance which acts on our minds as a sort of testimony or memorial*. Quem ut agnovi, cohorrui. aspicere et agnoscere aliquid. ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus. id ego agnovi meo jussu esse factum. In a more confined signification it is applied to the *recognizing and admitting some legal claim, &c.* on evidence.

Perceptio, (per-capio,) in its *first* sensè, probably means the act of *gathering fruit* for storing up; (and in this case I conceive the *per* (through) to relate to the several individuals to be gathered, approaching to the force of *ἐπιτελεω* and *διαδεχομαι* in the Greek, I mean the gathering of *each* singly, till *all* collectively are stored up). Thus we have percipere fructus, vectigalia, ranas, vellera, justa (our dues). hæreditatem et legata ut peculio referret, &c. perceptio frugum, &c.

Secondly, perceptio is *the getting hold of an idea in the mind by means of some instrument*, (to which I conceive the *per* in this case to refer as the means through which,) quod neque oculis neque auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potest. Voluptas quæ cum jucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus. ut cito percipiant animi dociles, teneantque fideles. percipere animo et memoria

custodire. ars ex multis animi perceptionibus constat. percipere præcepta artis, virtutem, philosophiam &c.

Comprehensio (cum prehendo), *first*, is an *embracing* (or rather *laying hold of or catching*) a *number of separate ideas into one*. *Comprehensiones rerum*, e quibus efficiuntur artes. omnia quæ sunt in rerum naturâ celeriter animo comprehendere. comprehendere aliquam rem indicio alicujus, (here the res consists of many particulars.)

Secondly, *Comprehensio* signifies *a number of words embraced or comprehended in a sentence; a period*. *Comprehensio numerosa et apta*. *Natura ipsa circumscriptione quadam verborum comprehendit concluditque sententiam*.

Thirdly, *Comprehensio* signifies *the seizing of malefactors*. *Is hominem comprehendit et in custodiam Ephesi tradit*: (here the *cum* relates to the accomplices, proofs, &c.) *comprehensio sontium mea, animadversio senatus fuit*.

Conceptio (cum, capio); the verb *concipere* is applied to corporeal or intellectual process, and signifies *a receiving a number of individual particulars into one whole*, which holds them as a lake does the waters of many streams.

Nubes concipiunt marinum humorem. concipere morbum. flores concipiunt noxium virus. concipere cogitationem alicujus rei. concipere

odium in aliquem. concipere spem ex aliquo. concipere summa de aliquo. animo et mente concipere.

Concipere also signifies the *embracing several particulars in one form of words*: sicut verbis concipitur jure nostro senatus jusjurandum concepit. qui edictum concepit. omnis conceptio privatorum judiciorum in jure constituitur. As it is in the last meaning of concipere that the substantive conceptio is used by good writers, we must beware of using it in either of the two former senses of concipere. It is indeed introduced here to give an opportunity for the caution.

Sensus means, *first, the feeling attendant on any act of perceiving the τὰ αἴσθητα by the senses*, (the feeling attendant on seeing, &c.) Sensus auditus etiam dormientes egemus. vita et sensu carere. carere omni sensu doloris.

Sensus means, *secondly, the faculty or power of perceiving the τὰ αἴσθητα, (the senses of sight, hearing, &c.)* Sensus autem interpretes et nuntii rerum in capite tanquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et collocati sunt. quæ sensibus percipiuntur. oculorum sensus acerrimus.

Thirdly, sensus is used to signify *the feelings of the mind*, (to use common language, often called *impressions*,) when the mind, like the senses, is merely a recipient, and the thought or feeling (like the perception of an object) is something

rather *passum* than *actum*. Percipere sensum ex mœrore patris. oratio ad animorum sensus exprimendos experta. vultus sensum animi indicat. valde mihi placebat sensus ejus de republica. odium inclusum nefariis sensibus impiorum. integra mente cæterisque sensibus. penetrare ad sensum opinionemque judicis. oratio ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata. sententiæ sæpe acutæ non acutorum hominum sensus prætervolant. deinde cum similis sensus extitit amoris. oratio quæ a communi sensu hominum abhorret.

Fourthly, sensus signifies the *feeling intended to be conveyed to the mind by any word or words*, (Anglice, the sense of a word:) versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. nec testamenti potuit sensus colligi.

Sententia. Quintilian says, sententiam veteres quod animo sensissent vocaverunt. Now as sentio agrees in its meanings with sensus, consequently sententia means, *quod sentimus unimo*, either, first, *collected together in the mind in the form of a sentiment or opinion*; or, secondly, *collected together in words as a sentence*.

First, mos fuit academicis occultandi sententiam suam, nec eam cuiquam aperiendi. de diis immortalibus habere non errantem et vagam, sed stabilem certamque sententiam. manere in sententia.

Secondly, *sententia* est oratio sumpta de vita, quæ aut quid sit, aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit. acutæ crebræque *sententiæ*. itaque in illis selectis brevibusque *sententiis*. The following forms are common *tenere*, *manere in*, *permanere in*, *constare in*, *perstare in*, &c. *mutare*, *decedere de*, *desistere de*, &c. *deducere de*, *frangere*, *deduci de*, *deterri de*, *dejici de*, &c. *hortari ad*, *perducere ad*, *assentior ad*, &c. *discedere de*, *ire in* (from mode of giving vote), *rogare*, *colligere*, *dicere*, *ferre*, *pronuntiare*, *terminare*, &c. *de sententia* (according to or as if proceeding from), *ex sententia* (as if proceeding out of), *in sententiam* (tending towards or agreeing with), *a sententia* (differing from), *in sententia esse* (to be of an opinion); *sententia* has also a meaning answering to the fourth meaning of *sensus*; quæ lex hanc *sententiam* continet, ut omnes leges tollat quæ postea latæ sint.

Intelligentia. We have seen that *sensus* in its third meaning signifies an impression on the mind, in which the mind (like the senses) is merely passive. But *intelligentia* signifies rather *the product of that act of the mind, by which it abstracts, selects, and arranges*. The act *intellectio* is defined by Cicero, “cùm res tota parva de parte cognoscitur, aut de tota pars:” which could only be done by a process of reasoning, (*intus*, *lego*.) Simul autem cepit *intelligentiam* vel no-

tionem potius, quam appellant *intus*, (the intus of the Latin is here marked,) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem. principio homines rerum omnium quasi adumbratas quasdam intelligentias animo ac mente concipiunt. rerum plumarum obscuras et necessarias intelligentias. habere intelligentiam juris civilis.

Secondly, intelligentia means *the faculty or power which the mind has of acting and operating on thoughts, and does not merely receive them*: Tamen fretus intelligentia vestra brevius dissero. is omnes intelligentia anteibat. Deus intelligentiam in animo, animum conclusit in corpore. nobis accipientibus intelligentiam, quæ est mentis acies. longissime ab imperitorum intelligentia et sensu.

Scientia may farther be compared with *ars*, *doctrina*, &c. which will be presently noticed.

Augere, to increase commonly by an addition of more, has already been explained: augere et amplificare res. augere aliquem divitiis. cumulate augere aliquod munus. epistolæ tuæ auxere mihi dolorem.

Cumulare. (Cumulus is properly *the quantity over and above measure*, not scraped flat, but heaped up.) Metaphorically, Peroratio, quam cumulum quidam vocant. ut ad illam optimam prædam damnatio Roscii velut cumulus accedat. ad summam lætitiæ quam ex tuo redditu

capio, magnus illius adventu cumulus accedit.) Cumulare then; besides signifying merely *to heap*, (as cumulus also,) means *to give the crowning heap; to heap on*. Nunc mihi animus ardet et meum cor cumulatur ira. cumulari maximo gaudio. summum bonum quod cumulatur (is heaped up to its greatest height, full and running over) ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta. Cumulus is perhaps another form of tumultus, a tumeo, to swell; the transition is easy, as cum, tum, quam, tam, &c.

Exaggerare. (Agger is properly a mound raised by bringing materials together (ad gero) for military purposes); exaggerare means therefore *to heap up*, (ex out, or rising out of the level :) it is a strong metaphor implying *considerable effort* in the agent, and *but little fastidiousness* as to the materials. Magnas opes exaggerare. rem familiarem omni ratione exaggerantes. nihil est ad exaggerandam et amplificandam orationem accommodatius. oratione exaggerare aliquid. exaggerare verbis.

Amplificare. (*Amplus* is applied to buildings, places, honours, offices, rewards, power, strength, sums of money, &c. almost to any thing which is vulgo *very large of its kind*. (Is it from ανα, πλεω, to fill up?) the English word *large*, or, mutatis mutandis, *considerable*, renders its general meaning. Amplius the adverb may often be

rendered *more at large*; *ampliare* and *ampliatio* is judicially the hearing a cause more at large.) *Amplificare* then is *to enlarge*; and *conveys the idea rather of extending what already is, than of adding what is new*. This idea is preserved even when the *modus operandi* is, by adding what is new. *Amplificare urbem, domum, numerum senatus, sonum, pretium, voluptatem, facultatem, auctoritatem. amplificare aliquem honore et gloria. aliquid amplificare atque ornare dicendo.*

Multiplicare, (multus, plico, to fold,) to increase by addition of like quantities; but not used strictly in this sense. Æs alienum eo biennio multiplicatum est. aucto exercitu, auxiliis multiplicato. in domum multiplicatam.

Potest, (potis est,) first, applied to a person or thing, indicates his or its ability to act, &c. secondly, by itself it indicates abstract possibility.

First, dico igitur et quam possum maxima voce. quam potui maximis itineribus. ut gravissime diligentissimeque potui. sic tueor, ut possum, concordiam. hoc ad obtinendas causas potest plurimum. ego qui neque usu satis, ingenio parum possum. qui per vim et scelus possunt plurimum. qui apud me et amicitia et beneficiis et dignitate plurimum possunt. cum hac exceptione quantum valeam quantumque possim. quoad possim

et mihi liceret. non possum quin exclamem. multum posse ad salutem alterius.

Second, potest fieri ut fallor. potest, ut alii ita arbitrentur, et ego ut ne credam tibi. comprehendi hominem jube quantum potest. ut potest, &c.

Valeo; *first*, to be strong from health or to be in strong health.

Facile omnes, cum valemus, recta consilia ægrotis damus. valere corpore. recte valere: *in complimentary forms* at the commencement of letters, si vales bene est; also on leaving any one, and at the end of letters, vive, valeque; and on getting rid of any thing, si tales est deus, ut nulla hominum charitate moveatur, valeat.

Secondly, valeo signifies *to be strong for any purpose or in any thing*: alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum. ad populum valere dicendo. valere ad gloriam. ad consolandum autem cum illa valeant. Ignari quid virtus valeret. autoritas tua plurimum apud me valet. valere in omnes partes. hoc contra te valet. valere opibus, armis, potentiâ.

Thirdly, when valet is used respecting *a word* it means, *has the force or meaning of*. Quærimus verbum Latinum pro Græco et quod idem valeat.

Fourthly, as to *value*, valeo means, *has the worth of, is worth*. Denarii, quod denos æris valebant.

Polleo. What force polleo derived from its derivation or original meaning we cannot discover. It seems to be *applied* like valere ad, and to signify, *to be efficacious for some purpose.* Harum duarum ad fidem faciendam justitia plus pollet. nec ulla res plus apud eum pollet quam ejus voluntas atque judicium.

Pollere scientia vel virtute. armis. malis artibus &c. multum in hac urbe pollet obedire temporis.

Herba contra anginas efficacissime pollet.

Queo. Without knowing the derivation, it is impossible to say wherein queo differed from possum, as it is possible that words having the same general meaning and application might yet have very different *associations.* Ad te non queo sine lachrymis scribere. atque hoc loco illud non queo præterire. It is found more in poetry than in prose, and more commonly among the older than later poets.

Exemplis, (ex, emo,) instances selected from a number of similar ones. Exemplum est, quod rem auctoritate, aut casu alicujus hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat. hoc interest inter exemplum et testimonium; exemplo demonstratur, id quod dicimus, cujusmodi sit: testimonio esse illud ita, ut dicimus, confirmatur. exempli causâ paucos nominavi. unam rem exempli gratiâ proferre. assumere aliquid in exemplum.

Secondly, exemplum signifies *an instance prospectively in reference to others that are to be made like it; a copy in the sense, not of being copied from others, but that others are to be copied from it.* Capuæ literæ sunt allatæ hoc exemplo: Pompeius mare transit. componere exemplum epistolarum. sibi quisque exemplum expetunt. aliis exemplo esse. præbere exemplum aliis. proponere alicui exempla ad imitandum. cum esset ille vir exemplum innocentiae. omnia exempla cruciatus colere in aliquem. capere, sumere, habere, sequi, inducere et adjungere, supponere, ponere exemplum. uxor singularis exempli. pessimi exempli, &c. clara, illustria, &c. exempla.

Exemplar coincides with the second sense of exemplum, *a copy to be imitated or to be copied.*

Sua facere nec ab exemplari pendere. ad imitandum vero tam mihi propositum exemplar illud est, quam tibi. Cornuto quid melius, quid sanctius, quid in omni genere ad exemplar antiquitatis expressius. in libros de corruptis exemplaribus factos inciderunt. vos exemplaria Græca nocturna versate manu versate diurnâ. When the thing to be copied chances to be *taken* from many other like instances, or is itself copied from something before, we may be in danger of confounding the meaning of exemplar with the first

meaning of exemplum ; but we ought not to lose sight of what is *proper* to it on account of what is only *accidental*.

Specimen, (specio,) a *view* or *glimpse* of any thing, *by which may be judged what it is, what is its nature, quality, effects, &c.*

Num dubitas, quin specimen virtutis capi debeat ex optima quaque natura. Here it is taken not for *imitation*, but as a *sample* by which the rest may be judged of. Ingenii specimen est quoddam, transilire ante pedes posita, &c. Denique hoc specimen est popularis judicii. temperantiæ, prudentiæque specimen. Exemplum merely gives an instance which all the *other instances* are to be supposed to *resemble*; specimen gives a view, a taste, &c. from which we are to *infer properties* belonging to *that* of which it is a specimen.

Indicium. The verb *indicare* means to *publish*, to *declare publicly*; *index* therefore is the *person who does this or the thing through which it is done*, (spoken of as personally acting ;) *indici-um* is that *by means of which the index* indicat aliquid, and by which aliquid indicatur. We must be careful not to confound indicium with id quod indicatur.

Omnia quæ solent esse indicia et vestigia veneni. certissima argumenta et indicia sceleris. quas notas scelerum, quæ indicia parricidiorum

reperietis. P. Lentulus hoc specimen virtutis, hoc indicium animi sui fore non putavit &c. indicium dare. indicio esse. &c.

Signum. If the following is not exactly a chronological history of the word, it at least shews the connections of its various senses.

First, an image. Pictores et ii qui signa fabricantur. statuas, signa, picturas nihil magis quam amplitudo commendat. (statuæ quæ publico loco statuuntur) nego signum ullum æneum, marmoreum, eburneum fuisse, &c.

Second, an image engraved in a ring, and then the impression of that image on wax, &c. used as a sign manual. Ostendi tabellas Lentulo, et quæsi, cognosceretne signum. annuit. Est vero, inquam, signum quidem notum, imago avitui, clarissimi viri.

Thirdly, (getting rid of the idea of an image, and keeping only the latter part of the last meaning,) it signifies a sign, or that which marks any thing, in order that it may be recognized. Of this sense there are many applications. Signum, *the soldier's standard*, which marks the place near which he ought to be found in battle, advance and retreat; hence signum tollere, (these often, by the way, had images of deities, &c. wrought on them.) *Signum, signal of trumpet, of watch word*, (hence petere, poscere, dare signum,) *the word or sign for action, signum a constellation*, (because indi-

cating events both to mariners and astrologers,) and more generally any *sign or mark by which we recognize any thing*. Habes alia signa quæ observem. ii maximum signum illo die dedit voluntatis suæ. magni amoris signum. bona signa consentientis multitudinis. signum, nota, vestigium. Metaphors are also drawn from each of these senses, as inferre signa. dare signa, &c.

Nota, (noscere, to be acquainted with,) means properly a *mark impressed on any thing, for the purpose of knowing again or recognizing the thing thus marked*. Proprium in communi signo notari non potest. reliquis epistolis tantum faciam, ut notam apponam eam, quæ mihi tecum convenit. instruit etiam secretis notis, per quas haud dubie agnoscent sua mandata esse. Notæ had various objects. Thus *grammarians and critics used to put a nota* against any word or passage to which they desired to draw attention. Mittam ipsos tibi libros, et ne multum operæ impendas, dum passim profutura sectaris, imponam notas, ut ad ea ipsa protinus, quæ probo et miror, accedas. (hence the *explanations* appended to such marks got to be called notæ. jurisconsulti notas.) *amphoræ of wine, &c. &c.* were distinguished as to their age by certain notæ. interiore nota Faler-num. secundæ notæ mel. *Marks of disgrace, also of property, also of tattooing for ornament, were branded on slaves.* Multos honesti

ordinis, deformatos prius stigmatum notis, ad metallam condemnavit. Barbarum compunctum notis Threiciis. *Cypher writing, or marks*, the force of which was known only to those who used them. Extant epistolæ ad familiares domesticis de rebus: in quibus siqua occultius perferenda essent, per notas scripsit, id est, sic structo literarum ordine, ut nullam verbum effici posset. We have *notes of musical sounds, marks on cattle* pice liquida notam porcis imponere.

Marks or letters used to represent the sounds of the alphabet. Qui primus sonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis literarum notis terminavit.

Also a number of these, together forming a writing, inspicit acceptas hostis ab hoste notas. Even a sign agreed between parties, when not impressed on any thing, *but made by motion of the hand*; this is rather poetical.

In all its metaphorical uses, nota will convey the original idea of *a mark made to distinguish any thing*; but for *what purpose*, or *by what means*, must be learnt from the context. Nota veritatis. nomina sunt tanquam rerum notæ. o turpem notam temporum illorum. notas et vestigia scelerum.

Monumentum (moneo).

Monimentum generaliter *res est memorie causa in posterum prodita*: in qua si corpus vel reliquia inferantur, fiet *sepulcrum* (a sepelio):

si vero nihil eorum, erit monumentum memoriæ causæ factum, quod Græci νεωτάφιον appellant. sepulcri monumento donatus est. Ipsæ enim familiæ sua quasi ornamenta ac monumenta servabant, et ad usum, si quis ejusdem generis occidisset, et ad memoriam laudum domesticarum, et ad illustrandum nobilitatem suam. monumentum ei marmoreum faciendum locaverunt. magnum est eadem habere monumenta majorum, eisdem uti sacris. ab Atheniensibus, locum sepulturæ intra urbem ut darent, impetrare non potui.

Monumentum, when used metaphorically, should be *applied to something at once conspicuous and durable, and recording something of importance*. Monumenta gloriæ. monumenta majorum sapientiæ. ex annalium monumentis. qui sine ullis ornamentis monimenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum reliquerunt. monimenta odii publici sempiterna. hæc de sapientissimis viris monumenta nobis litteræ prodiderunt. clarissimum monumentum clementiæ suæ.

Documentum (doceo), a lesson, what may teach one something.

Esse documentum cæteris. esse documento reliquis. P. Rutilius, qui documentum fuit hominibus nostris virtutis, antiquitatis, prudentiæ. ut in posterum documentum statuerent, ne quis, &c. jam ab adolescentia dederas documenta ma-

xima quam contemneres populares insanias. (to teach us how you) homo omnium scelerum, flagitiorumque documentum. a lesson in, (we should say, *a master of*, i. e. so perfect himself, that he could teach others.)

Argumentum. Arguo is, first, *to prove any thing*: speculatores non legatos venisse arguebat. Second, *to prove in a bad sense, and relating to some person, or, to convict*: arguere aliquem facinoris. arguere quempiam aliquo crimine. argui de aliquo crimine.

Argumentum therefore is, id quod arguit, first, *a proof by reasoning*: ea Menedemus exemplis magis quam argumentis conabatur refellere. argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, docere, non eventis. excogitare argumenta firma ad probandum. argumenti conclusio, quæ est Græce, ἀποδείξις, ita definitur, ratio quæ ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit. idque hoc argumento confirmari potest.

Second, *matter for reasoning*: Servius mihi dabit argumentum ad te epistolæ. argumentum ad scribendum mihi jam deest. librorum Ciceronis argumenta. egis argumento epistolarum. quod egomet multis jam argumentis antea iudicaram. Tabulæ novæ quid habent argumenti. id magno argumento est.

Third, *the groundwork or plot of a drama*, by which the poet establishes some great moral truth,

is called argumentum. (hence διδάσκειν and docere are applied to the representation). tragici poetæ cum explicare argumenti exitum non possunt confugiunt ad deos.

Ratio will be examined when we treat of the word in its primary sense.

Vestigium (vestis) probably meant, in its primary sense, *the trace of the trailing of the toga on the sand*. Afterwards it came to signify a *foot-mark*. Imprimere vestigium in aliquo loco. vestigium ungulæ equi. vestigium ponere, facere, &c. Used also *metaphorically*, num quod eloquentiæ vestigium. dignitatis, fraudis, &c. persequi, consequi, &c.

Tamen (as before explained) *is used to express something opposed to that which has been admitted*. Tamen nihilominus putabant oportere. Si quinque hominum millibus ad vim, facinus, cædemque delectis, locus quæritur, tamenne patiemini vestro nomine firmari opes? In order to ascertain the exact force of a passage in which tamen occurs, it is necessary to be very careful to discover precisely the admission, to which tamen is adversative.

Tamen sometimes precedes the admission: sed tamen, etsi omnium causâ velle debeo, tamen cum omnibus non eadem mihi causa est.

Tamen is often used when quanquam &c. are understood. Accusatus capitis absolvitur, mul-

tatur tamen pecuniâ. hi non sunt permolesti, sed tamen insident et urgent. tamen, contemptus abs te, hæc habui in memoria. Si, tamenne patiemini? &c. tamen in aliena causa loquere? si tamen, &c. nisi tamen, &c. unde tamen, &c.

Nihilominus implies *that of two things the one is or does something in no less a degree than the other*: it therefore implies comparison, which tamen does not. Capessentibus rempublicam, nihilominus quam philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam. minus dolendum fuit, re non perfecta, sed puniendum certe nihilominus. Ubi Phædriæ se ostenderet nihilominus amicum esse quam Anti-phonti. quæ nihilominus, ut ego absim, confici possunt. Legati proficiscantur, bellum nihilominus paretur. tamen nihilominus putabant, &c.

I must now warn my reader, (and with not less reason than when treating of quanquam, propter, and alter,) that he must bring all the acuteness of his mind to bear on the following *επὶ πτερόντα*, or he will not be able to split the straws which are to be divided before he can estimate the turn of the balance. The good downright blow of King Richard's heavy crusader will not serve him, but he must e'en betake himself to the silk-cutting Damascus-blade of the lighter handed Soldan. He will find the references to the first book of Cicero's Offices coincide with Ernesti's smaller figures: the second number represents the line.

It may be well worth the trouble to *add* these second figures to his copy of the Offices.

Ut is used after the enunciation of an action or quality, to indicate the effect or consequence of it. And as the effect is proportioned to the cause, it often therefore serves to express the measure of that action or quality of which it is the effect. Idem tibi censeo faciendum (here an *action* is enunciated) ut par sis in utriusque orationis facultate (here is the *consequence* of this action). The remainder of the first section supplies us with the following examples. Magnum attulimus adjumentum, ut non modo Græcarum litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos. te hortor ut studiose legas, &c. Et id (vim dicendi et æquabile orationis genus) nemini video Græcorum contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret. dulcis tamen ut Theophrasti discipulum agnoscere possis. The English *so that* indicates the measure of cause by *so*, and the effect by *that*.

As *ut* is used to indicate *possibility* or *capability* in the cause of doing something, it takes the potential mood. If the action be *really present*, it is clear that its consequence (what follows from it) cannot be *past*, (as in the examples given in censeo, hortor dulcis est, which are followed by sis, legas, and possis.) But if the action be *past*, there is no reason why its consequence may not also be *past*, (as in the example

contigisse, which is followed by the past tense laboraret.) thus cursorem miserunt ut nuntiaret. si rerum aliquem delectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. quibus rebus effectum est ut infinita pecuniæ cupiditas esset. utrisque separatim locutum ut ne cupida quid agerent. Cato ad Pompilium scripsit, ut eum secundo obligaret militiæ sacramento. But there is no reason, if the action first enunciated be past, that its consequence *must* be past also. Magnum attulimus adjumentum, ut non modo docti sed etiam rudes arbitrentur. qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute conjunctum. It is evident that there may be a consequence *still present* of a past action.

The reader will find *ut* used to indicate the *effect*, and often the *measure of the cause*, in the following passages in the first book of the Offices, with the following contexts.

Ita in promptu ut vi. 1. sic definiunt ut viii. 5. fit ut ix. 13. xxi. 4. lvi. 6. lxiv. 9. ci. 4. cxvi. 10. tributum est at x. 10. impellet ut xii. 4. appetitio quædam ut xiii. 8. ad res tuendas ut xvii. 3. primum munus est ut xx. 6. generatos ut xxii. 6. ciii. 6. aggrediuntur ut xxiv. 6. effectum est ut xxv. 7. adducuntur ut xxvi. 2. tanta ut xxvi. 8. cxxix. 5. cliii. 6. sic impediuntur ut xxviii. 5. fundamentum justitiæ ut xxxi. 6. cum utrisque loqui ut xxxiii. 13. poenitere ut xxxiii. 23. ob eam

causam ut xxxv. 2. tantopere ut xxxv. 16. scrip-
 sit ut xxxvi. 10. monet ut xxxvii. 5. xc. 9. id
 agunt ut xli. 10. videndum est ut xlii. 5. qui aliis
 nocent ut in alios liberales sint xlii. 9. tantum ut
 xliii. 5. rapere et auferre ut xlv. 6. ductos gloria
 ut xlv. 8. propositum est ut xlv. 1. optabile est
 ut xlv. 5. primum in officio ut xlvii. 2. sin erunt
 merita ut xlvii. 6. præcipitur ut li. 13. referenda
 est ad illum Ennii finem ut lii. 9. ut discedatur
 liii. 2. natura commune animantium ut liv. 2.
 facit ut lvi. 2. quædam officia ut lix. 5. exercitatio
 capienda ut lix. 10. vacandum est iracundia ut
 lxix. 3. ut omittam lxxvii. 4. tribuit hoc ut lxxviii.
 5. ita afficiendum est ut lxxix. 2. ita suscipiatur
 ut lxxx. 5. nec committere ut lxxx. 4. præcepta
 ut lxxxv. 1. sic tueantur ut lxxxvi. 3. lxxxvi. 6.
 ita adhærescet ut lxxxvi. 8. ita probanda ut
 lxxxviii. 9. optandum ut lxxxix. 9. oportere duci
 in gyrum rationis ut xc. 16. tales ut xci. 6. sic
 definiunt ut xcvi. 8. ita consentaneum naturæ
 ut xcvi. 9. efficiendum est ut cii. 2. ut revertamur
 ad ciii. 1. excitandam diligentiam ut ciii. 4. modus
 est retinendus ut civ. 12. efficere ut cix. 10. sic
 faciendum est ut cx. 2. naturam sequamur ut
 cx. 4. tantam vim ut cxii. 3. pertulit contumelias
 ut cxiii. 5. meditatio et diligentia ut cxiv. 12. eni-
 tendum est ut cxiv. 14. major cura adhibenda ut
 cxix. 8. firmior ut cxx. 4. curandum est ut cxxi.
 2. cxxxii. 5. cxxxvi. 5. si non feret ut cxxi. 5.

exercenda est ut cxxii. 8. danda opera ut cxxiii. 3. cxxvii. 5. cxxxv. 8. cura illa ut cxxvi. 4. concedendum est ut cxxix. 4. evenerit ut cxxix. 7. duo sequemur ut cxxxiii. 2. vicit ut cxxxiii. 13. præcipitur ut cxxxvi. 1. gravitate adjuncta ut cxxxvii. 2. tria tenenda ut cxli. 4. Itaque ut appellemus cxlii. 4. sic definitur ut cxlii. 5. talis est ut cxliv. 2. judicare ex aliis ut cxlvi. 9. considerari vult ut cxlvii. 10. nec locus ullus prætermisus est ut clvi. 6. ita flagitiosa ut clix. 3. ita obscœna ut clix. 6. non potest accidere tempus ut clix. 9. intelligi potest ut clx. 10.

I will not apologize to my reader for supplying him with so many references. Should he feel a doubt about referring any of them to the rule of ut indicating *effect*, and therefore often intimating *measure* of cause, I will only beg him to *draw his inferences* respecting the case in question from others all but parallel; and on the one hand, to be very careful not to bind himself to English idioms, which may have no force in the Latin language, and on the other hand, not to reject Latin idioms because they have no force in the English language. The following example, *altera est res ut cum ita sis affectus animo, res geras magnas*, lxvi. 5. is the most difficult example of any in the first book of the Offices to refer to the rule of ut indicating *effect*. Yet a little consideration will convince us that it is so used, even

without taking into our account the words *causa et ratio efficiens est in priore*.

We have already remarked, that *ut*, though primarily indicating the consequence or effect of an action, often becomes *a measure of the cause*, namely, whenever the cause itself admits of more or less, and is supposed to be increased up to the measure which will produce the effect. Thus, *ita sunt in promptu ut res disputatione non egeat. tanta contentio ut difficillimum sit sanctam servare societatem. sic impediuntur, ut eos quos tutari debeant, desertos esse patiantur. tantopere apud nostros justitia culta est, ut is qui.* In these cases the *measure of the cause* is to be such, that *a certain effect may follow*. *Ut* therefore in such cases indicates not only effect, but *measure of cause*; and thence comes to be applied, secondly, to indicate *the measure of an action or quality, independently of any consideration of effect or cause*.

Credo te audisse ut me circumstiterint, ut aperte jugula sua pro meo capite ostentarint. Ut sæpe summa ingenia in occulto latent. ut valeo. ut ille tum humilis ut demissus erat! ut blandissime potest. ut multos sæpe vidi! ut se accusari nolunt! ut cupiunt laudari!

Under this head of *ut* signifying the measure of an action or quality, I should class these applications of it *vereor ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum* (i. e. in what measure) *timebam ut*

possem (how far). quod vereor tibi ipsi *ut probem*.

Under this head of *ut* signifying the measure of an action or quality, I would also class the applications of it to measure of time. *Ut primum* a provincia rediit. *simul ut* ortum est. ille *continuo ut* vidit. *statim ut* rediit. *ut semel* exivit. *primum ut* venit xxxix. 5.

The transition is easy from *ut* signifying measure of an action to its last meaning, namely, *ut* (with *sic*, *ita* *idem* expressed or understood) signifying *similarity of ratio or proportion* (continuous or discreet). It will be observed, that *ut* relates to the ratio between the first two terms. *Negotium sic velim suscipias ut si esset meum. ut quisque maxime perspicit &c.* is *prudenter haberi solet*. *Offic. xvi. 1. ita jubent uti ut mercenariis xli. 4. in eadem sunt injustitia ut si xlii. 10. colendum esse ita maxime ut quisque maxime erit his virtutibus lenioribus ornatus xlvi. 6. ut quisque erit conjunctissimus ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur l. 1. ut quisque maxime excellit, ita maxime vult lxiv. 5. ita teneantur ut sit constitutum. facillime autem impellitur ut quisque erit altissimo animo lxv. 8. ut quisque maxime opis indigeat ita ei potissimum opitulari xlix. 11.* The following occur also in Cicero's *Offices*. *Ut ipse &c. idem tibi &c. i. 5. nos, ut videmur, magnum attulimus &c. i. 9.*

non ut interpretes vi. 13. ut solemus vi. 14. ut Pannætio videtur ix. 2. ut ait Plato xiv. 17. ut in astrologia audivimus xix. 5. ut qui quondam xxi. 2. ut præclare scriptum est a Platone xxii. 2. Ut nuper M. Crassus negabat xxv. 3. ut in fabulis est xxxii. 3. ut ille qui xxxiii. 6. sicut ipsi dixerant xxxiii. 16. ut majores nostri xxxv. 4. ut enim cum civiliter contendimus xxxviii. 5. ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia ejusdem generis xi. 3. ut in equis, ut in leonibus l. 10. ut in Græcorum proverbio est li. 6. sed ut nec medici lx. 1. ut enim apud Platonem est lxiv. 3. ut supra dixi lxviii. 8. ut dicitur lxxx. 8. ut enim sunt, qui &c. sic reperies multos &c. lxxxii. 4. ut Calliocratidas, qui &c. lxxxiv. 4. ut enim tutela, sic procuratio lxxxv. 4. similiter ut si lxxxvii. 4. xxxii. 11. ut adversas sic secundas &c. xc. 2. ut si nautæ certarent lxxxvii. 4. ut si quis cxliv. 13. ut turpe, sic indecorum xcv. 1. ut venustas, sic hoc xcv. 6. ut ea quæ civ. 6. ut enim debemus &c. sic &c. cxi. 4. Ut quidam cxi. 5. ut hic idem cxvi. 6. ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita desinendi &c. cxxxv. 7. ut in ceteris, sic &c. cxxxix. 4. ut pictores &c. sic multa nobis cxlvii. 8. ut apum examina &c. sic homines clvii. 1. ut quidam morbo aliquo suavitatem cibi non habent, sic libidinosi, avari, facinorosi veræ laudis gustum non habent. Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedæmoniorum inflammatum esse cupi-

ditate vincendi : *sic, ut* quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellit *ita* maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse. (Here *sic* relates to the first *ut* ; *ita* relates to the second *ut*.)

When *sic* and *ita* are used with *ut* to indicate proportion, *ut*, like the English *as*, marks the two first terms of the proportion, *sic* and *ita* mark the two last ; but with this difference in modo concipiendi, that *sic* refers the terms indicated by *ut* to those indicated by itself, whilst *ita* refers the terms indicated by itself to those indicated by *ut*. There is no difference in *re ipsa* so far as the proportion itself is considered, but we are thus enabled either to direct the reader's attention chiefly to the *id quod* simile est, or to the *id cui* simile est, (without losing sight of the other,) by an act of the mind answering to *that* which takes place in the use of *hic* and *ille*, where we speak of things *present* or things *remote*.

Sic, thus, in this manner now being practised, now being mentioned, now being considered, &c. *sic* factum est. *sic* res est. *sic* opinor. *rex sic* incipit. *sive sic* est *sive illo modo*. *sic* hoc, de quo loquimur, decorum. Atticum *sic* amo *ut* alterum fratrem. *Sic* ulciscar facinorum singula, quemadmodum, a quibusque, sum provocatus. Litteras Græcas *sic* avide arripui quasi diuturnam sitim explere cupiens. apud eum *sic* fui tamquam domi meæ. omnis pars orationis debet

esse laudabile sic ut nullum verbum nisi elegans excidat. sic ei te commendavi ut gravissime potui. Sic vita hominum est, ut nemo conetur sine spe accedere.

Ita, so, in that manner or degree, in the manner above or before stated, in like manner as has been said, or as we have been speaking of, &c. mutatis mutandis. Quæ cum ita sint. vehim des operam ut investiges sitne ita. est judices ita ut dicitur. ita est vita hominum quasi cum ludas tesseris. bellum deprecantibus ita demum remisit, ut ducēs sibi dederentur. ita defendere consuevi Volteranos quemadmodum consuevi tueri meos. ille non ita pridem abiit. This is a remarkable form of expression, answering to our own "not so long ago, before, after," where we compare the measure of the matter in hand with the measure of something supposed at a distance from us. Non ita multis ante annis. non ita multum spatii est. non ita magna mercede. non ita se diu jactare potuit. nec ita multo post in Galliam proficiscitur. non ita valde moventur. Thus the labour of being precise has ever been avoided, and men have been as careless as any thing about accuracy, and have left it to their successors to work like any thing to supply their deficiencies.

The reader may try the explanations of sic and ita in the Offices. Sic v. 6. viii. 5. xxviii. 4. xxxviii. 8. li. 6. lx. 4. lxiv. 5. lxx. 3. lxxxv. 1, 5.

lxxxvi. 6. xc. 2, 14. xciv. 10. xcv. 1, 7. xcvi. 5, 8.
 xcviij. 11. ciii. 13. cviii. 1. cx. 2. cxl. 6.
 cxxxvi. 11. cxxxix. 4. cxlii. 8. cxlv. 8. *Ita*
 vi. 1. x. 6. xl. 14. xlv. 4. xlv. 5. xlix. 12. l. 2.
 li. 5. lix. 3. lxiv. 6. lxvii. 12. lxxvii. 6. lxxix. 2.
 lxxxviii. 8. xcv. 3. xcvi. 11. ci. 4. ciii. 5. cxxv. 4.
 clvi. 7. clvii. 9. clviii. 8. clix. 3. clx. 4.

If the reader will refer to Scheller's Index respecting *ita* and *sic*, he will, I think, agree with me, that in offering *talis* as an explanation of both conjunctions, he has *fallen short* of rendering the precise meaning of each, whilst in explaining *ita* by *hoc modo*, &c. he has fallen into a positive *error*; which errors have led him into considering *sic* and *ita* as redundant where they each of them make a precise addition to the meaning of the passage.

Tam (tantum, as quam from quantum) implies *so much or such a quantity of a certain Quality* (for its application is confined to adjectives and adverbs, and does not extend to verbs) *as bears a certain ratio to a quantity of some other Quality.*

Non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum, ut non sciret. quam quisque pessume fecit, tam maxime tutus est. quam plurimum ederit, tam citissime sanus fuerit. quid opus est de Dionysio tam valde affirmare. nihil est tam valde vulgare quam nihil sapere. nemo tam multa,

ne in Græco quidem otio scripsit, quam multa sunt nostra. hic tam imbecillus quam videtis. tam sordidus, nocens &c. tam vesperi, mane &c. tam maxime plurimum, &c. tam magis.

Adeo implies that an action or quality has been carried to that point, that another action results from it.

Adeone erat stultus ut &c. adeo mihi invisus est, ut nihil non acerbum putem, quod commune cum illo sit. adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo. Adeo non tenuit iram ut &c. hæc dicta adeo nihil moverunt quemquam ut &c. Rempublicam funditus amisimus, adeo ut Cato vix vivus effugeret. Neminem quidem adeo decipere potuit, ut ei nummum ullum crederet. at vero illi adeo vim facinoris sui perhorruerant, ut cogitarint &c. Adeone, ut etiam humanitatis jura violentur. Ducem hostium intra moenia atque adeo in senatu videtis. Atque hoc adeo mihi concedendum est magis quod &c.

Usque eo has the same meaning as adeo, but somewhat stronger.

Usque eo morosi sumus, ut nobis non satisfaciat ipse Demosthenes. quod Amerinis usque eo visum est indignum ut fletus gemitusque tota urbe fieret. usque eo non fuit popularis, ut patrimonium solus comesset. usque eo commotus est ut, &c.

Quæ cum ita essent tamen usque eo se tenuit,

quoad a Cn. Pompeio ad eum legati venerunt, usque eo persequi dum proprium efficiatur. usque eo imperio carere non potuit.

Usque adeo. This is even stronger than usque eo. Postea tempestas ipsos quoque jactare cœpit usque adeo ut dominus navis in scapham confugerit. usque adeo verberari jussit dum animam efflavit.

Usque dum. Duces prædonum vivos domitæ; usquedum per me tibi licuerit, tenuisti. res jacuit usquedum inveniretur. usquedum ad navem erit. usque dum regnum obtinebit Jupiter.

Quoad. As adeo implies that an action is carried on up to that point, when another action results from it, quoad implies that an action is carried on as long as some other action, &c. lasts, and ceases when said action ceases.

Hostibus fugientibus, quoad insequi pedes potuit, terga cæsa. ego me ducem in civili bello, quoad de pace ageretur, nolui esse. quanquam quoad fuit in urbe, ejus consiliis obstiti. tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te quantum proficias non pœnitebit. quoad longissime potest mens mea, respicere spatium præteriti temporis. omnia cogitando, quoad facere potui, suam prosecutus. quoad fieri possit. quoad facere potui. quoad patiatur consuetudo. quoad scire possis.

Sicut implies that a certain action is done in this very manner, as is immediately to be ex-

pressed. Whereas *item* implies that it is done in *that manner*, as *has been* already expressed. Both mean *in the very same manner sicut as is to be* expressed, *item as has been* expressed. And this *prospective* and *retrospective* force bears out what has been said as to *sic* and *ita*.

In the first book of the Offices, *sicut* will be found in xxxiii. 16. ciii. 8. cxxx. 12. cxlix. 3. *Item* will be found in ditto, x. 5. xi. 4. xxxvii. 12. lxxxiii. 11. xc. 5. c. 9. cvii. 9. cix. 4, 9. cxviii. 9. clvii. 7.

Si me *sicut* soles, amas. Hac in re scripsi ad eum, ut tuo iudicio uteretur, *sicut* in rebus omnibus. ille me amplectitur *sicut* neminem. quamvis scelerati fuissent, *sicut* fuerunt. *quoniam* ejus causam defendi in Senatu, *sicut* mea fides postulabat. defendere aliquem *sicut* caput et famam suam. nihil est quod cogit hominem, *sicut* in foro non bonos oratores, *item* in theatro malos oratores perpeti.

Item implies that a certain action which follows *item*, is exactly similar to one which has gone before. Thus *item* like *ita* is retrospective, i. e. refers to some action before expressed.

Itaque ex me quærunt, credo, et ex hoc *item* Scævola. Gabinium statim ad me vocavi, deinde *item* accersitur Statilius. Te non venisse miratus sum, quod *item* nunc miror. Romulus augur cum patre *item* augure. non *item* in oratione, ut in

versu extat numerus. spectaculum tibi uni jucundum, ceteris non item. hæc sicut exposui ita gesta sunt. sicut tu concupisti item volebat.

Tanquam implies that an action is done under one set of circumstances (tam), just as much (quam) as it would be under another; tanquam is attached to the latter action, though belonging to each.

Ut istum, tanquam si esset consul, salutarent. ego tecum tanquam mecum loquor. gloria virtutem tanquam umbra sequitur. tanquam ad scopulum aliquem libidinis mentem appellere. quid mihi nunc vos, inquit Crassus, tanquam alicui Græculo, quæstiunculam ponitis?

So Offices, liv. 8. cii. 6. cxxxiv. 3. Sometimes when a mode of expression proper to one action is used metaphorically to another, tanquam is added before the more violent part of the metaphor, in order to soften it into a simile.

Formam quidem ipsam et tanquam faciem honesti vides. sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos et sibi præfidentes, tanquam in gyrum rationis, duci oportere.

Quasi illustrates an action, &c. by another, and implies that the illustration is rather a strong one, and so must be taken quantum valeat. Sometimes the illustration supposes a case exactly opposed to the real one. Vocem ab acuto sono ad gravem recipere, et quasi quodammodo

colligere. est in anthis tenerum quiddam, quod ægritudine, quasi tempestate, quatiatur. sine quodam afflato quasi fororis. Philosophia laudandarum artium omnium procreatrix et quasi parens. Litteras græcas sic avide arripui quasi diuturnam sitim explere cupiens. Hostes maximo clamore insecuti, quasi parta jam atque explorata victoria, quasi vero ad cognoscendum ego ad illos, non illi ad me, venire debuerunt. Instances of quasi will be found in the first book of the Offices, ii. 12. xvi. 5. xxiii. 11. xxx. 5. xli. 7. xlii. 7. liv. 5. lxi. 11. lxx. 11. lxxi. 12. xciii. 1. cvii. 1. elviii. 5.

Velut does not (as *tanquam*) express merely that the action is the same (in quantity) in a given case, as it would be in another given case, but it asserts the perfect similarity of the cases themselves, and implies, *a fortiore*, the similarity of their effects. It is therefore often employed as quoting a case in point. Læti, velut explorata victoria, ad castra pergunt. velut hæreditate relictum odium patrum erga Romanos sic confirmavit, &c. Absentis ariovisti crudelitatem, velut si coram adesset horrebant. Itaque, velut si urbem aggressurus Scipio foret, ita ad arma est conclamatum. velut in cantu et fidibus, sic ex corporis totius naturâ. veluti qui sentibus anguem &c.

Quemadmodum. After what manner or measure, after the manner or measure, according to.

Quemadmodum (modus, in a borrowed sense, indicates the measure or mode of an action.) *Quemadmodum* indicates the manner according to which the agent intentionally acts, directing his action to that rule; but *quomodo* merely signifies the mode in which the agent acts, without implying intention, stating only the fact, whereas *quemadmodum* states the intention. Solus ille cognovit quemadmodum istum vinci oporteret. sed isti qui Clodii leges timuerunt, quemadmodum cæteras observarunt? Sic ulciscar facinora singula, quemadmodum, a quibusque sum provocatus. magnificentius est dicere, quemadmodum gesserimus consulatum, quam quemadmodum ceperimus. Pergratum mihi feceris, si, quemadmodum soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quærantur; sic, de amicitia disputaris quid sentias? ut quemadmodum sint in se ipso animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos.

Hæc negotia quomodo se habeant, ne epistolâ quidem narrare audeo tibi. In hac arte nullum est præceptum, quomodo verum inveniatur, sed tantum est, quomodo judicetur. sed ita me consulem fecistis, quomodo pauci in hac civitate facti sunt. quomodo hominis dicunt. nam quomodo nunc est, pedem ubi ponat in suo, non habet.

Perinde (per-inde) signifies that an action, &c. will proceed from a given time throughout the

rest of its course, in a manner indicated by another part of the sentence.

Non possum dicere, me hæc perinde ut dicam discenda esse didicisse. Sed hæc omnia perinde sunt ut aguntur. Habes a fratre munus magnum, sed perinde erit ut acceperis. Hæc perinde accidunt, ut eorum qui absunt mentes oratione tractantur. Perinde ut opinio est de cujusque moribus, ita quid ab eo factum aut non factum sit, existimari potest. Difficilis est de eorum temeritate, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere. Perinde habere aliquid ac si non esset. Utilissimum munus, sed non perinde populare. Quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati perinde ac satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent. Non perinde atque ego putaram, arripere visus est. Perinde ac si in hanc formulam omnia judicia legitima comprehensa sint, perinde dicemus.

Prout, (pro-ut,) in proportion to, according as. It does not imply a likeness between two things, but a proportion or similarity of ratios.

Tuas litteras, prout res postulat, expecto. prout cujusque eorum aut natura, aut studium fersbat. prout locus iniquus æquusve his aut illis; prout animus pugnantium est, prout numerus, varia pugnae fortuna est.

Sive. The following words of Scheller deserve attention. De synonymicis vocabulis notandum tironem non debere inter ea referre quæ

non sint. v. g. *aut et vel cum sive, seu non commutari debet. Sive, seu, dici solet de iisdem rebus duplex nomen gerentibus: aut et vel de diversis.* In this, as in many other instances, Scheller has rather *indicated* than *led* the way; has rather pointed out what *ought* to be defined, than *has* himself defined it. If the reader will refer to his explanations of *quamquam, id, oportet, et, propter, ut, ad, neque, in, solum, sed,* and of their synonyms, I think he will allow that much remained to be done and undone.

Sive, per apocopen seu, suggests a second (name or thing, as the case may be), which if (si) put in the place of the first (ve) would equally admit of that which has been predicated. (It may be explained ve, si potius sit. Now ve puts two or more things on an equality in a certain respect.) The two things, though equal ad idem, are not mutato nomine eadem, as Scheller and Crombie infer from partial quotations. Quid perturbatius hoc ab urbe discessu, sive potius turpissima fugâ. o fortunatum hominem, qui hujusmodi nuncios, seu potius Pegasos habet. Aristarchus, et ætate nostra Palæmon, vocabulum sive appellationem nomini subjecerunt. quo non arbiter Hadriæ major, tollere seu ponere vult freta. (Had Faciolati attended to the true force of seu, he would not have remarked semel tantum ponitur etiam cum necessario repetendum videtur.) When it is

a priore intended to specify two or more different cases, (each being equally in point,) sive or seu, or both are repeated. Ita, sive casu, sive consilio decorum, pœnas perolvit. sive sic est, sive illo modo. Superstitio instat et urget, et quo te cumque verteris, persequitur: sive tu vatem, sive tu omen audieris: sive immolatis, sive avem aspexeris: si Chaldæum, si haruspicem videris: si fulserit, si tonuerit: si tactum aliquid erit de cœlo, si ostenti simile natum factumve quippiam. in tantas brevi creverant opes, seu maritimis, seu terrestribus fructibus, seu multitudinis incremento, seu sanctitate disciplinæ. sive hac, seu meliore via perges, a me quidem, &c. seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere existimarent; sive quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent. The origin of the meaning of *sive* may be seen in a quotation from Plautus; Si, hercle, scivissem, sive adeo joculari dixisset mihi, se illam amare, nunquam facerem ut illam amanti abducerem.

In explaining *sive* and *seu*, one synonymist has seized upon an *Accident*, and exhibited it as the differentia of the word, whilst another has brought forward a *Proprium* as the distinctive power of the word.

Ad with its accusative indicates, *first, the object to which a real motion is made, or an action is, metaphorically, directed.* May be rendered *to, towards.*

Secondly, it indicates *the effect intended by an action, to the production of which it is directed.* May be rendered *for, to produce.*

Thirdly, it indicates *the point of time, space, number, quantity, &c. to which an action continues, metaphorically moving to this object through other time, space, &c.* May be rendered *up to, as far as.*

Fourthly, it indicates *that to which something is added, addition being a motion of a thing from one to another.* It may be rendered *in addition to, besides.*

Fifthly, it indicates *that place, time, to which something having already been moved, and being able to move no farther, remains close to, and therefore signifies proximity.* May be rendered *close to, at.*

The reader will not fail to remark the analogy between this latter sense of *ad* and that sense of *in* which does not imply motion. In each case the motion has ceased, and the state in which the thing moved then remains is the meaning indicated by the preposition.

We will now proceed to examine each of the senses of *ad*.

First, Mater ardetes in filium literas ad me misit. cum ego ad Heracleam accederem. cum senatus ad Cæsarem supplex accederet. regressus ad.

Africam. ire ad militiam. ad meridiem spectans. vias ad. scripsit ad me. mandata ad populum. accusare ad populum. convertere navem ad puppim. quod ad fratrem promiserat. genus orationis quo uti ad vulgus nemo possit.

Secondly, Non ad vulnus sed ad speciem valere videntur. qui ad fraudem calidi sunt. plus hujus inopia possit ad misericordiam quam illius opes ad crudelitatem. non enim ad iudiciorum certamen, sed ad aurium voluptatem. sive illa vestis mutatio ad luctum ipsorum sive ad deprecationem valet. Domus Mutii commendavit adolescentiam Rutili ad opinionem innocentiae et juris scientiae. ad nullam rem utile. deus coelum ad volubilitatem rotundavit. ad ludibrium, quietem, ornatum, usum, laudem, querelam, exemplum, suspicionem, caedem, spem, avaritiam, fructum, voluntatem, causam, veritatem, rem, rationem, conjecturam, scientiam quaestum. In all these cases action is as much implied, and ought to be understood, as in the following uses of ad where it is more clearly expressed: ad opprimendum, ad defendendum, ad probandum, placandum, dicendum, imitandum, &c. ad hoc efficiendum. ad illud recuperandum.

All those examples, to which the dictionaries give a variety of such meanings as in *reference to, according to, after, &c.* would class under.

this second sense, and mutatis mutandis be explained by the original meaning of *direction to*.

Ad privatum dolorem luctuosum, ad rationem reipublica gloriosum. ratio vitæ mirabilis ad laudem. sordidum est ad famam. pecuniam meam contemnitis et recte, est enim ad vulgi opinionem mediocris, ad tuam nulla, ad meam mediocris. ad spem obtinendæ veritatis gravissima, ad contentionem dicendi leviora. velim consideres quid faciendum putes, primum *προς το ασφαλες*, deinde ad opiniones. neque ad usum meliores, neque ad speciem pulchriores. ad exemplum amissi imperii. ad Græcorum consuetudinem disputare. ad morem. ad legem. ad errorem multitudinis religionis simulacra fingere. nemo Catone commodior comior, moderatior fuit ad omnem rationem humanitatis. describere pecuniam ad rationem Pompeii. hi omnes multa ad veritatem admirabilia dixerunt. ad istam orationem brevis est defensio. quid id ad civitatem. nihil ad rem. ad omnia cæcitas mentis. ad hæc igitur cogita. ad meum sensum et ad illud iudicium nihil potest esse laudabilius.

Thirdly, Si ad centesimum annum vixisset. vigilant ad multam noctem. (up to far in the night.) Si Catilina in urbe ad hunc diem remansisset. Sophocles ad summam senectutem Tragoedias fecit. usque ad id tempus. ille ad breve tempus severitatem postulavit. hæc res ad breve tempus du-

ratura est. legere orationem ad eum finem quem memoria possit comprehendere. quem ad finem se effrenata jactabit audacia. Salutares sententiæ, quibus ad hanc diem diximus. patriam non servandam ad reditum nostrum. nos hic te ad mensem Januarium expectamus. Bestiæ quæ ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus. ab hora octava ad vesperum collocuti sumus. cum ad fauces vos repleveris. de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt. verbum ad literam immutatum. ad numerum. ad verbum. ad summum. hæc iste ad insaniam concupiverat. ineptus ad summam impudentiam. incautos ad satietatem trucidatis. ad quatuor millia hominum.

Fourthly, Si ad cætera vulnera hanc quoque mortiferam plagam inflixisses. quæro a vobis quid sit, quod ad jus pontificium civile appetatis. ad hoc promissa barba, et capilli efferaverant speciem oris. Consul ad id, quod pridie prætermisisse pugnandi occasionem videbatur; tunc quoque &c. ad has tot tantasque res. ad hunc numerum quingentos singuli sument.

Fifthly, Cum ad Cabystra quinque dies essem commoratus. si fatum fuit exercitum populi Romani ad lacum Thrasymenum interire. habes hortos ad Tyberim. Lucius Cæsar erat ad portas. villa mea ad Lucrinum. ad omnes introitus homines armatos opponit. stare ad curiam. facere sacrificum ad aram. cum senatus habitus esset

ad Apollinis, rami ad terram jacent, quidam ad medium januæ sedentes, cum ad rhedam pugnari viderent, dicere ad subsellia. Dionysius ad me fuit bene mane. Ad lucem denique arcte dormire cæpi, aliquis ad vinum disertus. Turdi eodem revolant ad æquinoctium vernum, venire ad tempus, vester honos ad mei temporis diem petitus, non ad alienæ petitionis occasionem interceptus, ad extremum manus dedit, quo vase utebatur ad festos dies, et ad hospitem adventum, quorum ad ætatem laus eloquentiæ perfectum non fuit, isque rem integram ad reditum suum jussit esse, tu, demerso me et equo ad ripam.

Utilitatem. The property of being useful. Utility in the abstract, that quality in *things* which enables *persons* to use them for some good purpose.

Artes in quibus non utilitas quæritur necessaria, sed animi libera quædam oblectatio, referre omnia ad utilitatem et omnia facere causa sua, utilitas in deliberando finis, utilitatis specie duci, utilitates ex amicitia maximæ capiuntur, utilitatem afferre, esse utilitati amicis et reipublicæ, utilitate hominum nihil debet homini esse antiquius. Cum omni utilitate quam dii hominibus dederunt ars aliqua conjuncta est, per quam illa utilitas percipi possit, nec tamen nostræ nobis utilitates omittendæ, aliisque tradendæ. ni-

hil de utilitatibus, nihil de commodis suis cogitare.

Usus is best understood as contrasted with *habitus*, which signifies mere possession, whereas *usus* is *that actual using or practising, by which persons avail themselves of the utilitates in things*. Thus the *utilitas amicitiae*, &c. can only be enjoyed by the *domesticus usus*, &c.

First, *Usus frequens, qui omnium magistrorum præcepta superat. usus est magister optimus. usus, exercitatioque forensis. rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. nec virtutis usum modo sed ipsum habitum (mere possession of) per se esse præclarum. usus nauticarum rerum. usus belli. et ætate et usu doctus. quippe qui usum in republica magnum habere debes. cum ad tuam summam prudentiam tantus usus accesserit. usus rerum maximarum. communis usus. usus quotidianus. assiduus usus uni rei deditus. ad usum agrestem. humanos in usus. ad usus hominum. usus vitæ. (In the most *abstract* sense, *usus* means the usings or practisings, the uses and practices of life, of the arts, &c.) more particularly, *Membrorum usum nullum habere. quem ex quaque bellua usum habere possemus. arborum consectio magnos usus affert ad navigia facienda. quod supervacuum sit, aut usum nullum habeat. Apollonius multis in rebus, mihi magno usui fuit. usui esse ad condenda jura. uti muscæ,**

culices odio et malo et molestiæ: bono usui estis nulli. capable of being made a good use of. ad omnia hæc magis opportunus nec magis ex usu tuo nemo est. Est mihi cum eo domesticus usus et consuetudo. conjunctus magno usu familiaritatis. mihi cum eo vicinitas et magnus usus. nam et inter nosmetipsos vetus usus intercidit.

Commodum. (cum modus.) Whatever possesses the quality of being, first, *according to or in unison with the measure of some other thing, person, &c.* mutatis mutandis: second, of being *according to or in unison with the measure of man's nature in general.*

First, Salutem reipublicæ meis commodis et rationibus prætuli. est ejus, qui aliis præsit, eorum quibus præsit commodis utilitatique servire. quibus contra valetudinis commodum laborandum est. tu quod commodo tuo fiat. servire commodis et utilitati alicujus. dignitatem reipublicæ suis commodis præferre.

Secondly, Qui utilitatem defendet, enumerabit commoda pacis. dimicare de honore, gloria, cæterisque commodis. præterea commoda et incommoda considerantur ab naturâ data animo et corpori. incommoda vitæ sapientes commodorum compensatione leniunt.

If we remember that a thing is utilis, when it can be used as an *instrument* to effect something,

and commodus when it agrees and harmonizes with some *state* of persons or things, we shall not confound the distinctive qualities of these words.

Opportunitas. The quality of being opportunus, (from *portus*, a harbour, and *ob*, fronting the vessel as it sails, and therefore easy of access,) i. e. *the quality of being suited in the circumstances of place, time, &c.* (mutatis mutandis,) *to something to be done.*

Opportunitas idoneorum ad agendum temporum. certe in armis locorum valet opportunitas. deinceps de ordine rerum et temporum opportunitate dicendum est. itaque hac opportunitate annuli usus reginæ stuprum intulit. enumerari non possunt fluminum opportunitates. considera quæ sit utilitas quæque opportunitas membrorum.

Occasio. *The quality of being suitable in respect of time.* (Ob-casus intimating that the thing falls in our way at the happy moment.)

Tempus actionis opportunum, Græce *συναγία*, Latine appellatur occasio. habere occasionem ad agendum aliquid. occasio occurret, data est, &c. amplam occasionem nactus. occasionem regnandi captare, amittere, tenere, &c.

See also fructus, emolumentum, lucrum, quæstus.

Semper. *Continually, without cessation.* It

is applied to past, present, and future, both absolutely and relatively.

Quod semper movetur æternum est. heri semper lenitas verebar quorsum evaderet.

Omni tempore, *at every individual portion of time*, at each instant. Omni tempore pacis auctor fuisset.

In tempus. *For the time*. To last so long.

In omne tempus. *For all time*. For ever.

Eo tempore. *At that time*.

Eo tempore omni. *At that time, inclusively of the whole* of it.

Ad tempus. 1. *Suited to the time*; directed to that individual time. 2. *Up to a time*; continuing to a certain time.

Per tempus. *During a given time*.

Pro tempore. *For, according, or proportioned to the time*; as much as the time allowed.

Ex tempore. *Arising out of the time*; as the time suggested.

Sub tempus. *About the time* something else is doing.

Cum expresses union: for example, first, *the union of two or more persons in some action; also of a person and thing, (when to the latter a sort of personality is attached;)* and lastly, *of a person and thing, (when to the latter importance as an instrument is attached.)*

Second, *the union of an action, property, &c.*

with some quality or circumstance in the agent or some other person.

Thirdly, the union or coincidence of an action with the time of another action, or more properly with another action as to time.

First, vagamur egentes cum conjugibus et liberis. sæpe admirari soleo cum hoc C. Lælio. quare id quoque velim cum illa videas, ut, &c. cum aliquo facere. mecum, tecum, nobiscum, &c. quicum, quibuscum facere.

Also, considerate cum vestris animis. sic habeo statutum cum animo et deliberatum. si cum animis vestris longo intervallo recordari illud vitam volueritis.

Lastly, et tu cum gladio cruento comprehensus es. cum ferro invadere in aliquem. immissi cum falcibus multi locum purgarunt. Julium cum his ad te literis misi.

Second, homo quæ aget ea molitur cum labore operoso et molesto. quod cum spe magna sis ingressus, id non exequi usque ad extremum. perspicere aliquem rem cum consilio et cura. inscius faciendi cum aliqua solertia judicandi. semper magno cum metu dicere incipio. ira procul absit, cum quâ nihil recte fieri potest. oratorem cum severitate audiri, poetas autem cum voluptate. consensio in naves cum fuga. omnia rabide appetentem cum inexplebili cupiditate. hisce omnibus Catilina cum reipublicæ salute, et

cum tua peste ac perniciē proficiscere. recte medicina ista tentatur cum eo tamen ne prae-cordia dura sint (Celsus).

Thirdly, Sulla pariter cum ortu solis castra metabatur. is cum prima luce Pomponii domum venit. exit cum nuntio Crassus. ego ne abs te abii hinc hodie cum diluculo.

Conjuxi. conjungere, to join into one, to unite. (Cum, jungere.) quanquam nos ab ineunte ætate illius usus, consuetudo, studiorum etiam honestissimorum societas, similitudoque conjunxit. conjungere bellum (to carry on together). conjungere aliquam secum (to unite in marriage). conjungere amicitias, affinitates. conjungi fœdere. Jungere is applied to persons, things, and feelings, with cum and ad: hence besides conjungere we have also *adjungere, to join on, or attach*, implying not the entire union of conjungere, but that the things joined are, as it were, joined *at one point*, and often intimates the *priority*, either in time or consideration, of that to which the other adjungitur.

Non equidem recuso, sed te adjungo socium. qui ad virtutem adjungunt voluptatem. juris scientiam eloquentiæ quasi ancillulam adjunxisti. nam illud tertium quod Aristoteles adjunxit, minus est necessarium. hic dies valde me Crasso adjunxit. ad eorum causam me adjungerem. itaque ad hanc elegantiam verborum adjungit illa oratoria ornamenta. The same explanation of

cum and *ad* in composition, may be applied to the compounds of the following synonymes of *jungo*.

Nectere, to twist one thing round another, also to make a twine of two or more things. *Laqueum cuiquam. funem alicui. vinculum collo. comam myrto. flores, coronam, brachia, foedera, choros, insidias, causas, verba, carmina, &c. nectere aliud ex alio nectitur.* (not merely after, but in consequence of) *ex hoc genere causarum fatum a Stoicis nectitur.*

Plicare, to fold, (*πλεκω*.) *Charta plicatur. anguis sua membra plicat. complicamus epistolam. Applicare* is of very wide extent, but if we keep in view the original notions in the corporeal things of *flat surfaces*, secondly, of bringing these surfaces *close together*, we shall see the rationale of *applicare scalas mœnibus. se alicui in itinere. navem ad ripam. so. ad aliquem quasi patronum. ad amicitiam, ad virtutem, ad honores, ad philosophiam, ad scribendum. applicare aures, dextram, corpus, &c.*

Plectere, to twist, (*πλεκω*.) *Super orbibus orbem. plectitque comas et volvit in orbem.* (Where the dictionaries translate “to strike or beat,” perhaps they ought to translate “to punish,” referring to the punishment of torture by twisting. Hence also *complector* with its applications, *complecti spatium munitionibus. aliquem brachiis, benevolentia,*

caritate, familiaritate. complecti aliquid animo. complecti sententiam, judicium, &c. memoriâ, orationê, &c.

Texere, to weave, applied to the things interwoven, and to that which is produced by their interweaving.

Texere flores, virgas, crates, telam, vestem. The metaphorical application to naves, pyram, sermones, epistolas, &c. will be clear if we keep in view both the *number* of the materials, and *care* in uniting them, and that the product is so *different* from the disjoined parts. The same remark applies to the force of memoria, crimen, &c. contextitur.

Ligare, to bind any thing, also to make any thing into a bond. Fascia ligare crus. ligare vulnere veste: thence ligari pace, pacto, &c.: also ligare pacta. colligare manus. colligare sententiam verbis. colligavit se cum multis. (but *colligere* (from λεγω) is to gather together. Viros, vasa, togam, numerum, even gradum, spiritum, vocem, animum, se, gratiam, benevolentiam colligere.)

Glutinare (gluten, glue) to stick together by means of gum or glue. Metaphorice. vitæ dissimilitudo non est passa voluntates nostras consuetudine conglutinari.

Copulare (copula a collar) to join as if by collars. Sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem, copulatas esse docui cum voluptate. nihil est

amabilius nec copulativus, quam morum similitudo bonorum. copulare verba (to unite two words into one). societatem cum aliquo. The idea of running together as in the yoke is kept sight of.

Stringere, to draw tight as with a cord. Stringit vitta comas. Metaphorice, ad stringendam fidem. stringere gladium (to grasp). qui orbem terrarum constringit novis legibus. quæ dissipata sunt et divulsa conglutinare et ratione quâdam constringere. constringi virtute, libidinibus &c.

Stipare, to cram into, to fill full, (στύβω) apes liquentia mella stipant. Antonius senatum armatis stipat.

Denso, to thicken. Densantur nocte tenebræ. densatur globus militum.

Continere, (cum-teneo.) The use of the words teneo and habeo is almost as unlimited as *the employment of the human hand, and the extent of human property.* Mutatis mutandis, the sense is evident. Tenere locum, solum, consuetudinem, cursum, vitam, personam. tenere se ab. tenere se domi. tenere aliquem aliquo loco. tenere aliquid manu, ore, imperio. teneri culpâ, irâ, &c.

Tenet consuetudo, fama, lex. imber tenet per noctem (lasts). spes, ira tenet. animus tenet (has hold on, understands).

Continere means therefore, *to restrain from straying or bursting forth, (as cohibere.)*

Mundus omnia complexu suo coerces et continet. vita corpore et spiritu continetur. honestas tota his quatuor virtutibus continetur. nulla res vehementius rempublicam continet quam, &c. continere memoriâ. hoc argumentum continet res utiles.

Risum, animum, oculos, cupiditates, linguam, se, continere. se a cupidine, a supplicio alicujus. continere se in studiis. se ruri. hostem continere quam angustissimè. odorem, frumentum, discipulos continere.

Concilio. First, to press together as fullers do cloths in washing. Vestimentum apud fullorem cum cõgitur conciliari dicitur. Metaphorice, conciliare corpora, animos, voluntates, opem, benevolentiam. conciliare nobis, ad nostras utilitates. legiones sibi pecuniâ. pacem inter cives. homines inter homines. aliquem ad aliquem. conciliare ad me audiendum benevolentiam. conciliare fidem, gratiam, auctoritatem, amorem alicui.

Cogere, to drive together as cattle. (cum-agere.) *agere* means, first, to lead (*αγειν*). That this was once the sense of the Latin verb, may not only be inferred from its *derivation*, but also from the sense of *agmen*, a leading, (as the Scotch say, "a great following,") a number sufficient to be led against the enemy; also from the *imperative age*, en age, rumpe moras, (*lead on, proceed.*) age sane, omnes citatis equis advolant Romam.

age dum, ad pugnam, &c. (absurdly translated *come*, &c.) and also because *a great number of senses of agere are not analogical without admitting this meaning*, and are perfectly so on the admission of it. No doubt it was lost partly from the prevalence of *duco* and its compounds, and partly because of its extensive application in senses, which, though derived from *agere* "to lead," had almost lost the traces of the original sense. From *agere* to lead, proceeds therefore, second, *agere to conduct any thing to its issue*. *Agere suum negotium*, rem, rempublicam, censuram, bellum, causas. (Whence *agere*, (by itself,) to *plead*; *agere adversus aliquem*. *agere cum aliquo ex jure civili*. *agere furti*. *agere aliquem reum incestus*.) *agere annum*, ætatem, ævum. *agere vitam*. (Whence *agere* (by itself) to *live*;) *agere forum*. *agere cum populo*; and thus *agere*, by itself, is to conduct or manage any business, which the context indicates. *eo tendit*, *id agit*. *id agunt*, ut viri boni esse videantur. ut ad te scriberem mecum egerunt. *agere ex animo*. *agere cum aliquo*. In the passive, *agitur* often expresses the thing is under conduct, the thing is in hand: *tua res agitur*. *agitur populi Romani gloria*. *veritas*, *judicium*, &c. *agitur*. *vis legis agitur*, *agitur præclare si est significatio virtutis*. *agere aliud*, to be conducting or attending to something else than the matter in hand,

whereas age *hoc*, conduct or attend to what you are about. agere personam. agere Cheræam is to conduct through all the scenes of the drama an assumed character; (whence agere alone is *to act* on the stage,) and agere amicum, principem, ministrum, to play the part of, &c. in real life; agere se pro equite, to play one's own part as if one were, &c. That agere should be used in so many senses, is to be expected from *warriors who had been shepherds*.

Whether the third sense of agere, *to drive*, arose from such a combination as agere currum, to manage a chariot, &c. where driving would form the principal part of the management: or whether from the union of the actions in the same person, and in reference to the same object as agere pecus, (for if it meant in its original sense "to conduct," it might easily pass into the sense "to drive:") however this be, the sense is evident in agere hostem, agere currum, agere in exilium. Metaphoricè, agere radices in profundum. agere spumas. ut ferri agique res suas videntur. (the *αγειν και φερειν* of the Greeks.) We now return to the compound *cogere*; first, *to drive together, or lead together*. Cogere agmen, (to condense.) frigore mel cogit hyems. Crassus pollicitus est se jus civile, quod nunc diffusum et dissipatum est, in certa genera coacturum et ad artem facilem redacturum. cogere homines armatos. cogere

pecuniam a civitatibus. comam in nodum. oleam, naves, senatum, &c. neminem coegeris, ipsi convenierint sua sponte: thus it easily passes into its *second* sense of, *to compel*, as if to drive into a narrow space, in order to prevent escape. Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est. sed si res cogat. cogere ut &c.

Congregare, (cum-grex,) *to collect as a flock*. Cætera animantia congregari videmus, et stare contra dissimilia. dispersos homines unum in locum congregari. quicum te aut voluntas congregavit aut fortuna conjunxit.

Coacervare, *to heap together*, (acervus, a heap, from acus chaff, *axis* a point,) cogere et coacervare pecunias.

Accumulare (cumulus is, as has been already mentioned, what is heaped on a measure over and above), accumulare is then to *add to an already formed heap*; cædem cædi accumulatur. auget addit, accumulatur.

Contrahere, *to draw together*. Contrahere exercitum. in unum locum contrahere. contrahere aliquid in acervum. contrahitur animus formidine. contrahere frontem (to knit the brow), contrahere vela. contrahere mortem, (to draw disease as it were from infections.) damnum, piaculum, periculum, molestias, nefas, contrahere, (as if from various sources.) contrahere tempus, orationem &c. (to contract or draw together, and therefore to shorten.)

contrahere negotium, venditionem, &c. (to bring together, as it were, the several elements of any business, sale, &c.)

Congerere (q. $\pi\iota\sigma\omega$) *to bring or carry together.*
Congerere opes. res omnes pulcherrimas Mithridates ex tota Asia direptas in suum regnum con-gesserat. *congerere crimina* in aliquem. si omnia simul congesseris.

Comportare. (cum, portare.) Portare signifies properly *to carry goods from one place to another.* ($\pi\alpha\rho\omega$, $\pi\alpha\rho\sigma$, portus.) Memini cum hominem portarem ad Baias Neapoli octophoro. nulla navis quæ milites portaret. quorum corpora erant insueta ad onera portanda. portari in triumpho. portare humeris, collo, sinu, &c. com-portare arma, frumentum, aurum, prædas, &c.

Neque (ne-que) per apocopem *nec.*

First, *When one thing has been denied, without indication of farther denial being intended, and then another thing is also denied, as connected with it, neque and nec are used in reference to the second.* Nec and neque may in this manner *begin a sentence*, if they intimate a denial in *continuance* of some other denial before expressed or understood.

De Officiis, xxiii. 12. Qui autem *non* defendit *nec* obsistit, si potest injuriæ &c. xxvi. 5. *Nulla* sancta societas, *nec* fides regni est. xlii. 8. Nam fortis animus in homine *non* perfecto *nec* sapiente

&c. lvi. 4. *Nihil* autem est amabilius, *nec* copulatus &c. vi. 2. Hæ disciplinæ igitur si sibi consentaneæ esse velint, de officio *nihil* queant dicere: *neque* ulla officii præcepta &c. tradi possunt &c. xlii. 8. *Non* benefici, *neque* liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores judicandi sunt. lxviii. 2. *Non* est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate: nec qui invictum se a labore præstiterit, cum &c. lxxx. 6. Fortis vero et constantis est *non* perturbari in rebus asperis, nec tumultuantem de gradu dejici. xcii. 8. *Non* eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes, neque excludentes ab ejus usu suos.

Secondly, *But when two or more things are, a priore, intended to be denied*, (and not one denial to be made subordinate to or consequent to the other,) *nec or neque are put before the first, and are also repeated before the second*, (it may be remarked, that the first *nec or neque*, like our expression neither, *implies the second*,) thus,

a Neque, this ; neque, that.

b Nec, this ; nec, that.

c Neque, this ; nec, that.

d Nec, this ; neque, that.

a Neque, this ; neque, that.

De Officiis, iv. 13. Nulla enim vitæ pars, neque publicis neque privatis ; neque forensibus

neque domesticis in rebus ; neque &c. lxvi. 4. Nullique neque homini neque perturbationi animi, nec fortunæ succumbere. lxxvi. 6. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis, M. Scaurus C. Mario, neque, cum versaremur in republica &c. xcii. 11. Quæ primum bene parta sit, nullo neque turpi quæstu neque odioso. cxxiv. 8. Neque submissum et abjectum, neque se efferentem. So also cxxvii. 6. cxxxiii. 8.

b Nec, this ; nec, that.

xxxii. 7. Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea quæ &c, nec, si plus tibi noceant &c, contra officium est majus anteponi minori. lx. 1. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores &c. lxix. 8. Quidem homines severi et graves, nec populi nec principum mores ferre potuerunt.

c Neque, this ; nec, that.

De Officiis, v. 8. Hic, si sibi ipse consentiat, et non interdum naturæ bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit, nec justitiam, nec liberalitatem. lxiv. 8. Ex quo fit, ut neque disceptatione vinci se, nec ullo publico ac legitimo jure patiantur. lxxvii. 4. Neque enim in republica periculum fuit gravius umquam, nec majus otium. cii. 2. Eamque (rationem) neque præcurrant, nec propter pigritiam, aut ignaviam deserant. cx. 6. Neque enim attinet repugnare naturæ, nec quidquam sequi, quod &c. (perhaps this example belongs to No. 3. *a*.)

d Nec, this ; neque, that.

I believe there is not an instance of the sequence of *nec* followed by a single *neque* in the first book of the Offices.

Nec quid faciam scio ; neque tantum est in re quantus est sermo.

Thirdly, Neque and nec are also used to signify, not that a second thing is denied, but that the thing denied (to which the neque or nec is attached) is connected with a thing affirmed (either preceding or following). Nec and neque have here the force of et non : the et uniting two things, and the non denying one of them, (either the latter or the former, as the case may be.)

a Sometimes the affirmative precedes the negative connected with it by *neque* or *nec*.

Cic. de Officiis, ii. 8. Orationem autem Latinam legendis nostris efficias pleniorē. Nec vero arroganter hoc dictum existimari velim. xii. 6. Ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quæ suppedient et ad cultum et ad victum : nec sibi soli, sed conjugii, liberis, cæterisque &c. xiii. 7. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adjuncta est appetitio quædam principatus, ut &c. Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ est rationisque quod &c. xxv. 7. Quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniæ cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio, nemini nocens, vituperanda : sed fugienda semper injuria.

xl. 4. Eos omnes censores, quoad quisque eorum
 vixit, in æerariis reliquerunt: nec minus illum qui
 jurisjurandi fraude &c. xlviii. 9. demus, necne, in
 nostra potestate est. xlix. 1. Acceptorum autem
 beneficiorum sunt delectus habendi. Nec dubium,
 quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. i. 5.
 ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper cum Græcis
 Latina conjunxi neque id in philosophia solum
 sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci, &c. l. 6.
 quæ docendo, discendo, &c. consiliat inter se
 homines. neque ulla re longius absumus a natura
 ferarum, &c. lviii. 4. totaque domus quæ spectat
 in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere
 refugium. lxxxvi. 4. tradetque se totum reipub-
 licæ, neque opes aut potentiam consecrabitur.
 lxxxviii. 11. omnis animadversio contumelia vacare
 debet: neque ad ejus, qui, &c. sed ad reipublicæ
 utilitatem referri. lxxviii. 8. cavenda est etiam
 gloriæ cupiditas, &c. nec vero imperia expetenda,
 ac potius, &c. lxxii. 1. sed iis qui, &c. adipiscendi
 magistratus et gerenda respublica est. nec enim
 aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magni-
 tudo potest. lxxvi. 8. parvi enim sunt foris arma,
 nisi est consilium domi. nec plus Africanus, &c.
 quam eodem tempore P. Nasica, &c. lxxxiv. 7.
 qui classem ab Arginussis removendam, nec cum
 Atheniensibus dimicandum putabat. lxxxvi. 3.
 totamque eam sic tuebitur ut omnibus consulat.
 nec vero criminibus falsis in odium quemquam

vocabit. ciii. 1. ex quibus illud intelligitur, appetitus omnes contrahendos, &c. neque enim ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum, &c. cxlv. 5. quæ autem parva videntur esse delicta, neque a multis intelligi possunt. præsentī uti animo et consilio nec a ratione discedere.

6 Sometimes the affirmative *follows* the negative connected with it by nec or neque.

De Officiis x. 3. nec enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit deliberari solat, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis, utrum honestius; itemque duobus, &c. lxxii. 9. si quidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque victuri. c. 7. neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt. The following examples are taken from the Præcepta: itaque neque tu multum interfuisti rebus gerendis, et ego id semper egi, ne interessẽm nec miror et gaudeo: ut neque cessaret unquam (Scipio) et interdum colloquio non egeret. magistratus nec obedientem et noxium civem coercento.

The reader will observe, that these latter uses of the disjunctive particle have greater force than would result either from two negatives, or mutatis mutandis, two affirmatives: thus nuncii nobis tristes nec varii venerant has a force which would not belong to nuncii tristes et constantes, or nec læti nec varii.

1st. We have already seen that *ad* signifies, first, motion towards, and secondly, rest close to. In like manner *in* signifies, *first, motion into*, (from the exterior to the interior,) and *secondly, rest within*. From these two senses its other meanings are derived. Before considering the sense of *in* signifying *into*, it may be well to remark, that in the use of prepositions, more especially, it is necessary to avoid judging of the idiom of one language by that of another. The *modus concipiendi* of the Romans often gives a metaphorical motion to ideas, to which the English idiom ascribe rest. This idiom is therefore inexpressible in the English language, but the rationale of it is as comprehensible to the mind as that of the Greek compounds of *en*, which may be traced to the game of the Discus, and understood, though not expressed.

In then *first* signifies *motion into a place*, (real or metaphorical,) which place may be considered as the *recipient* of something from without.

In fines Eburnorum pervenerant. in Asiam mittere. conspicere in cœlum. qui ex civitate in senatum delecti estis. vocare aliquem in jus. ire in jus. in suspicionem vocatus est. (as we say, brought into a state of.) vocare aliquem ad se in nuptias. est id quidem in totam orationem confundendum. leges in omnes terras distributæ. quæ confecta in reliquum corpus dividuntur.

divisi eas tabulas toti Italiæ, divisi in omnes provincias. Gallia est omnis divisa in tres partes. tradere in custodiam vel pistrinum. redigere aliquem in potestatem suam. in illam orationem Metellinam addidi quædam. in tabulas inscribere. in hanc formulam omnia judicia conclusa et comprehensa sunt. quam commodissime putatur in solutam orationem illigari. ejus tetrarchiam. ex Græcis comitibus in unum collocarat. Cæsar itinera ita facit ut multos dies in oppidum ponat. plebs, in cujus tu infamiam ea contulisti. non omnes loci in omnem causam conveniunt. qui se consulatum in Bruti locum petere profitetur. mulier quæ in concubinæ locum duceretur. commutari ex veris in falsa. (this may be expressed idiomatically in English.) servulum in populum perduxit armatum.

As the substantive governed by *in* signifies the place (real or metaphorical) into which something is moved (really or metaphorically), *the use of in, with a substantive to signify the object towards which an action tends or is directed*, (for good or bad as the case may be, i. e. for or against,) is an easy step. Inflammati amore in patriam. indulgentes in liberos. obsequium in homines. religio in deos. merita, facta, consilia, &c. in rempublicam. gratus esse in aliquem. omnem orationem converti in increpandam Cæpionis fugam. in deplorandum interitum exercitus. summo studio op-

timoque in rempublicam consensu. illiberalis in aliquem. negligens in amicos. (not liberal towards, &c.) populum inflammare in improbos, aut incitatum in bonos mitigare. ita ad impietatem in deos, in homines adjunxit injuriam. impetum facere in aliquem, quod in hunc majus crimen expectemus, id quod apud Platonem est in philosophos dictum, suscipere odium infinitum in aliquem. invidia in aliquem. peccare in rempublicam. scribere carmen in aliquem.

The use of *in*, with a substantive to signify the object of an action, leads to the use of *in* with a substantive *to indicate that towards which the action has the relations expressed by the terms as to, in relation to, about.*

Jurare in certa verba. jurare in legem, in edicem, in litem. in hanc rem cognitorem me dedisti, auditis de eo in quem judices non estis. aliquem esse dominum in suos. hoc, si est in libris, in quem hominem et in quod tempus est? quis in hanc rem fuit arbiter? alter multos plane in omnes partes fefellit. quid in utramque partem mihi in mentem venit explicabo. in eam tabulam magni risus consequebantur. in eas ipsas res, quas improbiissime fecit, testimonium sumsit. sed quia de concessione loquebamur, in eam praecepta dedimus. in id quoque praecepta posuimus. tradere praecepta in singula causarum genera. lex scripta communiter in plures res, vel in aliquam certam

rem. facillime et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes. That relation which we express in English by the words *according to*, is intended in the following examples of *in*. Factum est in Africani sententiam. in ea ipsa verba, quæ adversarius ediderit, iudicium accipere. recitatæ sunt tabellæ in eandem fere sententiam.

The use of *in* with a substantive to indicate the object of an action, leads to *the use of in with a substantive to indicate the purpose or end proposed by the action*, which may be considered *morally* the object of the action. Often it may be desirable to supply a gerund, to agree with the accusative.

Qui semper et somno et cibo in vitam non in voluptatem uterentur. utilia in vitam hominum. pecunia in rem militarem datam. conscriptæ in Ciliciam legiones. in classem cadit omne nemus: prætor pecuniam in remiges imperabat. pecunia in classem erogata. puer qui tibi in tutelam est traditus. in frumentum imperatum. pecunia Pompeio decreta in rem frumentariam. omnium rerum in contrarias partes facultas ex iisdem suppeditatur locis. in eam sententiam multa dixit. duæ epistolæ in eandem rationem scriptam. cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu loquerentur. in sumptum mutuari ab aliquo. neque hæc in eam sententiam disputo, ut &c. hæc scripsi in eam partem ne &c. cum miles domum revenisset egissetque lege in hæreditatem paternam. id in eam

partem accepi. magnum sumptum in Timachridis prandium. in familiæ luctum nupsit. insumere laborem in aliquam rem.

The use of *in* with an accusative, to indicate in different degrees the object or end of an action, leads to the use of *in with an accusative signifying time, to indicate the time proposed by an action, (the temporal object, if the expression is allowable, of the action.)* Also the measure proposed of any action, quality, &c.

In proximum annum consulatum petere. consilia temporum sunt quæ in horas commutari vides. ad cænam invitavit in posterum diem. vivere in diem. non deterret sapientem mors quo minus in omne tempus reipublicæ consulat. eum in perpetuum modestiorem esse spero. auctio constituta in mensem Januarii. in reliquum tempus aliquid sancire. prædicuntur in multos annos. in hunc annum. hoc in omne factum et in omne tempus idem valet. reliquum relinquitur in audientium judicium. horti quam in diem proscripti sint velim scire.

Vulturnus, si a serena cœli parte cœperit flare, non durabit in noctem : at subsolanus in majorem partem noctis extenditur. hostilem in modum sævire. incredibilem in modum concursus fiunt ex agris.

The transition is natural from the use of *in*, with an accusative to indicate to what measure an action

proceeds to *the use of in, with an accusative to indicate the numbers proposed by an action, the number to which the action extends. The numerical object, if the expression is allowable, of the action.*

Titurius quaternos denarios in singulas vini amphoras portorii nomine exegit; for each individual; duodena describit in singulos homines jugera. ut in singulas colonias ternos cives Romanos facere posset.

Secondly, in signifies in a place, among persons, in a circumstance, action, time, &c.

Place. In senatu dicere. in occulto stare. in sole ambulare. in oculis omnium. genus faciarum æquabiliter in omni sermone fusum.

Person. Esse in clarissimis civibus. hic in magnis viris non est habendus. Cæsaris autem in barbaris erat nomen obscurius. in perditis et desperatis. in septem numeratur.

Circumstance. State. Se in ea re maximas diis gratias agere. tu in lictoribus, in toga prætexta esse consulem putas. habere aliquid in promptu.

Action. Patris studium in filiis erudiendis. summo in amore esse. in ista sum sententia.

Time. In his annis. in hoc tempore. in pueritia. in bello. in pace.

Solum. Modo, &c.

In order to ascertain precisely the force of the

adverbs, we must look to the nouns from which they are derived.

Modus is properly *a measure of length or quantity*. Modos, quibus metirentur rura. salis contriti semunciam, in eandem modum musti adjicere. Then *a measure of sound*: Lyrici modi. musicis modis exercitus accendere. flebilibus modis concinere. tibicinis modi. Then *measure generally*: omnium quæ fiunt quæque dicuntur ordo et modus. terminare magnitudinis et diurnitatis modum. finem et modum transire. modo et ratione aliquid facere. servare, imponere, definire, constituere, adhibere, facere modum. bono modo aliquid facere.

Non semper tractantur uno modo. omni modo egi cum rege. si humano modo peccasset. tentat mille modis. nullo modo. sine me meo vivere modo. pecorum modo trahi, occidi, capi. mirum in modum. servilem in modum. majorem in modum.

Modo. Keeping the derivation of the adverb always in view, its senses, which otherwise appear unconnected and inexplicable, arrange themselves in a clear analogy. It is used to express *the smallest measure*, first, of *time*, second, of *quantity*. (The old English expression, "in a measure," comes near it.) Of course the notion of this measure being always the very *smallest*, is attached to it by custom, (that *norma loquendi*), and could not be inferred from its derivation.

: First, *Modo*, in or with the smallest measure of time, if past, *an instant ago*; in the smallest measure of time reckoned back: if future, *in an instant*, in the smallest measure of time reckoned forward.

Nunc uxorem me esse meministi tuam: modo cum dicta in me ingerebas, odium, non uxor eram. modo enim hoc malum in rempublicam invasit. Davum modo timere sensi ubi nuptias futuras esse audivit. in qua urbe modo gratia, auctoritate floruimus, in ea nunc iis omnibus caruimus. advenis modo? (are you but now come?) Admodum. (on the instant.) de signis et furtis tacet modo quasi minus idoneis ad furorem avaritiæ. (but now silent.) vos modo parcite. mane modo: etiam percontabor. vide modo: etiam atque, etiam considera. cave modo. domum modo ibo.

Hence *modo* also means *in or with the smallest measure of time partitive*, (independent of past, present, and future,) *at one instant, at another instant*.

O academiam volaticam modo huc, modo illuc. modo hoc, modo illud audire. modo unum tum autem plures. modo mundum tum mentem putat. modo egens, repente dives. modo menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo cœlo, tum autem signis cœlestibus. modo temperantiam, sæpius vinolentiam. niti modo ac statim concidere. modo ait, modo negat. sol modo accedens, tum autem recedens. Nam modo ducebam ducentia retia pisces;

nunc in mole sedens moderabar arundine linum. modo adversum hostes, interdum in solitudines pergere. So with aliquando. nonnunquam.

Secondly, modo indicates *some property or action being in the smallest measure*; the word expressing this property immediately follows or precedes the modo.

Hæc omnibus qui ea *mediocriter modo* (ever so little moderately) considerent, pertractata esse possunt. si vos *mediocris modo* fortuna reipublicæ adjuverit. Si Pompeius *paulum modo* sibi placere ostenderit. servitutem, *honorificam modo*, non aspernari. hi *unum modo*, quale sit, suspicantur. *Vide modo* etiam atque etiam considera. vici si *modo permansero*, quæ secundis rebus *delectationem modo* habere videbantur, nunc vero etiam salutem. ut non *modo secunda sperare* debeas, sed etiam adversa fortissimo animo ferre. vir bonus, quem Fimbria etiam, non *modo Socrates* noverat. non *modo facere* sed ne cogitare quidem audebit, quod &c. in hac arte, si *modo est hæc ars*. is senem per epistolas pellexit, *modo non* montes auri pollicens.

Solum, (from solus.) As modo (in its second sense) expresses the measure of an action, &c. namely, its being in the least measure, *merely, barely, scarcely, only just done, &c.* compared with something more full and complete, (expressed or understood,) so *solum* expresses *that*

an action &c. is alone, or not accompanied by another action (expressed or understood).

For *solus* means *alone, exclusive of all others.*

Ea dicam vobis audientibus, quæ ipsi soli, re integra, sæpe dixi. Stoici soli ex omnibus eloquentiam virtutem esse dixerunt: solus solum conveni: solum unum hoc vitium affert senectus hominibus. We talk of loca sola, solitary places, (where a person would be solus.) De re una solum dissident: de cæteris mirifice congruunt. nos nuntiationem solum habemus, consules etiam inspectionem. non solum publicas sed etiam privatas injurias ultus est. quibus opibus non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed pœne ad perniciem suam.

Tantum (from tantus) *first, expresses the measure of an action, quality, &c. being in the same ratio as something else, expressed or understood: (so much, so far.)* Nec tantum proficiebam, quantum volebam. tantum, quantum sat est. Romanis ferme par numerus erat: equitum copiis tantum, quod Ætoll accesserant, superabant.

Secondly, tantum expresses so much of an action, quality, &c. as to produce a certain effect, or to be of a certain amount, or just to stop short of producing a certain effect, or being of a certain amount, expressed or understood. Rex tantum auctoritate ejus motus est, ut Tisaphernem hostem judicaverit. id autem tantum abest ab

officio. ut nihil officio magis possit esse contrarium. tantum abest ne enervetur oratio ut &c. nomen tantum virtutis usurpas: quid ipsa valeat ignoras. you do this much only, namely, you use &c. nihil dicam arrogantius, tantum dicam. so much I *will* say, namely, &c. dixit tantum, nihil ostendit. so far he went that he &c. homines rusticani nomine tantum noti. thus far known, by name. Lucilius hosce secutus, mutatis tantum pedibus. tantum quod ex Arpinati veneram, cum mihi a te litteræ redditæ sunt. tantum quod ultimam imposuerat Pannonico bello Cæsar manum, cum. thus much had been done, namely, that Cæsar had &c. tantum, ne noceas, dum prodesse velis. thus much, so far, namely, that you just avoid harming whilst &c. tantum quod hominem non nominat. tantum quod aratoribus obsides non dedit. cum agger promotus ad urbem, vineæque tantum non jam adjunctæ (so far, so much, that they were only not) mœnibus essent. cum hostes tantum non accessierint.

Dumtaxat. (derived from dum and taxo. Indeed the word is found thus divided.) The Latin critics derive taxo from tago, to touch, (whence also comes tango, as pango from pago,) and explain the rationale, because things cannot be estimated without touching and examining. But this is very forced; and though the adverb taxim with tax and tagax may be thus derived, it is evident, both

from the fact that no instance of *taxo* is found in the supposed primary sense of to touch, and also from its meanings being, first, *to rank*, second, *to estimate*, and from the derivation of other similar words, *taxator*, *taxiota*, *taxatus*: from all these it is evident that *taxo* comes from *τασσω* ordino.

Now the meaning which lexicographers give to *dumtaxat* is *only*. Scheller seems to consider it as a synonym used for *solum*. This is very unsatisfactory, as it is not probable that the force of the two words, *dum* and *taxat*, was so entirely lost to the Roman ear.

The *dum*, as it appears to me, must signify a continuance of something implied by *taxat*. If *taxat* be used in a kind of bye-sense, as we use the expression, "Whilst a man could tell a hundred," or the vulgarism, "Before one could say Jack Robinson," (which the *sort of action* implied by *taxat* would hardly lead one to expect,) the meaning would be "for a short time." But this is not borne out by the contexts. But if the word *taxat* retains its proper force, altered only from an active to a *neuter* sense, and means ranks, (takes rank,) then the meaning, with but little force on the *dum*, will be, "*so far as it is of importance*," and will answer to the vulgarism, "so far as it goes."

Nos animo duntaxat vigemus, etiam magis quam cum florebamur: re familiari comminuti

sumus. Here the meaning we have given to *duntaxat* agrees well with the context, in which Cicero is describing the outrages of Clodius, and the loss of property to himself and his friends.

Quis enim aut diligat quem metuit, aut eum a quo se metui putat? Coluntur tamen simulatione duntaxat ad tempus. Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderint, tum intelligitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum.

Cur ergo non iidem in jure civili, præsertim cum in causis et in negotiis et in foro conteramur, satis instructi esse possumus ad hoc duntaxat, ne in nostra patria peregrini atque advenæ esse videamus.

Hæc sunt omnia ingenii vel mediocris, exercitationis autem maximæ: artem quidem et præcepta duntaxat hactenus requirunt, ut certis dicendi luminibus ornentur.

Valde me Athenæ delectarunt: urbs duntaxat et urbis ornamentum et hominum amores in te et in nos quædam benevolentia: sed multum est philosophiæ.

Sin autem jejunitatem et siccitatem et inopiam, dummodo sit polita, dum urbana, dum elegans, in Attico genere ponit, hoc recte duntaxat: sed quia sunt in Atticis alia meliora, videat, ne ignoret et gradus et dissimilitudines et vim et varietatem Atticorum.

Here the meaning of duntaxat could not be *only*.

Hanc ego maximam hæreditatem a patre accepi, qui primus omnium Asiam Græciamque incolentium in amicitiam vestram venit, eamque perpetua et constanti fide ad extremum finem vitæ perduxit: nec animum duntaxat vobis bonum ac fidelem præstitit, sed omnibus interfuit bellis, quæ in Græcia gessistis, terrestribus navalibusque.

Primum dico pro capite fortunisque regis: (Deiotari) quod ipsum etsi non iniquum est in tuo duntaxat periculo: tamen est ita inusitatum regem capitis reum esse, ut ante hoc tempus non sit auditum.

What other action &c. can be here meant to be excluded by duntaxat in the sense of *only*? But in the sense of "as far as that goes," as far as this *pretended* danger can be allowed weight, the meaning is at once agreeable to derivation, and to the force of the whole oration.

Unice. As unicus is more strongly exclusive than solus, so is unice than solum; for solus, *signifying one or more exclusive of others*, implies that there *are* others; but unicus, signifying the *only one*, or (to use a vulgar idiom) the *only ones*, implies that there are *no* others. Unicus filius. unicus maritus. unicum solamen. quæ bona unica

sunt. (which have no others like them.) unico magis unicus. (thus, dearer than the dearest.) qui me unum et unicum amicum habuit. (one and only.) ad eam rem unicus. (the only one fitted for.) unicus dux. (not the best of many, but the only.) virgo unicæ pulchritudinis. scelus unicum. unica luxuria. ingenium unicum. unica fides. all imply that which stands alone, and has nothing simile aut secundum.

Unice then is *applied to an action done in such a manner as that it stands alone.* Hoc eximie nos et unice delectabat. negare ei quem unice diligebam, durum admodum mihi videbatur. avus tuus amavit unice patriam. quos ego ambos unice diligo.

Singulatim. (from singulus.) *Singulus* implies *each one* (of a number expressed or understood) *taken by itself, one at a time.* Honestius eum agrum vos universi (all together, in the body corporate) quam singuli possideretis. (each by himself, if it be divided among you.) milvius cœpit vesci singulas. (one by one.) qui singulis pinxerunt coloribus. (one colour for a whole picture.) Centuriones quibus. singulæ naves erant attributæ. (one to each.) Ille legiones singulas posuit, Brundusii, Tarenti, Siponti. (one at each place.) describebat censores binos in singulas civitates. (two to each.) Res omnes singulorum annorum (of each by itself) mandabat literis. Quod effi-

citur in cœlo singulis diebus et noctibus. Crescit in dies singulos hostium numerus. Vix autem singulis ætatibus. (at each period.) singuli oratores tolerabiles (one for that period) inventi sunt.

Singulatim then is one by one. Quæ singulatim et diu collecta sunt, uno tempore universa perdere (altogether). Singulatim unicuique respondere (each by himself).

Sigillatim et singillatim has the same meaning and derivation. Sigillatim potius quam generatim atque universa loquar. legionem collaudat, centuriones sigillatim appellat. partes sigillatim exsequar. sigillatim unicuique denunciabat. singillatim unamquamque rem attingere.

Singulariter. (from singularis.)

Singularis implies the possession of the quality of being singulus, as unicus implies the possession of the property of being unus. Both draw the attention to the quality of unitas and singularitas, when the mere stating of the fact that the thing in question is unum or singulum would be insufficient.

Ubi ex litore aliquos singulares egredientes conspexerant, impeditos adoriebantur. Here the attention is drawn from the mere fact of their being singuli, to that *quality* which fitted them for being attacked.

Sed expresses an objection introductive of a correction. This correction is in the shape of a

concession, an *assumption*, or a *change*, &c. as the case may require. In the first case it may be rendered *but, I allow*, &c.; in the second, *but, I must insist*; in the third, *but, rather*, &c. &c. As to *position*, sometimes the *sed* immediately follows the thing objected to and corrected, sometimes the thing objected to and corrected is recapitulated after the *sed*.

Pausanias magnus homo, *sed* varius in omni genere vitæ. Hi non sunt permolesti, *sed* tamen insident et urgent. Non odio adductus alicujus, *sed* spe, non corrigendæ, *sed* sanandæ civitatis. *Sed*, non de me, ut dixi, *sed* de sapiente quæritur. *Sed*, sive est ars sive non, non est quidem ea negligenda. *Sed*, tametsi antea scripsi, tamen hoc tempore &c. Non fuerant nuptiæ futuræ: *sed* ea gratiâ simulavi, vos ut pertentarem.

O præclarum Imperatorem! nec jam cum M. Aquilio, *sed* vero cum Paulis, Scipionibus conferendum. *Sed enim* hoc non solum ingeni *sed etiam* naturæ. *Sed, enimvero* cum detestabilis altera res et proxima parricidio. Non modo hujus non sunt *sed ne* Romuli *quidem* aut Numæ Pompilii *sed* Tarquinii superbissimi regis. Apponam urnam ego hanc in media via; *sed autem* quid, si hanc abstulerit quispiam!

Often *sed*, as in English, is used to break off and interrupt: even here it corrects an error.

Sed de perceptione hactenus. sed quis est hic senex. Sed id omittamus.

The difficulty in the use of sed is to fix with nicety and precision on the exact word or words of which it is corrective, (its antecedent, if I may be allowed the expression.) And even when these extend to two or three words, *to which* of them more especially the correction of sed is appended. The reader will do well to examine the following passages in the first book of the *De Officiis*, and notice the antecedents to sed.

i. 7. Neque solum in &c. sed etiam in &c.
 i. 11. Non modo rudes &c. sed etiam docti &c.
 ii. 4. Disces tu quidem a principe &c. sed tamen nostra legens &c. iii. 5. Vis major est in illis &c. sed hoc quoque colendum &c. iv. 7. Sed cum statuissem. (This is only a breaking off.) v. 4. Hæc quidem quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum &c. sed sunt nonnullæ disciplinæ &c.
 vi. 13. Non ut interpretes sed ut solemus judicio nostro &c. x. 3. Nec enim solum utrum &c. sed etiam, duobus &c. itemque &c. x. 7. Primum est de honesto sed dupliciter. xi. 6. Commune animantium omnium &c. sed inter hominem et belluam &c. xii. 7. Nec sibi soli sed conjugi, liberis &c. xiv. 17. Sed omne quod &c. (I believe this breaks off from the enthusiasm of Plato, and returns, as he ought, to the science.) xx. 5. Sed

justitiæ primum munus. (This also breaks off from the nominal to the real definition of justice.)

xxi. 1. Privata nulla naturâ sed aut veteri &c.

xxii. 1. Violabit jus humanæ societatis. Sed quoniam &c. in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi.

xxiii. Sed injustitiæ &c. (To break off from such poor derivations, and to return to my main subject.)

xxvi. 1. Nec rei familiaris amplificatio vituperanda : sed fugienda injuria est. xxvii. 1. Cavendum est ne quid peccatur &c. Sed in omni

injustitia permultum interest utrum &c. xxx. 3. Humani nihil a se alienum putat, sed tamen aliter de illis ac de nobis judicamus. See also xxx. 10.

xxxiii. 3. xxxv. 7. xxxvi. 8. xxxviii. 4. xli. 8. xlii. 2. xlii. 9. xlii. 2. xlvii. 3, 5, 6. xlix. 9.

l. 2. &c.

At, ast. (ἀτάκ.)

Sed expresses an objection occurring in the course of writing or thinking, to which the necessary correction is (by concession, assumption, &c.) immediately appended ; but *at* and *ast* expresses properly *the objection of one interrupting the speaker or writer*, or, if it comes from himself, it expresses *a sudden thought objected by him to what he has just said or written*. It has therefore the force of a *colloquial interruption*, a change, if not of speakers, of the character and object of the speaker, not found in *sed*.

It often interrupts an assertion or denial with

a question, observation, &c. which destroys its force. *It interrupts a question* with an observation, which shews the question to be ill timed, unnecessary, &c. It even *interrupts an argument* with an assertion or denial, which is so to be explained away as to add strength to the argument. In order to express it in English, when its being an interruption is not so marked as to be evident in construing, some such expression as, *yet I object, yet I say, yet I repeat*, might be resorted to. And the oratorical force thus given to the passages in question, taken in conjunction with the clear meaning of at in passages of evident interruption, will establish its force.

Una mater oppugnat. at quæ mater? | Cæsar nunquam, nisi honorificentissime, Pompeium appellat. At in ejus personam multa fecit asperius. Armorum ista et victoriæ sunt facta, non Cæsaris. | Quid porro quærendum est? factum ne sit? at constat. A quo? at patet. | Bene Pericles cum casu formosus puer præteriret, dixissetque Sophocles, o puerum pulchrum, Pericle! At enim prætorem, Sophocle, decet non solum &c. | Non est in parietibus respublica—at in aris et focus. | Quid est &c. At ego non nego &c. At videte hominis intolerabilem audaciam. | At Sulla, at Marius, at Cinna recte, immo jure fortasse, arma contra patriam tulerunt. Sed quid eorum victoria crudelius? | At in perturbata re-

publica vivimus. Quis negat? Sed hæc vide-
rint, qui nulla sibi subsidia paraverunt. | At somnia
multa falsa. Immo obscura fortasse nobis. | Ob-
secravit ut aliquam si non propinquitatis, ut æta-
tis suæ; si non hominis at humanitatis rationem
haberet, si non bonam at aliquam rationem afferre.
At per deos immortales quid est.

Let us add a few instances of particles used with
at. Its use with *immo* has already been shewn.

Nihil est opere aut manu factum quod ali-
quando non conficiat et consumat vetustas. *At*
vero hæc tua justitia et lenitas animi florescet
quotidie magis. | Sed quanquam Stoici negant
nec virtutes nec vitia crescere: *attamen* utrumque
eorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari pu-
tant. *At jam* posthac temperabo. Leno sum
at *ita*, ut &c. Audi quod dicam. *At enim* tædet
jam audire eadem millies.

The reader may examine the use of *at* in the
following passages in the first book of Cic. de
Offic. xxxv. 5. Ut majores nostri Tusculanos
acceperunt &c. at Carthaginem &c. funditus sus-
tulerunt. xxxv. 11. Si non optimam, at ali-
quam rempublicam &c. lix. 7. Vicinum citius
adjuveris in fructibus &c. at si lis in judicio sit
&c. lxxv. 8. Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit
in quo &c. at ille vere &c. xcvi. 7. Si Æacus
&c. diceret &c. at Atreo dicente &c. cxiv. 12. Si
non decore at quam minimum indecore &c.

Atqui interrupts, but with a strong objection, or something which is intended to produce the attention generally yielded to a strong objection against what has gone before, and with more of the force of a contradiction in argument than belongs to at.

Modum statuarum haberi nullum placet? Atqui habeatur necesse est. | O rem inquis difficilem et inexplicabilem! Atqui explicanda est. | Credo illam jam adfuturum, ut illam a me eripiat. Atqui, si illam digito attigerit uno, oculi illico effodientur. | Si virtutes pares sunt inter se paria esse etiam vitia necesse est. Atqui, pares esse virtutes, facillime perspicui potest. | An cætera mundus habebit omnia, hoc unum, quod plurimi est, non habebit? Atqui certe nihil omnium rerum melius est mundo. De Offic. I. cxii. 6.

Autem states another view of the same case, puts it in a different point of view. (Not corrective of the former (as sed), because they are not ad idem, each is correct in its way; not interruptive (as at), because the train of thought &c. is continuous; not contradictive (as atqui), because there is no opposition of argument, as we say, on the other hand); but as contrasting the cases in hand.

Cic. de Offic. lib. I. ii. 3. Disces quamdiu voles: tamdiu autem velle debebis &c. As to my

permission on the one hand, *disces* &c. as to your duty on the other hand, *debebis velle* &c. ii. 7. *de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio : orationem autem Latinam profecto legendis nostris efficies plenior.* On the one hand, as to my free permission &c. on the other hand, as to my opinion and advice. iii. 11. *Nos autem quantum in utroque proferimus aliorum sit iudicium.* On the one hand, I take on myself to say that I see none of the Greeks &c. on the other hand, about my &c. others must decide. vii. 11. *Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea* &c. On the one hand, as to *philosophical* morality ; on the other, as to *didactic* morality. So viii. 4, 6. ix. 11.

Again xi. 10. *Homo autem, quod rationis* &c. On the one hand, as to the irrational animal ; on the other hand, as to the rational animal. xvii. 1. *Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus.* On the one hand, as to the distinct duties of the first officium ; on the other hand, as to the distinct duties of the three remaining officia. So xvii. 7.

The difficulty in the use of *autem* is to fix on the exact point of contrast ; *in this we must constantly refer to the modus concipiendi of the writer.* The reader will do well to examine the points of contrast in the following passages : xviii. 7, 11. xix. 14, 18. xxi. 3. xxii. 5. xxiii. 1, 11. xxiv. 5, 7. xxv. 1. xxvi. 2, 10. xxviii. 1, 15.

xxxiii. 20. xxxv. 3. xxxvi. 6. xl. 1, 9, 11. xli. 2, 3, 6, 9. xliii. 1, 5. xlv. 5, 10. &c. &c. &c. There is no limit to contrasts.

Etiam. We will now consider the conjunctive particles.

Et and que agree in connecting things, qualities, actions, &c.; but et is used to connect things, qualities, actions, &c. which are distinct from each other; que is used to connect things, qualities, and actions, either actually the same, or parts of the same.

We will take the examples of que and et, as they occur in the Offices.

i. 1. Annum jam audientem Cratippum idque &c. Here the actions connected together by que are the same. Indeed id is only a restatement of the *same* action for the purpose of afterwordings stating its location, as the Americans would say.

i. 2. Abundare oportet præceptis institutisque philosophiæ, the things connected by que form together that with which he overflows. He does not overflow with each separately, but they are constituent parts of *that* with which he overflows.

i. 3. Propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis. I will leave out of the question every instance of this use of the et, namely, where the first et *precedes* its adjunct, as does each et

which follows: because the individualizing force of *et* is granted in such instances. These shall be spoken of presently. But certainly an argument of probability respecting the *general* force of *et* may be derived from its being selected, and not *que* for this individualizing service.

But to return to *que* and *et*. ii. 1. *Quamobrem disces tu quidem a principe hujus ætatis philosophorum et disces quamdiu voles.* Here the object of Cicero is to make two distinct promises, that he shall learn of *the best master*, and that he shall learn *as long a time* as he pleases. It would be to destroy half the force of the passage, if we were to render it, you shall learn of the best master as long as you please, making the time a mere circumstance of the action. It is clear that he considers each a separate and distinct advantage allowed to his son.

ii. 10. *Quod est oratoris proprium apte, distincte ornateque dicere.* Here the things coupled by *que* are the several parts, together making up the *proprium* of an orator. They are not so many distinct *propria*, but together form *the proprium*.

iii. 5. *Sed hoc quoque colendum est æquabile et temperatum orationis genus.* Though the two qualities connected by *et* are properties of the same genus, they are mentioned as distinct properties. In *modo concipiendi* they are regarded

not as parts together making up a whole quality, but as qualities as separate and distinct as are these metaphors of external and internal properties. Each is predicated *by itself* of this genus orationis.

iii. 6. Et id quidem nemini video Græcorum adhuc contigisse. This observation respecting the deficiency of each of the Greek writers is clearly intended to be distinct from any observation he had made before. Had it been a distinct *head of argument*, he would have used *atque* instead of *et*. But though it does not amount to an argument, it is a distinct observation, yet naturally connected with what preceded it. *Et* therefore is used.

iii. 7. Ut idem utroque in genere laboraret, sequereturque et illud &c. The actions connected by *que* are *mutato nomine* the same, and might so be stated, e. g. "should labour in following, &c."

iv. 3. Platonem gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere. The excellencies coupled by *et* are not considered as parts of *that* excellence in speaking to which Plato might have attained, but as *distinct* excellencies, to *each* of which he might have attained. Quality and quantity are distinct properties.

iv. 4. Demosthenem si illa quæ a Platone dicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset. These

are two distinct hypotheses, *each* of which must be granted before the consequence would follow. It would be to lower the force of the passage, if we translated it "remembering the matter were willing to," &c. On the contrary, the *fact* of remembering and the *desire* of uttering rhetorically is each distinctly required.

iv. 5. Ornate splendideque facere potuisse. These are not stated as distinct properties, each of which would be in Demosthenes a separate quality, but as component parts, together forming the excellence by which he would be distinguished. This is the *modus concipiendi* in the writer. The nature of the case bears him out, for ornament and splendour though separable in the mind are really inseparable. So the apte, distincte, et ornate, may be as really united as they were in *modo concipiendi*. The same speech may be *apte* in reference to circumstances and persons, *distincte* in reference to arrangement of matter, and *ornate* in reference to beauty of imagery, &c.

iv. 5. Eodemque modo. This speaks for itself, as not stating any thing distinct. If it be answered, that he was before speaking of Plato and Demosthenes, and is now speaking of Aristotle and Isocrates, I answer, this difference is *nihil ad rem*, the *modus* in each case is the same, as he himself intimates by *eodem*.

iv. 6. De Aristotele et Isocrate. I need not urge the distinct individuality of these philosophers.

iv. 7. Sed cum statuissem aliquid hoc tempore ad te scribere et multa posthac. Two distinct intentions are intended to be enunciated; something at this time, and many things at a future time. We should lower the force of the passage if we attempted to convey it as a single intention, "had intended having written something now to write more presently." It is clear that he wishes each to be as distinct in modo concipiendi as they must be in re.

iv. 11. Cum multa sint in philosophia accurate copioseque. a philosophis disputata. These two properties are considered as component parts, making up the quality of the disputata. The disputata are not supposed to possess each of these properties distinctly, but together, namely, that at the same time they contain plenty of matter carefully examined.

iv. 12. Quæ de officiis tradita ab illis et præcepta sunt. These are not contemplated as conjoint qualities of the same thing, but as separate and distinct actions; the act of handing from one to another through a succession of philosophers, and the act of giving to their scholars as rules to be received and observed. It is not intended to speak of the quæ as those same things which

being handed down are also taught, but it draws the attention to each of these modes of action as distinct in itself.

iv. 16. *Vacare officio potest in eoque.* The *eo* is the same as *officio*. I must caution my reader to remember, that in this and similar cases he must not consider the *que* as relating to the whole clause, (i. e. in *eo colendo sita est omnis honestas &c.*) but as the ear of the Roman would evidently receive it. Thus, *eoque* would at once be referred by him to *officio*; *id* in the quotation i. 1. would be referred to *audientem Cratippum*, without waiting for the differences, *Athenis* in the one case, and *colendo &c.* in the other. This observation gets rid of a great mass of difficulty.

v. 1. *Et in negligendo turpitudine.* Here the *et* connects in *eo colendo sita est honestas* with in *eo negligendo &c.* I need not prove that these are different actions. Neither need I trouble myself with the quotation which immediately follows.

v. 5. *Propositis bonorum et malorum finibus.* Should any one observe that though *malum* and *bonum* are evidently distinct, it is in truth a repetition of the word *finibus* that is connected by *et*, I will beg him to remember, that the *fines* bonorum and the *fines* malorum are as distinct as Cinna the poet and Cinna the conspirator. Cicero at least considers them so, and the question is his *modus concipiendi*, not the *res ipsa*.

iv. 16. Qui summum bonum, sic instituit ut nihil habere cum virtute conjunctum idque sit. Here, as I have before remarked, the couple is with that of which it is only a repetition, i. e. summum bonum, and does not speak of two distinct things. See iv. 16. *Qui instituit ut nihil habere cum virtute conjunctum idque sit* to which *Hic* sensible *ipse* consentiat et, *conquidendum* naturæ bonitate vincatur. It may be said that these are identical propositions, and ought to be united with *que*. Unless I am deceived, Ciceró wishes to obtain for them a distinct attention for the sake of impression, and so marks the opposition of the words *consentiat* and *vincatur* naturæ bonitate, to the neglect of the identity of the propositions.

vi. 19. Sequemur igitur hoc eodem tempore et in hac questione. The enquiry and the time are considered as distinct objects of attention, and it would be to lower the sense of the passage if we rendered it, "in my present treating of this question." Indeed the *hoc tempore* would more properly be rendered on this occasion, meaning probably when he is writing to one who is studying under a Stoic philosopher, and who ought not at present to be hampered with academic disputations. This is a distinct reason from the one connected with it by *et*, namely, this enquiry which, as he presently shews, is intended to guide men in their conduct, not to make them dispute

about philosophical questions; for which former object, the sound morality of the *Stoins* is best suited.

vi. 14. E fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro hauriemus. He conjoins these, as in truth they are not much more separable than the "I do, opine, think, believe, and am of opinion of Sir Arthur Wardour."

vii. 8. Superioris generis huiusmodi exempla sunt: omniane officia perfecta sint: num quod &c. et quæ sunt generis ejusdem. Here he is stating different questions, neither, on the one hand, the same, nor, on the other, altogether making up the whole enquiry.

ix. 13. Fit ut distrahatur animus offeratque accipitem curam cogitandi. The actions connected by *que* are only mutato nomine the same.

I think I have produced a sufficient number of examples to develop the distinction between *et* and *que*. Let me exhort the reader to proceed with the enquiry till he has fully satisfied his mind that the distinction set up is not imaginary. It will save him little trouble to add farther references, because every page will supply him with a considerable number of examples. But let me caution him to confine his examination to passages with the scope of which he is fully and precisely acquainted. And let him bear in mind that it is the *modus concipiendi of the author*

which is to decide whether *que* or *et* be the appropriate conjunction, and that the reader's object should be to ascertain in what mode his thoughts were conceived. The *real* connection of the things united is indeed the first thing to be considered by a *writer*, whose aim should be to preserve in his writings the connections and distinctions which really exist between *things*; but it is this connection in the mind of his author which is the first thing to be considered by a *reader*, whose primary object ought to be to elicit the connections and distinctions which his author intended to express.

It remains to notice a second use of *et*, which the synonymists have been more successful in developing, namely,

When it is intended to indicate a priore that we are going to speak of two or more things, actions, qualities, &c. of which each is to be considered as of distinct importance, Et is used as many times as there are things spoken of, and is placed before each.

i. 3. Propter summam et *doctoris* auctoritatem et *urbis*. ii. 6. Quoniam utrique et *Socratici* et *Platonici* esse volumus. iii. 8. Sequereturque et *illud* forense dicendi et *hoc* quietum disputandi genus. iv. 9. Quod et *ætati tuæ* esset aptissimum et *auctoritati meæ*. xii. 2. Et ad *orationis* et ad *vitæ* societatem. xiv. 10. In omnibus et

opinionibus et factis. xvi. 3. Potest et *videre* et *explicare* rationem. xlii. 7. Nam et *qui* &c. et *qui* &c. lvi. 10. Quæ et *mutua* et *grata* dum sunt. lviii. 1. Occupati et *sunt* et *fuerunt.* lxx. 7. Si contenti sint et *suo* et *parvo.* lxxvi. 9. Africanus singularis et *vir* et *imperator.* Add also, iv. 1, 11. viii. 2. ix. 8. xji. 7. xvii. 3, 6. xviii. 8, 9, 12. xxxiii. 23. xlv. 3. xlv. 2. lii. 5. lxvii. 6, 8. lxviii. 3. lxix. 5, 7. lxx. 8. lxxii. 6, 8. lxxiii. 7. &c.

There is yet another use of et, namely, *when it is repeated after a parenthesis merely to recal its having been used before.* But this is in no ways peculiar to the use of et.

Cic. Off. lxxii. 7. Et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda sit rerum humanarum et ea, quam sæpe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque securitas.

Atque. One force of this conjunction is evident, namely, to indicate the entering on a division of a subject or a head of an argument connected with one or more divisions or heads already stated.

Cic. Off. v. 1. Atque hæc quidem quæstio communis est omnium philosophorum. Having already assigned three reasons for writing De Officiis, he is now proceeding to state a fourth reason.

viii. 1. Atque etiam alia est divisio officii.

Having made one division of moral duties, he is now going to propose a different one, but not *ad idem*.

Atque ea sic definiunt. He has made a *division* of moral duty, he now adds the *definition* of each.

xxii. 3. Atque ut placet Stoicis. Having before stated the opinion of the Academics.

xxiv. 1. Atque illæ quidem injuriæ. He is mentioning three divisions (according to the cause) of positive injuries, that which he is now going to state is the second division.

xxxiv. 1. Atque in republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli. Here he enters upon another division of justice.

xxxix. 1. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserint. Here is another division of justice, namely, of individuals having promised something to the public enemy. See also lxxxix. 12. xci. 1. The first of these is connected with lxxxviii. 5. It may be noticed, that the duty recommended, and not the circumstances, constitute the distinction requiring *atque*.

xcvi. 5. He is here entering upon the definition of the division he has already given in xcvi. 1.

cxii. 1. Having stated the general nature of man, he is here entering on the individual nature of each.

cxviii. 9. Having spoken of the duties, he now mentions the amusements of youth.

cli. 7. cliv. 2. cliv. 9. clv. 4. clvii. 1. These are different examples urged argumenti gratia. See also Clc. Off. lib. II. iii. 1. iv. 7. xv. 5. xxix. 10. xl. 1. li. 1. liv. 11. lx. 1. lxxix. 9. lxxix. 1. cxliv. 10. 2. Lastly to speak of the

Sometimes *atque* is placed at the conclusion of the division of a subject, or of the head of an argument, as a sort of recapitulation of the whole division before entering on another.

clxiv. 5. Atque hæc quidem hætenus. clvii. 4. Atque hæc in moribus. De benevolentia autem, &c. Also lib. II. xxiii. 13. xlv. 13.

Atque is, secondly, very commonly used in the middle of a sentence, to connect things, incidents, qualities, objects, actions, &c. &c. which are divisions of some subject, which is capable of being divided into two important heads, (as cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, two equals, two opposites, &c. &c.)

xix. 9. In res obscuras atque difficiles. The division is into things obscuras ad intelligendum difficiles ad faciendum, as the definition of the adjectives leads us to infer.

xxx. 3. Percipimus atque sentimus. Percipimus indicates the *act* of receiving through the sense, whilst sentimus expresses the *feeling* which

is the instantaneous effect of that act, yet separable from it by the mind.

lxxxv. 8. Inducunt seditionem atque discordiam. Seditionem indicates the *actual* division of parties, answering to the *στάσις* of the Greeks. Discordiam expresses the *moral* division of feelings. (cor.)

lxxxviii. 3. Dignius placabilitate atque clementia. Placabilitate expresses the readiness to be pleased after having received offence; clementia the easiness and mildness of temper, which is averse from receiving or giving offence.

xciv. 6. Nam et ratione uti atque oratione prudenter. This division would appear very natural to a Roman or a Greek of the higher orders, to whom oratory was almost as indispensable as reason. The definitions of the substantives deserve the reader's attention. On that of oratio I remember to have heard a striking comment in a relation of the unpremeditated eloquence which the peril of being attacked by an armed and furious populace drew from the relator. The definition of ratio is very striking. Res signifies a *thing*, as distinguished from a mere *idea*, or a mere *word*. Reor indicates the bringing of things present to the mind by memory, thinking, (which word is perhaps also from *thing*.) From its participle *ratus* comes ratio, which having at first meant the *act*, came next to signify the *power* of thinking.

xcix. 1. Dictorum omnium atque factorum.

ciii. 7. Studia graviora atque majora. Graviora weighty as to their importance to man's happiness, &c. majora vaster, as to the character they held in the opinions of men. Metaphors derived from *weight* are popular with the Romans as well as with the Greeks, and are often overlooked by lexicographers. *Stat*, for example, is explained *costs*, but it properly indicates the *balance being stationary* when the weights are equal; and the weight of the thing to be sold being thus shewn, its price (the ratio of weight and value being before settled) is fixed also. The Greek *αγω*, which also is applied to any thing weighing a certain weight, properly indicates its *drawing* one end of the balance as much as the standard weight does the other.

cxix. 1. Præclara eruditione atque doctrina. Here the getting rid of the roughness of ignorance and the acquisition of knowledge are the two parts of the division.

cxxxi. 8. Ne in perturbationes atque exanitiones incidamus. The whirlwind and the syncope of the active powers of the mind are here the membra dividantia.

clvi. 2. Neque solum vivi atque præsentēs. Whilst they were *themselves* alive, and were in the sight and hearing of those they taught.

clvii. 10. Consociatio hominum atque com-

munitas. The principle of union arising from a desire of society, and the principle of union arising from a desire of participating in mutual advantages are intended.

It must not be forgotten, that the temptation to use *atque* is considerable. *Atque* is of great value in rounding a sentence, and in connecting *enquipedation* words. It also gives an air of logical distinction and arrangement. It cannot therefore be doubted that we must sometimes be content to receive the *membra dividenda*, as rather dictated by rhetoric than logic. It consequently becomes the more necessary that we give to each *membrum dividens* its full force. If we amalgamate them, (which is easy to be done when they are two species of the same genus,) by using a generic word for each, the rhetorical force of the passage will be destroyed. The passages, xiii. 1. *veri inquisitio atque investigatio*, xv. 5. *colligata atque implicata*, will leave only a mortuum caput of rhetoric in the place of any logical distinction worthy of being specified, if we are not careful to give to each word its full force.

cii. 4. *Sintque tranquilli atque ab omni perturbatione animi careant.* Remove the image of a calm sea on the one hand, and of an eddying whirlwind on the other, or retaining these images, make them belong to that division of mind, which can have nothing in common

with the rushing wind, and inequality of ideas will be the result. This indeed may be avoided, by taming down the meaning of every word to some generic term. But then, unfortunately, the division intended to be expressed will, in losing its discordance, be robbed of all its force.

Add to the above examples of the use of *atque* to connect words and clauses indicating the *membra dividenda* of a *twofold* division, also Cic. Off. lib. I. xxxii. 11. xxxiii. 14. xxxiii. 21. lv. 60 lxxii. 1. lxxiv. 1. xcii. 16. cii. 1. cviii. 7. cxviii. 3. Also lib. II. i. 2. vi. 9. x. 1. xi. 8. xiv. 15. xvi. 8. xxi. 2. xlv. 7. lxiii. 16. lxx. 2. lxxv. 6. lxxxiii. 7. lxxxvi. 7. Also lib. III. iii. 2. xiv. 6. xxx. 4. xxxi. 3. lxxx. 6. lxxxi. 11. xciv. 3.

The third use of atque is easily understood by the aid of a little transposition, namely, to connect two things which are compared together.

cxlix. 8. Quæ beneficia æque magna non sunt habenda atque ea quæ, &c. becomes easy of explanation when transposed, quæ beneficia atque ea quæ, &c. non sunt æque magna. iste aliter atque ut edixerat decrevit. In aliis versor atque tu. Simulacrum Jovis contra atque ante fuerat, ad orientem conversum. Stellæ errantes versantur contrario motu atque cælum. paulo secus a me atque ab illo perfecta sunt. sententia gravius atque ipse sensisset excepta. hi coluntur æque at-

que illi. hoc unum et idem videtur esse, atque id &c. simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos. cum æquam partem tibi sumpseris atque populo Romano dederis. diutius abfuturus ac vellem.

Ac is used in the same senses as atque. *Ac* precedes words beginning with consonants, and *atque* precedes vowels. But the latter rule is not adhered to when the second word of a Duad (see page 215.) happens to begin with a consonant. This sacrifice of a rule to the second member of a Duad adds weight to what is observed in page 217.

The following are examples of *ac* in each of the three senses of *atque*.

First, xxxvi. 1. *Ac* belli quidem æquitas sanctissime fetiali, &c. li. 1. *Ac* latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, &c. cxiv. 15. *Ac* duabus iis personis quas supra dixi, &c. cxxiv. 1. *Ac* ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, &c. cxxxiv. 5. *Ac* videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur, ac primum de illis tribus, &c. ac de iis quidam, &c. xix. 17. *Ac* de primo quidem officii fonte diximus. ac de inferenda quidem injuria satis dictum est. *Ac* de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est. &c.

Second, xiv. 21. In animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore. xli. 11. De beneficentia ac liberalitate dicatur. communitas ac societas vitæ. civ. 9. Alter est, si tempore fiet ac re-

misso animo. cvi. 9. Delicate ac molliter vivere. cxlix. 3. Bene de republica sentientes ac bene meritos. clvi. 3. Sic homines ac multo etiam magis, &c.

Third, Aliter de illis ac de nobis judicamus. fit ut æque quisque altero delectatur ac se ipso. qui illis æque ac tu ipse, &c. contra ac liceret. non secus ac, &c.

Etiam increases something that has been premised, either, first, *by adding to it something besides, something distinct from it*, (and then the *etiam* may be rendered *besides*, and we must be careful to distinguish the *two* things it refers to, which I would call the *præpositum* and the *suppositum*,) or, secondly, *by extending the præpositum; whether it be an action, quality, &c. farther, and that præter spem*, (and then the *etiam* may be rendered *even*, and we must be careful to ascertain what is *the action*, quality, &c. so extended, and *how far* it is extended.

It cannot be necessary to demonstrate the rationale of *addition* of something else, and *extension* of a greater quantity being signified by the same word.

iii. 2. Ut non solum orationes meas sed hos etiam de philosophia libros. Not my *orations* alone, (as is your custom,) but besides them my *books on philosophy*. Here clearly *one* thing is added to *another*.

So in i. 6. *Neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci.* Not in *philosophy* alone, but besides in oratorical exercises.

viii. 1. *Atque etiam alia divisio divisio est officii.* The use of the *atque* to indicate another division of his matter has been already explained. *Etiā* implies, that, besides the division already given, (vii. 6.) *besides* this, and in no way superseding it, (for they are not *ad idem*, but relate the *one* to the manner of treating, the *other* to the matter treated,) there is a different division, not opposed, but not *ad idem*, of duty. And according to this force of *etiam*, Cicero actually does unite a practical manner of teaching with the matter of the commonia officia.

x. 3. *Nec enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit deliberari solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius.* But besides this deliberation, there is another deliberation; I say *besides* this, not superseding it, (for they are not *ad idem*,) there is *another* deliberation, namely, &c.

In all these cases it is clear, that *proposito additur suppositum.*

So also xii. 9. *Quæ cura exsuscitat etiam animos et majores ad rem gerendam facit.* Besides impelling men to *social feelings*, which he had before mentioned, besides this, it rouses *the spirits*, and produces another class of duties.

xxv. 6. *Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus.* He has assigned two reasons for that desire of riches which produces injustice. He is here adding another besides; he says, *Delectant magnifici apparatus.* Add to these instances where to one thing another is added by the use of *etiam*. To make them more clear, we add the prepositum in each case. (xix. 1. see xxviii. 2.) xxxiii. 2. see xxviii. 2. (lv. 9. see lv. 3.) lxxviii. 8. see lxxviii. 3. (lxix. 2. see beginning of same line.) lxxxi. 1. see beginning of same line. (lxxxiii. 1. see lxxxiii. 8.)

Let us now examine some instances in which *etiam* is used to extend an action, quality, &c. farther, and that *præter spem*, where *etiam* must be rendered *even*.

xiv. 7. *Multo etiam magis paucitudo, constantiam ordinem in consiliis conservandum, pluit factisque.* Here *etiam* with *multo magis* indicates an extension of the *conservandum*, to be preserved even much more, much as it should be attended to in things quæ aspectu sentiuntur.

Again, xiv. 13. *Quod etiam si nobilitatum non sit.* Going even to the extent of supposing its not being distinguished by praise.

So xiv. 14. *Etiam si a nullo laudetur.* Going even to the extent of supposing its not being praised by any one. I conceive the force of the *etiam* to extend the supposition implied by *si*.

Again, lxxi. 9. Non modo non laudi sed etiam vitio dandum puto. Here the negation of praise is extended even into censure. The non modo indicates the *measure*, (as has been explained in the word modo,) and the sed etiam is an *extension* of *that* measure; just as the non solum indicates *number*: and the sed etiam *adds another* and a different one to that number.

The following passages are examples that etiam following modo *extends the same*, and does not *add another*: lxxi. 9. lxxiii. 9. cii. 10. civ. 4.

The following passages are examples that etiam following solum *adds another distinct thing* to something gone before: lxxxvi. 2. xciv. 4. xcix. 4.

But to return to etiam, even. xxxiii. 6. Quo in genere etiam in republica multa peccantur. Even in our own state, which one would expect to be free from such abuse of justice.

xxxviii. 13. Atque etiam si quid singuli hosti promiserint. Even put the case that, even supposing that, individuals &c. Here the duty of keeping faith with the public enemy is extended even to individuals.

liii. 4. Interius etiam, est &c. This is a still farther extension, to use an Irishism, of the property which he has described by propior.

Add also, lv. 9. lxxviii. 9. lxxix. 8. lxxix. 9. lxxxix. 12. xci. 1. xcii. 18. xcvi. 2. cvi. 7.

We may add, that it will often require considerable acuteness and reflection to distinguish whether an example of *etiam* should rank under the first or second meaning of *etiam*. But we shall still be convinced that there is no *sors tertia*.

Quoque expresses *that connection between two things, that the one which is last mentioned (and which is immediately followed by quoque) participates in that which is predicated of the former, as if it were itself a part and portion of that former, (quo-que, and with which.)* The force of which combination is well rendered in English by *herewith* and *therewith*. The definition of *que* (as uniting parts of the same) agrees with this definition.

xxxvi. 7. Cum autem Pompilio videretur unam dimittere legionem; Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat dimisit. He *therewith* disbanded; the disbanding of the son of Cato went with the disbanding of the legion.

lx. 4. Officii conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem, ut facimus ipsi: sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Requires *therewith* practice; or, in other words, that rules of art and habitual practice are joint requisites; they must not be separated; the latter must be taken as well as the former, but at the same time, *quoque, therewith*.

cxxv. 9. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omni-

bus factis et dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cernitur, idque positum est in tribus rebus formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto: difficilibus ad eloquendum; sed satis erit intelligi: his quoque de rebus pauca dicantur. His main subject is the decorum, but in speaking of it he will be speaking (*therewith*) de formositate, ordine, ornatu, &c. i. e. he cannot treat of the former without at the same time considering these three qualities.

cxxxii. 12. Contentionis præcepta rhetorum sunt; nulla sermonis: quamquam haud scio an possint hæc quoque esse. 'I know not whether these latter might not be united with the former, whether they might not be treated *together*, as he adds quæ verborum sententiarumque præcepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.

clix. 5. Ea Possidonius collegit permulta, sed ita tetra quædam, ita obscœna ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. There is so much of filth in the things themselves, that I could not so express them but that obscenity of language would go along with it. I cannot separate the *appearance* of obscenity in dictis from the *reality* in factis.

The remaining example which occurs in the first book of the Offices, iii. 5. Vis enim dicendi major est in illis; sed hoc quoque colendum est æquabile et temperatum orationis genus. He means to say, that *together* with the former, (not

each separate,) the latter kind of style is to be cultivated. See also de Officiis, lib. II. lvi. 21. lix. 3. Here the liberty of boasting being admitted in the case of Philippus, *therewith* and along with it, Cicero's liberty of boasting is admitted. lxvi. 4. He observes that the highest civil honours being assigned to skill in the civil law, are *therewith* assigned to skill in oratory, as being finitima facultas. lxvii. 1. He has been just lamenting the neglect of civil law, and is reminded to join *therewith* his grief for the extinction of oratory, as being twin-sister sciences.

Cum, tum, are properly adverbs of time. They respond to one another as question and answer, cum, when? tum, then. We may remark by the way, that the use of the letter c and q to indicate a question, affords a very useful analogy in the Latin language, as combined with other words: thus, is, he, answers to quis, who? ea, she, to quæ, who? (quea;) id, quid? tantus, quantus? talis, qualis? tam, quam? tot, quot? and here, tum, quum? or cum? Perhaps the qu was selected, as being the first syllable in quæro. Perhaps the word quæro itself came from the name of the town Cures. Amongst worse guesses we may admit, that if Mettus Curtius by bringing his people to Rome gave the name Quirites to the conjoined nations, the ancient Romans, from considering their new fellow-citizens somewhat of meddlers

and busy bodies, or as Cicero expresses it, in *aliena republica curiosi*, might derive from their city this less honourable verb and adjective. Or these may have been first applied to that most celebrated of the Curites, Numa Pompilius, who, neglecting the sound rule to which Horace afterwards gave expression, *Tu ne quæsieris scire nefas*, instituted *aram Jovi Elicio, ad elicienda ex mentibus divinis prodigia*. He thus, perhaps, originated or confirmed the race of the *Curiosi* at Rome. The inquirer into such questions, though he may not think we have succeeded in hunting the inquisitive letter into its aboriginal corner, will perhaps consider this pyramid to balance on its apex as steadily as some other learned speculations of the same kind, exhibiting rather a *curiosa felicitas* in accidental coincidences, than any sufficient proof on which a sound judgment will rely.

Whatever be the origin of the use of the letters *qu* for interrogation, their immediate application in the instances adduced is probably derived from the *qui* which enters into *quot*, representing the *ος* in the *οσσοι* of the Greeks. In like manner the *t* in *tot*, *tantus*, *talis*, &c. comes from the use of that letter in *τοσσοι* and in *το*, which itself answers to *ο*. These appear too numerous coincidences to be explained, independently of imitation.

The *qu* or *cu* in *quum* or *cum* originally ex-

pressed interrogation, and the answer (as in analogical instances) was made by the similar sound tum. (Cum, i. e. quando? Tum, i. e. illo tempore.)

Now if we suppose the time of the action inquired by *cum* to be contemporaneous with an action connected with the respondent *tum*, as, for example, *cum* (i. e. quo tempore) recte navigari poterit? *tum* (i. e. eo tempore) quando valebis, then the *process from cum interrogative to cum indicative of time* is easy; thus, *tum* recte navigari poterit *cum* (i. e. quo tempore) valebis, or *cum* (i. e. quo tempore) valebis *tum* recte navigari poterit. And this process from an interrogative word, whose respondent of course follows it, to the same word become *indicative*, and *relating* to the same respondent become its antecedent, is analogical to what takes places with the interrogatives *quantus*, *qualis*, *quot*, &c. Thus *qualis* interrogative, and therefore antecedent to *talis*, may become *talis qualis*, where *qualis* is relative, and therefore consequent to *talis*.

From this second use of *cum* indicative and relating to *tum*, easily follows the use of *cum* by itself, (*tum* being for brevity suppressed,) thus, *cum* (i. e. eo tempore quo) valebis recte navigari poterit. Here *cum* neither expresses a question, to which *tum* responds, nor does it indicate the time of an action, to which *tum* indicates a con-

temporary action : but it is used alone to indicate the contemporaneousness of two actions, or, in other words, *their connection as to time.*

And from this force of *cum*, to indicate by itself connection as to time between two actions, follows, lastly, the use of *cum* as a *preposition expressing connection generally* : thus, *navigatio cum valetudine constat.* Here union in time is expressed by the preposition *cum*, and it is made to govern an ablative, because had its meaning been rendered by declinable words, these would have been put in the ablative, *e. g. eo tempore quo &c.* Thus we see the process of abbreviation in language.

To return now to the use of *cum* and *tum*, so far as they are synonymous with *et*, as indicating *the union of two things in respect of time.*

Cicero de Officiis, lib. I. xvii. 3. *ut et societas hominum conjunctioque servetur et animi excellentia magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis, eluceat.* We will proceed to translate this sentence, introducing a few remarks by way of parenthesis.

“ That both (he indicates *a priori* by this use of *et* that he is going to speak of two or more things) the distinct moral objects (*et* always marks the *distinct individuality* of the things united by it) of social union among men, (the *que* shews

that *societas* and *conjunctio* are only *parts of a whole*,) and that greatness of spirit, which is ever foremost in the fight, (here also *que* shews that *excellentia* and *magnitudo* are only parts of the same quality, and must be taken together. Of these, I suppose *excellentia* to indicate the riding out of the ranks to combat with an enemy, a metaphor which is very natural to the Romans, who, in distinction from the Greeks, depended much as to success in their attacks on the individual bravery of their soldiers,) may shine forth *at what time* in actively increasing and getting together helps for him and his, *at that time*, in looking down upon these very things, (as at once necessary to the wants, and beneath the ambition of a great mind.)

Cum and *tum*, therefore, when used together, indicate contemporaneousness, properly *cum* at *what time* the one thing is done, *tum* at *that time* the other is also done; less precisely, *as well* one thing *as* the other. Secondly, sometimes the *cum* is suppressed, and then *tum* indicates the connection of that to which it is attached with that to which the suppressed *cum* may be supposed to be attached.

Of the first use of *cum* and *tum* we may add the following instance. xxiv. 8. *Expetuntur autem divitiæ cum ad usus vitæ necessarios, tum ad perfruendas voluptates.* It is the contempora-

neousness of the objects in the mind of the seeker of wealth, (*as well* one object *as* another,) not the contemporaneousness of the different employments of the wealth itself, that is intended.

xxxv. 12. Et cum iis quos vi deviceris consulendum est; tum ii qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit recipiendi sunt. The contemporaneousness of attention to these duties is intended. The latter words indicate the possibility of *actually* having to decide on each case at the same moment, namely, to give licence to the rights of war over an enemy taken with arms in his hands, and to protect the unresisting citizen from a licentious soldiery.

Impius hæc tam culta novalia miles habebit
Barbarus has segetes? en quo discordia cives
Produxit miseros! en queis consevimus agros.

May we not be allowed to interrupt the labours of scholarship with a hope, that the time is not very distant, when neither the violence, nor the cupidity of individuals, or orders of men, shall be able to spread the horrors of war and the miseries which follow in its train? Surely it is not visionary to expect such an effect from the increase of sound knowledge. Why may it not become as difficult to persuade men to peril their lives and properties in one mistaken cause, as in an-

other? At the distance of not many centuries it was no difficult task for an enthusiast to oppose two continents in deadly strife by the arguments of superstition. But the time has passed, when the preaching of a crusade would be called the *vox Dei* even by Italians and papists. The passions of men *are* the same, but the false arguments by which these are put in motion lose their force as increase of knowledge discovers their futility. But paulo minora canamus.

lxix. 3. Ut tranquillitas et securitas adsit, quæ affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. The union of these effects, that with the former comes also the latter, is intended.

cxxxiv. 4. Sed cum in reliquis rebus, tum in sermone communi vicissitudo non iniquam putet, i. e. that when he actually admits the former, he may at the same time allow the latter principle, or rather the latter application of the same principle.

Of the *second* use of tum the following instances may suffice.

x. 7. Primum igitur est de honesto ; sed dupliciter : tum pari ratione de utili ; post de comparatione eorum disserendum. Is not tum intended to indicate, what he afterwards enlarges upon, that the consideration of the honestum and utile must not be separated ?

xiv. 6. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam

magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem, in consiliis factisque conservandum putat; cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminative faciat; tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis, ne quid libidinose aut faciat, aut cogitet. It is hardly necessary to say that Cicero intends these objects to be contemporaneously attended to. He does not encourage the idea of attending to one duty, and *only one*, at a time.

xix. 10. A qua tamen saepe fit intermissio, multique dantur ad studia reditus: tum agitatio mentis, quæ nunquam acquiescit, potest nos in studiis cogitationis, etiam sine opera nostra, continere. He is speaking of what may all be contemporaneous causes of intellectual progress.

We will now add a few instances of *tum frequently repeated*, where, as in our use of *at the same time*, the antecedent of *what* time is suppressed. xxii. 8. Mutatione officiorum, dando, accipiundo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus, &c. lxvi. 8. Laborum et periculorum tum vitæ, tum multarum aliarum rerum, &c. lxix. 1. Vacandum autem est omni animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate animi. lxxi. 11. Sed videntur labores et molestias tum offensionum, tum repulsarum, quasi quandam ignominiam timere. clviii. 9. Tum docere, tum discere vellet, tum audire, tum dicere. The common explana-

tion of tum, at one time, tum, at another time, may suit the impossibility of the æts dicere and audire &c., being contemporaneous, but does not suit (what ought never to be lost sight of) the analogy of the word. Is this use of tum explicable on the hypothesis, that by not fixing the antecedent time, it is intended not to fix the relative time; and so to intimate the possibility that *any one* of the actions &c. specified may be contemporaneous with this unknown time, though they could not be contemporaneous with one another, if the antecedent time were fixed. Reader, to suppose the possibility of an impossible thing, et vivos rodere unguis, is metaphysics. Happily the remainder of our work is comparatively easy.

Dicendi. *Dicere*, meaning to do that which is distinctive *μεγάλαν ἀρθρότητα*, namely, to speak articulately, (in opposition to the various sounds of beasts, which are not able, and are never said, dicere, to speak articulately,) is the generic term applied to every sort of speaking proper to man.

Cicero says of Demosthenes, cum ita balbus esset ut ejus ipsius artis, cui studeret, primam litteram non posset dicere, (to articulate, to pronounce, distinctly,) &c. He mentions also what Demosthenes effected: continenda anima in dicendo, (husbanding his breath in the act of speaking.) Thus he attained to the summa vis dicendi, and to all those excellencies, which together con-

stitute the *ars dicendi*. He concludes, *dicendo homines ut dicant, efficere*.

We will add a few applications of the various uses of *dico*.

Dicam quod sentio, grandis, et ut ita dicam, pudica. valeat, quid enim dicam? dices, quid postea? Hinc illa formula Consulis Senatorem ad sententiam dicendam excitantis. dicere Dictatorem. dicere jus. dicere leges. dicere diem. dicere causas. dicere concionem. est oratoris proprium apte, distincte et ornate dicere.

Loqui, meaning to talk or speak with friends, is applied to a more familiar sort of speaking than is meant by dicere.

Nec idem loqui esse, quod dicere: disputandi ratio et loquendi dialecticorum sit; oratorum autem dicendi et ornandi. multum loqui cum aliquo. de ea re nos inter nos locuti sumus. Phœbus volentem prœlia me (Horatium) loqui, (to speak in a familiar way of heroic deeds.) Scipio mihi sane bene et loqui videtur et dicere. Latine loqui putabatur litteratiusque quam ceteri. videat (in sermone communi) quibus de rebus loquatur. vulgo loquuntur. res ipsa loquitur.

Fari. The force of *fari* I cannot infer from its use, but it is applied, *first*, to *children*, *fari ne-scios pueros*; and Varro derives *infantes* from it. *Secondly*, to *oracular responses*, *neque me Apollo fatis fandis dementem invitam ciet*. Hence *fandū*

and infandum, fas and nefas, perhaps also fatum, or that which is pronounced by the oracle, and must be accomplished. *Lastly, it is used frequently by the poets, and rarely by prose writers.*

Pronuntiare, to deliver in a loud voice, as does a herald his message (pro) in the public assembly.

Eam rem ipsam, quam legissem, verbis aliis quam maxime possem lectis, pronuntiarem. con-
jectis in os calculis, summa voce versus multos
uno spiritu pronuntiare consuescebat.

*Eloqui. To speak out or express, has a greater force than loqui. in rebus invenire in ver-
bis eloqui dicitur. oratoris est composite, ornatæ,
copiose eloqui. præclare eloqui cogitata mentis.*

Exprimere means, properly, the *taking a moulded figure from the mould in which it has been pressed.* Exprimere et effingere formam alicujus. Thence exprimere formam reipublicæ. exprimere oratione mores alicujus. exprimere dicendo sensa possumus.

Effingere. Properly to mould as a potter does the clay, or as a statuary moulds a figure of soft materials. Hence effigies de humo fingere pocula. fingere e cera. Hence fingere cogitatione. mores oratoris effingit oratio.

Exercitatione means, in its first sense, the *drilling of soldiers in their exercises.* Exercere milites in aliqua re. exercere arma. exercere

pharetram et arcum. (hence exercitus, an army)
 exercitatio ludusque campestris. exercitatio usus-
 que dicendi. exercitationes ingenii.

Experientia means a series of the acts of trying, and their product experience, (ex πειρα.)
 Cæsar crebris expeditionibus, patientia periculo-
 rum, bellicque experientia durabat exercitum. again
 gratias fortunæ constantiæque meæ, quæ ad hanc
 experientiam excitavit.

Tractatio. The original meaning of tractatio must have been *the act of drawing*. Trahere lanam, from which and from *tracta*, (the thread on the spindle,) I believe, the metaphorical applications of the word are to be derived; the word itself having originally come from the *αργακτος* of the Greek. This seems far more agreeable both to the *sound* and *sense* of the word, than the etymology of *traveho* or *transveho*. But the substantive and verb, secondly, obtained *the meaning of handling*, probably from the great importance of the management of the hand in spinning; which *obscured* the more simple sense of *drawing out* the thread. (Hence the rubbers of the bathis came to be called *tractatores*.) Qui in armorum tractatione versantur. quæ observata sunt in usu et tractatione dicendi. By the way we may notice in the former of these sentences, the metaphor *versari* (from *verto*) which is the *πολίσμαι* of the Greek, (thence *πολοι*, and our word *pole*.) From

versari we have unfortunately derived the word *versed*. I say unfortunately, not merely because it *fits* the word *versor* so well, that it supplies us with a reason for neglecting the true meaning of the Latin word, but because it supplies us with an English word to which no precise *meaning* is attached, however its *application* may be ascertained.

Our language is rich in the spoils of time in more senses than one, for we have too often borrowed the metaphors of the Roman without remembering the original senses to which they should always be referred, and consequently, having no *standard* to which we may refer them, are too often forced to build them up in argument by a Lesbian rule, whence arises, on one hand, the *verbi controversia quæ jam diu torquet Græculos homines, contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis*, and on the other hand, an idle contempt for philological pursuits founded on the same principle as the hypothesis of those who would reject logic and rhetoric altogether, because logicians “puzzle our poor brains,” and rhetoricians run away with our feelings. A rejection of *the remedy* because it may be used as a *poison*.

Studium. Here again the English language supplies the word *study*, which a student may very naturally refer to his books, and a money-maker to his thoughts about gain, but we must look for its force to the quotations, *studio fallente*

laborem. incensi sunt studio, and not merely to the applicare se ad studium musicum, or the sunt pueritiae certa studia (*certain studies*), studia alicujus ordinare (*to order the studies*), occupare mentem studio (*to occupy the mind in study*), &c. &c. *Consuetudo* and *usus* have already been examined.

Feci. *Facere* indicates the *ποιησις* by which something is *ποιησις* made, or the *κατα* by which something is *κατα* done, i. e. it means *to make* or *to cause a thing to be*, which *prior* to the *ποιησις* did not exist; or it means *to do*, *that is*, *to perform, some action*. In the one case we look to the *ποιων*, the *ποιησις*, and the *ποιησις*; in the other, we look to the *καταρτων*, the *κατα*, and the *κατα*. Whether *facio* indicates a *ποιησις* or a *κατα*, it equally indicates the *means*, and therefore the homonymy is founded on analogy of thought.

First, *facio*, *to make*, or *cause to be*. What mode of being is intended must be learnt from the context.

Facere poema. ludos vero non facere quid facias; maximam pecuniam facere. exercitum non ita sum levatus, ut mihi deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur. ager pestilens mortem facit; deus nobis hæc otia facit. senatum bene firmitatem, firmitatem vestra auctoritate fecistis. iratum adversarii iudicium facere. illum securum probitas; forma timere facit. controversiam aut res facit aut verba. in eo libro ubi se exeuntem e senatu et cum

Pansa colloquentem facit. fac, quæso, qui ego sum, esse te. quis me autem, (fac velle) sinet. paulatim Plebem facio meam.

Secondly, *facio*, to do or perform some act. What act must be discovered from the context.

Ego plus quam feci facere non possum. facere non possum quin ad te mittam. non potuisti ullo modo facere, ut mihi illam epistolam non mitteres. amice facere. facere per malitiam. auctoritas sapientissimorum hominum nobiscum facit. facere contra aliquem. nihilo magis ab adversariis, quam a nobis facit. (as if coming from that side.) ea quantum potui feci, ut essent nota nostris. si id non facis, ego quod me in te sit facere dignum invenero. vereor ne quid illum iratus faxit pater. invitus quidem feci, ut L. Flaminium e Senatu ejicerem.

It must not be overlooked, that the verb *facere* used with an accusative, when they together imply an action which might be expressed by a verb cognate to the substantive, has always a peculiar force. Indeed the *facio* is here used in the first sense, i. e. to *make*, and indicates that the action &c. is not merely *done*, but is *made*, implying more plan, perseverance, &c. Thus to war and to make war, are not to be confounded as expressions of equal force.

Fecit dolorem alicui. injuriam fecit. sacra facere pro civibus. sacrificium cum læna facere.

Acusius tardius iter faciebat. aditum sibi facere ad aliquem. divitiæ animos faciunt. facere audaciam hosti. multa bona alicui. castra. cognomen alicui. conjurationem. consilium alicui. constitutum cum aliquo. contentionem cum aliquo. copiam pugmandi. cursu quingenta stadia. &c. &c. &c. See Facciolati, who has laboriously collected a number of examples. In the true spirit of lexicography, he has divided the sense of facio into forty distinct meanings, which he might with equal propriety have increased to forty thousand.

Ago has already been defined. As compared with facio it means to *conduct a business*, and implies a *course* of action. *Agere* looks to the executing the consecutiveness of some work, facio to the effect produced.

Potest aliquid facere et non agere, ut poeta facit fabulam, non agit, contra actor agit et non facit. vita omnis in actione consistit. (in the continuous carrying on of something.) apud illos homines qui tunc agebant. ætatem agere in litteris. id agunt, ut viri boni videantur. (I would not translate id agunt *do that*, which would be to confound ago and facio, and to make ago indicate an effect or end; but conduct *it* (Anglice, *themselves*) in such a manner that, &c.) De quo et præsens tecum egi et scripsi ad te accurate antea. (the whole of this shews a course of conduct, not a

mere action.) aguntur injuriæ sociorum. agitur vis legum, &c.

It would be a great mistaking of the force of aguntur to confound it with faciuntur, which indicates the effect, whilst aguntur indicates the process, of any action, i. e. the conducting it through its different stages ad exitum. So agere censuram, rempublicam, bellum. Agitur præclare and facitur præclare are as different as cause and effect. So age hoc, attend to the *conduct* of the matter in hand, and hoc face, *effect* this, bring this about. See the former article on ago.

Efficere answers very much to our vulgarism, to *work a thing out*, implying *the full accomplishment of a difficult matter*. Heri effeci epistolam ad Cæsarem. The propriety of the expression, as used by so accomplished a rhetorician as Cicero, in reference to his having concocted a letter to one he at once so feared, admired, and hated, is striking. qui nihil possunt dignum hominum auribus efficere atque edere. efficere et concludere rationem. tu mandata effice quæ recepisti. Usus progrediens familiaritatem efficit. feci igitur atque effeci ut neuter quemquam omnium pluris quam me faceret. efficere negotium, exercitum, &c.

Conficere answers to our vulgarism, to *make a thing up*, implying that the *effect is produced by the union (cum) of different parts*. What is the

whole, and what the parts, must be discovered from the context.

Conficere pacem, nuptias, bibliothecam, permagnam pecuniam, famam bene loquendi, amictus. nisi caves aliquid gnato conficies malum. annum munus confecero, centum confecit annos. cum id perspicuum sit, quod conficiatur ex ratiocinatione. dentes acuti morsu dividunt escas, intimi autem conficiunt. alvus cibos non conficit. The propriety of applying the word to the process of mastication and digestion needs no explanation. An examination of these two quotations, in which the utter contrition and corruption (Latin) of the material, in one state, is necessary to its existence in another state, will lead us to the analogy and sense of conficere, vulgo *to break up*, or *do up*: ignes conficiunt silvas. patrimonium conficere. conficere rem suam et publicam, confici dolore, desiderio, curis, &c. conficere aliquem triginta vulneribus. the triginta vulnera are, as it were, the parts.

Perficere answering to our vulgarism, *to do a thing thoroughly*, and approaches the meaning of the vulgarism, going through with a thing.

Perficere jussa alicujus. perforce hoc precibus eloquentia perfecit ut &c. sic in disputando ille perficit, qui pervincit et convincit. Analogous to the words of that "deevils buckie Callum Beg," who proposes to kill "all and sundry?"

Will the reader pardon me for stepping, not very far, out of my way to warn him against a sentence with which he is probably well acquainted?

Ne quis putet semper et ubique scriptores ita etymologiæ esse tenaces ut nunquam inde recedant. Nam sæpenumero composita *non aliam* habent vim quam simplicia et fere *numeri gratia* adhibentur composita. Hoogeveen, p. 470. That such an observation should be made by so great a scholar as Hermann is surprising. When the ipse (nay, the ipsissimus) caper deerraverat, in laying down a principle, what wonder if his followers spem gregis, ah! scilicet in nuda reliquit! It is not presumptuous to deny the correctness of the observation, applied even to the Romans, who it must be acknowledged had an affection for lengthened words. As applied to the delicately organized and fastidious Greek, as well might we expect them to have allowed Phidias to have added a supernumerary nose to his Venus. We can argue nothing from the *licentia poetica* or the *licentia dialectica*, (as exhibited in the additions, omissions, and changes, of letters): because in this case the ear was pleased, without the judgment being offended. Whether a word were *πολις* or *πολις* made no change as to *sense*, but not so whether it were *αναβαλλω* or *καταβαλλω*. A difference of meaning *must* either be approved by the

judgment, or be disapproved; there is no sors tertia of indifference. Let us not resort to such admissions in order to satisfy our ignorance, but rather acknowledge that most uncomfortable feeling, than lull our consciousness of doubt respecting the unde derivatur with such opiates.

Idem. It is to be regretted that much dangerous nonsense has been written for want of a little logical precision. The division of identity into moral and physical frees an important question from the difficulties with which sceptics have surrounded it. The wretch, conscious of that moral identity which consists in an unbroken remembrance of crime, ought not to be comforted by being told that the matter of his bones and muscles will not be the same in a future state. Can He who created our consciousness of moral identity recreate *it*? If He can, it is of little moment what identity there be of *body*, whilst there is an unbroken series of *thought*. Of as little moment to the question respecting a future state is the mode of connection of the soul and the body in this world. Be it what it may now, it relapses by death into the hands of its Maker, and may receive when *recreated* (as it might have received at the hour of creation) other laws of being from those to which it is at present made subject. Here we are under one dispensation of God's providence, and so long as it endures may

use the evidence of the past in our judgment of the future; but we are not warranted by sound reasoning to suppose This Power fettered from giving us another dispensation hereafter by the moral or physical laws which He has given us here.

In a word, if we admit thoughts and feelings to constitute our evidence of existence, and an uninterrupted remembrance of past thoughts and feelings to form our consciousness of moral identity, I doubt whether any man is *able* to believe in the impiety, which pretends to deny the power of Him who created these agencies to associate them hereafter with whatever organization He shall think fit. The future feeling of moral identity, in the mens conscia recti or in the *αναμνησις πολλων και δυσχερων*, cannot be rendered improbable by the arguments of the materialist. The fallacy of confounding *two ideas*, because they are expressed by the *same word*, is one of the most common and most injurious, and against which the philologist must ever be on his guard.

Talis. What has been said of *cum* and *tum* will apply to *qualis* and *talis*. *Talis* in its original meaning *responds to the question implied in qualis respecting the properties of any thing*. Secondly, *qualis* and *talis*, being applied to different things, indicate that of whatever property (*qualis*) one of them is, the other is of a quality responding

to it, (*talis*). And, lastly, *talis* is used by itself, to indicate that one thing &c. responds in properties to another thing not expressed.

An non intelligit, quid homines, quales nunc mortuorum summi beati arguis? nam de ipsam rei naturam quibus et quanta sit quaerimus. et cum tales quales ante habitarent, habeantur. ut quales simus, tales esse videmur, cum esset talis, qualem te esse video. nos equidem hoc divinari, sed aliquid tale pultavi fore. omnem legem esse laudabilem, quibusdam talibus argumentis docent. quibus rebus tantis talibusque gestis, quid fuit causa, &c. haud equidem tali me dignor honore. tales nos tunc esse putamus; ut jure laudemur; talem te esse oportet, qui, ab impiorum civium societate sejungas.

Similis. We have seen that *talis* refers the measure of certain properties in one to the measure of the same properties in another instance; (implied by *qualis*,) without settling what that measure is. (*qualis*, of what kind; being the origin of *qualis*, of whatsoever kind.) *Talis* indicates identity of properties (identity of species, not of individuals) in things themselves distinct. But *similis* indicates only the resemblance of properties in things, and does not amount to the force of *talis* or of *idem*.

Par est avaritia, similis improbitas, eadem impudentia, gemina audacia. Pro dii immortales!

similiorem mulierem magisque eandem non reor. filius patri similis. Phidias sui similem speciem inclusit in clypeo Minervæ. similis ac si. tanquam si. &c. similis and similes, (or simile,) with simia, &c. were probably derived from simul, and indicate a certain union in place and time of two things, (the original and the copy.)

Par, (from *vaga*, by the side of,) indicates similarity of ratios (*mutatis mutandis*) implying four terms. Omnia fuisse in Themistocle paria et Coriolano. præclaras duas artes constitulere atque inter se pares et ejusdem socias dignitatis. ut sint pares in amore et æquales. cujus paucos pares hæc civitas tulit. ut verba verbis, quasi dimensa et paria, respondent. quem tu parem cum liberis fecisti. pares dum non sint vestræ fortitudinis. pari spatio transmissus atque ex Gallia est in Britannia. si parem sapientiam hic habet ac formam, mihi ignoscet. dubitans quid me facere par sit. turpius quum par est. par pari referto. ex omnibus sæculis vix tria aut quatuor nominantur paria amicorum.

Æqualis; i. e. which has the property of being that, which, as a fact, is indicated by *æquus*, on a level. *Æquus* et planus locus. æquum arcibus aggerem attollere. in æquos et pares fastidiosus, in inferiores crudelis. partem pedis esse æqualem alteri parti. mons æquali dorso continuus.

Orbius meus fere æqualis (contemporary) æqualis sibi. virtutes inter se æquales, et pares. ontio par et æqualis rebus ipais.

Censeo means *to estimate value, as Censor*. Censores populi soboles, familias, pecuniasque censento. quinto quoque anno Sicilia tota censetur. qui minore summa censebantur. *Metaphorically*, si censenda atque æstimanda res sit utrum &c. Aristides, quo totius Græciæ justitia censetur. quid mihi animi in navigando censes fore? cives civibus parcere æquum censebant. veremini, censeo, ne in hoc scelere. For proof of that peculiar force of *deliberate well weighed judgment*, which the metaphorical meaning of *censeo* bears, we must look to the fact, that it was not only applied to that most important estimate of the *Censor*, but also of the *Senator*, (estimating the arguments for and against any question in the senate,) de ea re ita censeo: ut consules dent operam. bellum Samnitibus et patres censuerunt et populus jussit. Senatus censuit ita &c.

Judico (jus-dico) means *properly to decide officially, as judex, (but jus dicere is to give sentence.)* Ne quis in sua causa judicet, vel jus sibi dicat. nunquam auderet judicare, deberi viro dotem, quam mulier nullo auctore dixisset. tum Sempronius, perduellionis se judicare Cn. Fulvio, dixit. quantæ pecuniæ judicati essent. *Meta-*

phorically, non enim numero hæc judicantur sed pondere. plura homines judicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate &c. Concio judicare solet quid intersit inter. sic statuo et judico.

Arbitror means properly to decide as arbiter between parties. Simus et Crito vicini nostri hic ambigunt de finibus: me cepere arbitrum. dare arbitrum aliquibus de re aliqua. esse arbitrum inter aliquos. si in eo, quod utroque præsentē arbitratus est, arbitrio paritum non esset. *Metaphorically*, atque hæc, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti, quam ratione docti, putaverunt et probaverunt.

Existimo, to draw an estimate of, (ex. æs. τιμή, pretium.) In censu habendo potestas omnis æstimationis habendæ censori permittitur. *Metaphorice*, sed hoc statuitur, æstimationem litium non esse judicium. orationes ex quibus existimari de ingeniis oratorum potest. quanta sim lætitia affectus, facilius est tibi existimare, quam mihi scribere. eum qui hoc fecit, avarum possumus existimare. male existimare de aliquo. artes de quibus aliquid existimare possum.

Puto, first, to prune; secondly, (if we are to rely on Aulus Gellius,) *to free an opinion from errors by thinking.* Non signat profecto aliud, quam id agere nos in re dubia obscuraque, ut decisīs amputatisque falsis opinionibus, quod vi-

deatur esse verum, et integrum et incorruptum retineamus. Persequitor vitem attondens *frigitque* putando. *Metaphorice*, *viticus* rationem (account) cum domino crebro putet. cum eam mecum rationem puto. dum hæc puto, præterii imprudens *viticam*. rem ipsam putasti. noli putare me quicquam maluisse quam &c. cum unum te pluria, quam omnes illos putaram. contemnere aliquem et pro nihilo putare.

Sentio, cogito, and opinor, have already been defined.

Utriusque. *Uterque* means *each one of two*, or *two taken severally*. Cum *uterque* utriusque esset exercitus in conspectu. magna vis est in fortuna in utramque partem vel secundas ad res vel adversas. Quoniam utrique et Socratici et Platonici esse volumus. binos habebam scyphos: jubeo promi utrosque.

Ambo means *both*, or *two taken collectively*. Qui utramvis recte norit, ambas noverit. jurando obstringam ambo, uter ædilis fuerit.

Quisque is to *all*, what *uterque* is to *two*, meaning *each one of all, all severally taken*.

Nec enim tu is es, quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cujusque is est quisque. quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat. ut quaecumque rem a quoque cognovit, de ea multo dicat ornatius. ego, quid ad te tuorum quisque necessariorum scribat,

nescio. optimum quidque rarissimum est. doctissimus quisque. quinto quoque anno Sicilia tota censetur, cetera multitudo sorte decimus quisque ad supplicium lecti. pro se quisque, ut in quoque erat auctoritatis plurimum, ad populum loquebatur, ut quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis.

Omnis means properly *all, as made up of several parts, keeping these clearly in view*, (as *quisque* means each of the several parts composing the whole.) In *profundenda voce omne corpus intenditur*, (the whole, through all its parts.) *sanguinem suum omnem profunderet*, (all, including every drop.) *M. Crassus, quem semel ait in omni vita risisse Lucilius*, (all, including every part.)

Secondly, *omnis* means *every one throughout a whole number*. But herein it differs from *quisque*, that *quisque* insists on the separate individuality of each, whereas *omnis* draws the attention to the individual no more than is necessary to specify that none are left out. The use of *each* and *every* in English has much the same force. Each man drew his arrow to the head. Every man drew, &c. *Protea atque omnem* (not each, by herself, but every one of that body.) *Nereida quæ-rere jussi. militat omnis amans. spargentemque faces, et in omni turre furentem.*

Thus the plural *omnes* means *every one making up the whole number, the individuality of each*

being no farther dwelt upon than is necessary to specify that all are taken.

Omnes omnium ordinum hominum, (every man of every rank.) profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos, (will do every thing.) caste lex jubet adire ad deos, animo videlicet, in quo sunt omnia, (every thing is comprised.) vix ulla res est per omnia alteri similis, (through every instance.) plebs omnia quam bellum malebant.

Totus. We have seen that quisque *individualizes each*, and omnis *specifies every*; now *totus* indicates *the whole, inclusive of every and each*, or, as *Callum Bey* renders it, *all and sundry, altogether*, (i. e. all-together.)

Tota mente (in the whole of) atque omnibus (in every one of) artubus contremisco. Naves totæ factæ (made entirely of) ex robore. toti Galliæ bellum inferre. Nescio quid meditans nugarum totus in illis. Plancius totus noster est. totus in lætitiâ effusus.

Universus means *all in one*, or, as we express it, *all at once*. Forgetting the individuality of each part (quisque), the number of parts making up the whole (omnis), and the whole, including all its parts (totus); *universus* brings it to our mind as *one*. *universum mundum complecti*, to embrace the world as one, to perceive that simplicity of design from which it may be inferred to be the work of One Great Being. *omne cœlum*,

(*every* part making up the heaven, i. e. its many stars and planets,) totamque (*que*, and at the *same* time) cum universo mari terram mente complectere. (the *whole* of the earth, including every part, continent, nation, city, &c. and *the* vast sea, as *one* body of water.) confusa atque universa defensio. casum universæ pugnae non necessarium censebat. in casum universæ dimicationis non veniebant. universos esse pares aiebat, dispersos testabatur perituros. ex iis rebus universis eloquentia constat, quibus in singulis elaborare permagnum est. ut eadem sit utilitas unius cujusque et universorum.

Orationis. Our forensic word *pleading* approaches the original meaning, but not the extent of this word. In Rome oratory was addressed much more to the feelings of the hearers, than in our own country, and the judges were still more often moved by the persuasive arts of the rhetorician, than entangled by the subtleties of the logician, into the awarding of unjust sentences. Consequently oratio (from orare) would be more descriptive of the Roman style of eloquence, than of our own. Quintilian says, Quos nisi et delectatione allicimus et viribus trahimus et nonnunquam turbamus affectibus, ipsa quæ justæ ac veræ sunt tenere non possumus. This derivation of oratio from orare, to pray, is in harmony with the use of orator in Livy and Plautus: ad senatum pacis oratores missi. Venientes pacem petunt.

oratores Romanam mittunt. Equidem hercle orator sum, sed procedit parum.

Sermo. The difference between *sermo* and *oratio* is thus expressed by Quintilian: *Nam mihi aliam quandam videtur habere naturam sermo vulgaris, aliam viri eloquentis oratio: cui si res indicare modo satis esset, nihil ultra verborum proprietatem elaboraret: sed cum debent delectare, movere, in plurimas animum audientis species impellere, utetur iis quoque adiutoriis, quæ ab eadem sunt nobis concessa natura. Nam et lacertos exercitatione constringere et augere vires et colorem trahere naturale est.* Cicero says, *Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex: altera contentionis altera sermonis, &c. sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarum versetur: persequatur etiam convivia.* Here *oratio* is used as a generic term, answering more to the original sense of *orare*, as given by Varro, when he derives it from the genitive of *os*.

Locutio. The meaning of *locutio* will be evident from what has been said of *loqui*. *Sermo est oratio remissa et finitima quotidianæ locutioni.*

Facultas is derived from the old word *facul*, which means the same as *facilis*, which is evidently an abbreviation of *facibilis*, (do-able,) from *facio*. *Facultas* then signifies the *power of doing a thing with ease*. *Facultates sunt, aut quibus*

facilius fit, aut sine quibus aliquid confici non potest. Hortensius, cui summam copiam facultatemque dicendi natura largita est. Videndum est ne major sit benignitas, quam facultas. Miloni nulla facultas manendi, excedendi non causa solum, sed etiam necessitas fuit. quare illa nobis ulio tempore, si facultas erit, explicabuntur: libenter arripere facultatem laedendi. doleo tantam Stoiq; omnibus irridendi sui facultatem dare: ut habeat efficiendi facultatem. vim eloquentiae non rei naturam sed sua facultate metiri. facultas disserendi a Rhetoricis exercitationibus accepta. Ut facultas talit:

Facilitas is rather a moral quality, a habit of *easiness, or of taking things easily*. Pro tua facilitate et humanitate. facilitas in audiendo, lenitas in discernendo. si illius comitatem et facilitatem tuæ gravitati severitatiq; aspseris.

Potentia (potens) indicates *power over men, arising from the possession of means of acting on them*. Potentia est ad sua conservanda, et alterius obtinenda, idonearum rerum facultas. potentia in vi posita est et armis. opum nimiarum potentie non ferendæ. conciones illæ, quibus quotidie meam potentiam invidiose criminabatur. contra factionem et potentiam paucorum. consequi potentiam. esse in potentia. ampla et potens civitas, opibus valens.

Potestas. We have seen that potentia means power over men, arising from the possession of

those great means by which a man is constituted potens; potestas signifies *power or ability of doing any thing, by which a man potest facere aliquid*.

Si fuisse aliis quoque causa faciendi videbitur, aut potestas aliis defuisse demonstranda est, aut facultas: potestas, si aut necesse, aut non affuisse, aut conficere aliquid non potuisse dicetur: facultas, si ratio, adjutores, adjumenta et cetera, quæ ad rem pertinebant, defuisse alicui demonstrabuntur. potestas augendæ dignitatis, in patria moriendi, respirandi, deligendi, tribuendorum beneficiorum, cooptandorum sacerdotum, agendi quotidie, belli gerendi, faciendi, testamenti, imperandi &c. potestas rei frumentariæ, omnium rerum, vitæ necisque. potestas sit civi nostro mutandæ civitatis. fuit enim populi potestas. deorum potestas, mea potestas est. nihil est in nostra potestate. hujusce rei omnis potestas in vobis sita est. est in Pompeii potestate. privare aliquem potestate faciendi aliquid. permittere alicui potestatem faciendi aliquid. habere in potestate, suscipere in potestatem, venire in potestatem, per potestatem auferre aliquid alicui. &c. &c.

Vis means properly *physical force and the exercise of it, (violence, &c.) and is, secondly, applied to moral force.*

Vis fluminis, tempestatis, frigoris, veneni. celeritas et vis equorum.

Vis ingenii, conscientiæ, mentis, animi, in fortuna, &c.

Vis dicendi, rogandi, poenitendi, &c.

Vis oratoris, orationis, foederis, &c.

Vis ad deterrendum, cohortandum, ad secundas res, ad dicendum. rei vim et naturam explicare. . poene infinita vis ac materia artium. . quæ vis insit in his paucis verbis, si attendes, intelliges. vim vi repellere.

Copia signifies not the power in the agent, but rather *the supply of materials, opportunity, instruments, in a word, of means for doing any thing.*

Rerum copia verborum copiam gignit. Hortensius, cui summam copiam facultatemque dicendi natura elargita est. copia librorum, rei familiaris, consilii, pugnae, dicendi, videndi, armatorum, omnium ad vitam necessariorum &c.

Having examined the force of every word in the first sentence of Cicero's Offices, with the synonyms of each, according to principles, which have been developed in the preceding Essay, it remains that the reader commit these so firmly to memory, that he may be able to mention them *readily* and define them *accurately*. He will then judge whether this is not one of the surest means of obtaining that scholarship which both

understands and uses words with readiness and precision; whether it may not also be desirable to devote some portion of time every day to this object; lastly, whether it is not to be regretted that so little attention is given to it at a more early stage of scholarship.

Next in importance to the necessity of avoiding long and complicated grammars, (as being sure to produce in the greater number of instances the evils so clearly expressed by Quintilian^a;) is the necessity of obtaining a *copia verborum* accurately understood and rapidly remembered. Until this is effected, it is impossible that the student should be able to write Latin in the manner expected from him at our Universities, and (which is even of greater importance) it is impossible that he should acquire that knowledge of language, which will enable him to devote the whole time of his University education to higher objects than questions relating to the government, position, and meaning of words.

Were judicious selections from Cæsar, Terence,

^a Quam, ut per omnes numeros penitus cognoscere ad summam scientiæ necessarium est, ita incipientibus brevius et simplicius tradi magis convenit. Aut enim difficultate institutionis tam numerosæ atque perplexæ deterreri solent: aut eo tempore, quo præcipue alenda ingenia atque indulgentia quadam enutrienda sunt, asperiorum tractatu rerum atteruntur: aut si hæc sola didicerint satis se instructos arbitrantur.

and Cicero, illustrated by full and accurate vocabularies, set forth by the authority of our public schools, and were the *possession* of a certain number of Latin and Greek words, (precisely defined and readily remembered,) with a *power of using* these words according to the rules of a grammar, (brief and clear, like those of the Charter House,) made the *test* of the several periods of early scholarship, there seems little doubt that the Universities, freed from all necessity of teaching grammatical and verbal elements, (*vix hac ætate digna*,) would be able to devote *more* of the attention of their students to the literature of Greece and Rome, (including many of the moral sciences,) and would perhaps find time for *more* of mathematical and physical science than it is possible for them to teach whilst *so much* of the grammatical and verbal parts of the Greek and Latin languages remain (at least in *so many* instances) to be learned *after* the student has entered their walls.

There seems indeed little doubt, that whether the object of education be the acquisition of an accurate scholarship, or whether it be the drawing forth the powers of the mind, the practice of defining words with precision can scarcely be valued too highly. On the one hand, a clear and definite conception of the meaning of each word in a sentence, and a delicate sense of the shades of difference between it and its synonyms, is the

very best key to the grammar, the logic, and the rhetoric of the whole passage. To the first, as leading us to discover the rationale of rules, which the grammarian often treats as arbitrary : to the second, as habituating us to distinguish the predicables of thought from each other, and not to confound them in misty and indefinite ideas, and, besides this, guiding us by a precise knowledge of the particles of a language to that clear view of the *modus concipiendi* of an author, which is essential to our being able to see objects in the position in which he contemplated them : to the third, as exercising us in forming a just estimate of the force of every word on the feelings of the hearer or reader, and of its power of touching those chords of association by which passion is often more effectually roused than by any laboured appeal to the feelings. For in rhetoric, as in poetry, the electric flash of passion, or the softening influence of sentiment, is often conveyed in a single word.

Again it may be repeated, that a genuine philology is the very best gymnasium for the mind, the very best school for exercising its capabilities, whether of attack or of defence ; and, which is most important of all, for giving it that power, which, avoiding the excitement of contention, pursues its way in the peaceful confidence of its own strength, and enjoys the pleasures of intellect

neither as a means of vain display, nor of unsatisfying ambition, but, as the philosopher truly asserts, exceeding all others in purity and intensity.

Indeed it may be questioned whether this is not, at least in by far the greater number of instances, the true object of education. He who has been habituated to find *pleasure* in intellectual pursuits, has acquired sufficient *power* for all the average duties of life, and would in truth make a poor exchange, whether for his own comfort or the good of society, were he to gain more intellectual power in the place of a pure intellectual taste. The latter will tend to make him innocently and virtuously happy. He may not be roused to the acquisition of such force as belonged to a celebrated writer almost of our own times, who in early life was stimulated to burning the midnight oil by a jealousy of his neighbour's taper, and who in after life could speak of the countenance of the great as the only reward of intellectual labour; but neither is it the lot of many to need such force, whilst all require the means of happiness.

Once again I return to the point from which I may appear to have wandered. The habit of defining words with accuracy and precision is the first element both of intellectual taste and intellectual power. It can hardly be cultivated too early, or persevered in too long. To use the

words of one who has taught us that words are things, as another taught that knowledge is power,
 σπουδαστεον ὅπως ἀγαθὸς καλὸς, μεγάλην γὰρ εἰχουσι βίην
 πρὸς τὰ ἐπομένα.

Note. If the reader will refer to page 56 of the preceding Essay, he will observe that I have there spoken of the advantage of attempting to answer in *Latin* minute questions respecting the matter and style of whatever he has been reading. Of questions relating to *style* I shall give examples in the third part of this work. By questions relating to *matter* I mean such as the following, which the reader will answer, clause for clause, in the original Latin of the first sentence of Cicero's Offices. "What advantages does Cicero admit his son to be enjoying in his master and in the place in which he is studying? What result does he say may be expected from him? What does he state as the reasons for expecting this result? What is the force of these reasons severally? What example and conduct does he nevertheless hold out to him? What is the extent of the example and conduct held out? What degree of imitation does he expect from him? What is the object to be attained by this imitation?" Such questions will not only tend to impress the *matter*, but also the *words* and *collocation*, on the mind. Add only such questions as "what are the synonyms of this word?" Define each synonym from the others; and may we not say, omne tulit punctum?

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N. B. The reader will please to observe, that the references to Cicero's Offices in the body of the work are made to Ernesti's edition. The *first* figure indicates the minor divisions of Ernesti, the *second* figure specifies the number of the line, counting from the first line in each minor division.



